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Abstract 
 
    This thesis aims to examine the idea of nature in the works of Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge and William Wordsworth from the perspective of ecotheology. 
Its intention is not to identify their works with ecotheology, but it will be 
suggested how Coleridge’s search for the unity of the universe and 
Wordsworth’s yearning for dwelling relate to recent developments in 
ecotheological theory. Ecotheology can thus help us understand their ideas on 
nature. There is a historical and disciplinary gap between the works of the 
Romantic Period and ecotheology, and, in Romantic criticism, the idea of nature 
is often misunderstood as a mere projection of the mind. Moreover, Coleridge’s 
poetry has been the subject of an unjustified ideological criticism that has 
misrepresented its theological viewpoints, and Wordsworth has also been read 
in terms of a secular narrative about nature and consciousness. However, both 
Coleridge and Wordsworth to some extent perceive nature as an environmental 
landscape, and therefore nature can be understood as an independent reality as 
well as a creation of the mind. They develop ideas of God in their literary works 
in a way that needs to be understood not in a secular way, but in a religious 
sense. Just as ecotheology attempts to articulate the value of the non-human 
natural world, so Coleridge’s notion of unity and Wordsworth’s idea of dwelling 
affirm similar values throughout their works. 
    Focusing in Chapter 1 on the writings of a number of twentieth-century 
theologians, including Jűrgen Moltmann and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, I will 
outline the development of key ideas in ecotheology in terms of three main 
elements, the interrelatedness of the universe, the independent sacred value of 
nature, and a cosmic eschatology, which will be used as a conceptual 
framework for exploring the works of Coleridge and Wordsworth. Chapter 2 will 
show that Coleridge’s lifelong search for the unity of the universe reveals the 
interrelatedness of the universe, and the sacredness of nature as an 
independent value. Chapter 3 will see that Wordsworth’s idea of dwelling also 
implies these two elements. Chapter 4 will show that their eschatological 
visions are associated with a cosmic eschatology, of which the non-human 
natural world constitutes a crucial part. 
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 2 
Introduction 
 
 
    This thesis aims to examine the idea of nature in the works of Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge and William Wordsworth from the perspective of ecotheology. 
Ecotheology is a discipline that has only recently emerged, one which tries to 
re-discover the importance of nature by underlining the intrinsic value of the 
non-human natural world as part of God’s creation and articulating a relational 
dynamic among humanity, nature, and God. Both Coleridge and Wordsworth 
were deeply aware of the importance of such a dynamic and attempted to 
articulate the relationship in their works in their own particular ways. While 
Coleridge searches for the unity of the universe – humanity and nature and God 
- on a theoretical level, Wordsworth looks for an ideal place for dwelling within 
the context of the relationship among them on an experiential level. The two 
authors’ ways of developing the relationship relate to recent developments in 
ecotheological theory. Ecotheology can thus help us understand their ideas on 
nature. 
    In fact, a number of critics have already attempted to investigate 
Romanticism in the light of ecology. As part of various critical responses to the 
environmental crisis, ecological literary criticism, or ecocriticism, has 
developed over the last two decades. In his ‘Introduction’ to Writing the 
Environment: Ecocriticism and Literature (1998), Richard Kerridge suggests a 
wide cultural definition of ecocriticism as ‘moving beyond science, geography 
and social science into the humanities’: 
 3 
 
The ecocritic wants to track environmental ideas and representations 
wherever they appear, to see more clearly a debate which seems to be 
taking place, often part-concealed, in a great many cultural spaces. Most 
of all, ecocriticism seeks to evaluate texts and ideas in terms of their 
coherence and usefulness as responses to environmental crisis.1 
 
As a field of literary enquiry, ecological literary criticism thus aims to ‘reflect 
and help to shape human responses to the natural environment’ by ‘studying the 
representation of the physical world in literary texts and in the social contexts 
of their production’.2 In other words, ecocriticism investigates the meaning of 
the relationship between humanity and nature in terms of literary attempts to 
highlight values in the non-human natural world. Although the movement 
started rather earlier in the 1970s and 1980s in the United States, most critics 
acclaim the later scholar Jonathan Bate as ‘a leading example of a significant 
early step in the evolution of ecocriticism’, especially in British Romanticism.3 
                                            
1
 Richard Kerridge, ‘Introduction’, in Writing the Environment: Ecocriticism and literature, ed. by 
Richard Kerridge and Neil Sammells (London: Zed Books, 1998), pp. 1-10 (p. 5). See also Greg 
Garrard, Ecocriticism, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 4. 
2
 Kevin Hutchings, ‘Ecocriticism in British Romantic Studies’, Literature Compass,  4 (2007), 
172-202 (p. 172). 
3
 Robert Waller wrote on ‘Enclosures: the ecological significance of a poem by John Clare’ in 
Mother Earth, Journal of the Soil Association in 1963. Thomas Lyon has an important essay on 
‘The ecological vision of Gary Snyder’ in the Kansas Quarterly in 1970. Glen A. Love, a tireless 
propagandist for ecological criticism, wrote on ‘Ecology in Arcadia’ in the Colorado Quarterly in 
1972. In 1974, the first book-length critical study was published, Joseph Meeker’s The Comedy 
of Survival: Studies in Literary Ecology. William Ruekert on ‘Literature and ecology: an 
experiment in criticism’ in the Iowa Review in 1978. Don Elgin’s ‘What is “literary ecology?”’ in 
Humanities in the South in 1983. See, Tony Pinkney, ‘Romantic Ecology’ in A Companion to 
Romanticism, ed. by Duncan Wu, Blackwell Publishing, 1999.  < 
http://www.blackwellreference.com/subscriber/uid=959/book?id=g9780631198529_97806311985
29> [accessed 3 September 2012]. In particular, the Association for the Study of Literature and 
Environment (ASLE) was established in 1992, and ecocriticism ‘quickly became a burgeoning field 
of inquiry in American academia’ with the founding of ASLE’s journal Interdisciplinary Studies in 
Literature and Environment (ISLE) in 1993, and the publication of The Ecocriticism Reader: 
Landmarks in Literary Ecology in 1996. See Kevin Hutchings, ‘Ecocriticism in British Romantic 
Studies’, p. 173; Timothy Clark, The Cambridge Introduction to Literature and the Environment 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 15. See also, Pinkney, ‘Romantic 
 4 
As a matter of fact, Karl Kroeber ‘first introduced explicitly ecological concepts 
to British Romantic Studies with his essay “Home at Grasmere: Ecological 
Holiness”’ (1974), but it was Bate’s Romantic Ecology: Wordsworth and the 
Environmental Tradition (1991) that ‘brought green Romanticism to widespread 
critical attention, inspiring and provoking numerous critical responses, and 
setting the terms of much subsequent dialogue and debate within the new field 
of Romantic ecocriticism’. 4  This manifesto for romantic ecology was then 
followed by Karl Kroeber’s Ecological Literary Criticism: Romantic Imagining 
and the Biology of Mind (1994) and James McKusick’s Green Writing: 
Romanticism and Ecology (2000). 
    The ecological reading of Romantic poetry constituted a radical challenge 
to the existing way of understanding the Romantic tradition in terms of literary 
theories of the ambivalent relationship between consciousness and nature. 
Ecological literary criticism regards established literary theories as a 
misleading way of reading Romanticism. The theories of deconstruction and 
poststructuralism of the 1970s stressed the idea of textuality, rather than 
representation, as the dominant literary term for reading texts. For 
poststructuralists, language over and against material reality is the only world 
to which we can have access, with the result that nature can exist only as 
signified within language and culture. Especially Coleridge’s association with 
German Idealism and Wordsworth’s development of the power of the mind or 
                                                                                                                                
Ecology’; Lawrence Buell, ‘The Ecocritical Insurgency’, in New Literary History, 30 (1999), 699-
712 (pp. 700-1); Laurence Coupe, ‘General Introduction’, in The Green Studies Reader: from 
Romanticism to Ecocriticism, ed. by Laurence Coupe (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 1-8 (p. 6); 
Garrard, Ecocriticism, p. 4; Hutchings, ‘Ecocriticism in British Romantic Studies’, p. 173. 
4
 Hutchings, ‘Ecocriticism in British Romantic Studies’, p. 196. 
 5 
consciousness may thus create the impression that their notion of nature is a 
projection of the mind. Then the 1980s gave rise to a kind of politically 
responsible criticism, a leftist new historicism. For his part, Alan Liu has made 
the notorious claim that ‘there is no nature except as it is constituted by acts of 
political definition’.5 Considering Coleridge’s and Wordsworth’s retreat into the 
Lake District with their disillusionment with the French Revolution, there may 
be a lack of historicity or a social context in their notion of nature. Accordingly, 
for the historicists, their notion of nature has a kind of deficiency. As Jonathan 
Bate points out, ‘the human mind is superior to nature’ in the idealist reading of 
Romanticism in the 1960s, and ‘the economy of human society is more 
important than the economy of nature’ in the post-Althusserian Marxist critique 
of Romanticism in the 1980s.6 
    Ecological literary criticism, however, repudiates current literary practices 
by challenging such approaches to the notion of nature. It seeks to uncover how 
nature exists as an independent material reality in Romantic poetry; how 
humanity and nature are interrelated in the Romantic tradition. In his Romantic 
Ecology, Bate suggests that we may re-discover Wordsworth as ‘Poet of 
Nature’, who ‘articulated a powerful and enduring vision of human integration 
with nature’, and consequently ‘to relearn Wordsworth’s way of looking at 
nature’.7 Bate examines the materiality of nature by referring to Guide to the 
Lakes and Naming of Places sequence of poems from Lyrical Ballads in 
                                            
5
 Alan Liu, Wordsworth: the Sense of History (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1989), p. 
104. 
6
 Jonathan Bate, Romantic Ecology: Wordsworth and the Environmental Tradition (London: 
Routledge, 1991), p. 9. 
7
 Ibid., p. 9. 
 6 
Romantic Ecology, and he focuses on the interrelatedness of the humanities and 
environment in his The Song of the Earth (2001). Referring to his alignment 
with Bate’s criticism of recent academic criticism of romantic poetry, Karl 
Kroeber also rejects ‘rhetorical formalists (those of Yale School)’ and ‘the new 
historicists’, who ‘dismissed romantic description of nature as mere 
displacements of unconscious political motives’. 8  In his Ecological Literary 
Criticism, Kroeber tries to find how natural and cultural processes are 
interrelated: how ‘nature is a social construct’; how ‘human consciousness is a 
result of natural processes’; how ‘society arises out of humankind’s place in the 
natural world’. 9  He presupposes ‘the romantics’ most intense, original, and 
enduringly significant discoveries of humanity’s place in the natural world’ in 
the sense that ‘they believed that humankind belonged in, could and should be 
at home within, the world of natural processes’.10 They aspired thus to ‘relate 
cultural productions to natural conditions’ so that ‘nature and human 
consciousness were splendidly adapted to one another’.11 For instance, Kroeber 
argues that, in Coleridge’s ‘France: An Ode’, ‘the authentic sprit of liberty’ can 
be found ‘in natural processes’ in the sense that ‘true freedom of spirit 
underlying political libertarianism is to be found by engaging ourselves with 
natural processes.’12 
                                            
8
 Karl Kroeber, Ecological Literary Criticism: Romantic Imagining and the Biology of Mind (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 2. 
9
 Ibid., p. 17. 
10
 Ibid., pp. 2, 5-6. 
11
 Ibid., pp. 12, 15. 
12
 Ibid., pp. 12-13. For this argument, he quotes a passage from that poem, ‘Thou speedest on 
thy subtle pinions, / The guide of homeless winds, and playmate of the waves! / And there I felt 
thee on that sea-cliff’s verge, / Whose pines, scarce travelled by the breeze above, / Had made 
one murmur with the distant surge! / Yes, while I stood and gazed, my temples bare, / And shot 
my being through earth, sea, and air, / Possessing all things with intensest love, / O Liberty! My 
spirit felt thee there.’ (ll. 97-105). 
 7 
    If established approaches have been hostile to the idea of the organic unity 
of a literary work in the light of a hermeneutic of suspicion, both Bate and 
Kroeber attempt to reassess that unity in a positive and constructive way over 
and against deconstructive and new historicist approaches. And yet, it seems 
that the debate needs to continue to develop. On the one hand, the ecological 
criticism of Romanticism is valuable as it has brought back into literary criticism 
an idea of nature that exists beyond a projection of the mind. It makes us aware 
of the significance of our relationship with nature within the context of today’s 
ecological crisis, ‘rejecting instrumentalism, but esteeming intrinsic value, 
repersonalizing, resacralizing, and respiritualizing the natural environment’.13 
On the other hand, how far the unity of mind and nature can be viable in a sense 
that, particularly for Coleridge and Wordsworth, the idea of nature is partly 
created by the power of the mind needs to be investigated. Romantic poetry 
manifests a complicated relationship between humanity and nature, one in which 
the tension arising from the ambivalent relationship between mind and nature 
cannot be completely resolved. 
    Both ecological literary criticism and ecotheology thus have the common 
purpose of re-discovering the meaning of nature and re-establishing a close 
relationship between the human and nature. Although these two disciplines are 
closely related to the notion of nature, there is a crucial difference between 
their perspectives. For some environmentalists, one of the main concerns is 
how to overcome anthropocentrism, which sees the world from the perspective 
                                            
13
 See, Robert Kirkham, ‘The Problem of Knowledge in Environmental Thought: A 
Counterchallenge’, in The Ecological Community: Environmental Challenges for Philosophy, 
Politics and Morality, ed. by Roger S. Gottlieb (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 193-207 (p. 194). 
See also Clark, The Cambridge Introduction to Literature and the Environment, pp. 13-14. 
 8 
of human interests and resources. For instance, deep ecology tries to 
differentiate itself from other areas of ecology by ‘beginning to question 
anthropocentrism’. 14  Lynn White Jr. makes an interesting comment on 
Christianity and ecology: ‘Since the roots of our trouble are so largely religious, 
the remedy must also be essentially religious, whether we call it that or not.’15 
In other words, he criticises Christianity for developing a dualism of man and 
nature and so becoming an anthropocentric religion. Alistair McIlgorm also 
refers to an intimate relationship in Christianity between humanity and nature in 
that ‘creation is seen as God’s work and speaks to us of the transcendent God’, 
but at the same time he points out that this relationship has been broken in the 
sense that ‘Greek thinking has influenced theology and incorporated the 
dividedness of the enlightenment mindset’ and ‘people hide from God self 
evidences Himself in nature’.16  As a result, ecotheology has emerged as a 
religious response to the environmental crisis by re-discovering the intimate 
relationship between God and the world, in which God reveals Himself not only 
through Jesus Christ but also through creation (His works): ‘in all, through all 
and over all’ (Ephesians 4:6); ‘in him everything lives and moves and has its 
being’ (Acts 17:28).17 God also reveals Himself through nature, which implies 
clearly the intrinsic value of nature. 
    The uniqueness of ecotheology as against ecology lies indeed in the idea 
that nature itself can maintain its own independent value owing to its 
                                            
14
 John Sitter, ‘Eighteenth-Century Ecological Poetry and Ecotheology’, Religion and Literature, 
40 (2008), 11-37 (p. 32). 
15
 Lynn White Jr, ‘The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis’, Science, New Series, 155 (1967), 
1203-1207. 
16
 Alistair McIlgorm, ‘Towards an Eco-Theology of Fisheries Management?’ Citeseer (2000) < 
http://uow.academia.edu/alistairmcilgorm> [accessed 30 November 2012], p. 2. 
17
 Ibid., p. 2. 
 9 
relationship with God. Whereas ecological literary criticism tries to formulate 
the meaning of nature by examining the materiality of nature and the 
interdependence of mankind and nature – either being able to overcome 
anthropocentrism or within its context - an ecotheological perspective 
professes the independent and intrinsic value of nature as based on the believed 
fact that it is created by God and that the Creator still reveals Himself through 
it. In this respect, the ecotheological perspective on Romanticism is different 
from the ecological reading of Romanticism in that the former investigates the 
significance of nature in Romanticism within the context of the relationship 
between the Creator and the creation. It is not intended to claim that an 
ecotheological perspective is superior to an ecological approach, but merely to 
draw attention to their different ways of perceiving the universe. Some critics 
point out how the two disciplines have cooperated with each other. For some 
Christian theologians, the ecological movement has enabled them to re-
discover the value of nature in Christianity; for ecologists, ‘a principal source of 
their prophetic and egalitarian principles lies in the symbolic wealth of the 
biblical tradition.’ 18  One of the main reasons for discussing Coleridge and 
Wordsworth from an ecotheological perspective is that their works represent 
the relational aspect between God and creation in a profound way. Just as 
ecotheology is the ‘rediscovery of ecological themes in a variety of religious 
texts’, an ecotheological way of reading Coleridge and Wordsworth can bring to 
light a relational theme between humanity and nature and God in their works. In 
                                            
18
 Ronald J. Engel, ‘Democracy, Christianity, Ecology: A Twenty-First-Century Agenda for Eco-
theology’, Cross Currents, 61 (2011), 217-231 (p. 229). 
 10 
other words, their works evince a sincere religious dimension.19 
    As a matter of fact, an investigation of their ideas on religion reveals a 
complicated picture of the issue. First, their attitudes towards religion changed 
over the course of their careers. Before turning to orthodox Christianity, 
Coleridge was a follower of Unitarianism and Wordsworth was interested in 
mystical experience through nature. Secondly, as Emma Mason put it, 
‘twentieth-century criticism has tended to investigate religion either as an 
oppressive ideology or as the basis of a form of Dissent struggling to free itself 
of the transcendent to achieve a status as a form of secular politics.’20 The 
religious aspects of the works of Coleridge and Wordsworth have been either 
neglected or misrepresented. Hedley, for instance, indicates that ‘the 
institutional parameters of twentieth-century English Literature have tended to 
marginalise the religious and philosophical core of Coleridge’s thought’.21 M. H. 
Abrams saw the religious aspects of Wordsworth in terms of a humanistic 
secularization of Christian doctrine, rather than a form of religion. In his Natural 
Supernaturalism, Abrams asks the question, ‘what does God do in The Prelude?’ 
and answers, ‘Nothing of consequence.’ Though a number of passages refer to 
God, they do not signify any profound religious thought: 
 
God is at intervals ceremoniously alluded to, but remains an adventitious 
and nonoperative factor; if all allusions to deity were struck out of The 
Prelude, there would be no substantive change in its subject matter or 
                                            
19
 Anne Hallum, ‘Ecotheology and Environmental Praxis in Guatemala’, Nova Religio, 7 (2003), 
55-70 (p. 55). Quoted by Sitter, ‘Eighteenth-Century Ecological Poetry and Ecotheology’, p. 11. 
20
 Emma Mason, ‘Romanticism and Religion’, Literature Compass, 1 (2004), 1-4 (p. 2). 
21
 Douglas Hedley, Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion: Aids to Reflection and the Mirror of the 
Spirit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 3. 
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development. God is the purely formal remainder of His former self.22 
 
Abrams conceives the poem from the perspective of ‘the secularization of 
inherited theological ideas and ways of thinking’ within the context of the 
Enlightenment and French Revolution.23 In the 1980s Kenneth Johnston likewise 
argued that the subject of ‘Man, Nature and Human Life’ in Wordsworth’s grand 
project of The Recluse, including The Prelude, The Excursion, The Ruined 
Cottage, and Home at Grasmere, was ‘to have displaced outmoded religious 
epics (and perhaps religious scriptures themselves) with persuasive 
representations of a humanistic philosophy’.24 
    On the contrary, in the ecotheological reading of Coleridge and Wordsworth 
of this thesis, I aim to show that religion is one of the keys to understanding 
their works. I will not, however, read these texts as ecotheological texts, and 
do not intend to try to compare or unify the two different disciplines of 
literature and theology. Throughout the whole thesis, the two disciplines keep 
their boundaries. By using ecotheology as a conceptual framework for analysing 
the poetry of Coleridge and Wordsworth, it seems possible to show how their 
works anticipate and can be elucidated by some key ideas of ecotheology. One 
of the possible explanations of how literary texts of Coleridge and Wordsworth 
are able to bear theological ideas derives from the intimate relationship itself 
between literature and theology. Although literature has been regarded as a 
way of confirming or preparing for belief, or as a way of challenging, even 
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 M. H. Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 90. 
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 Ibid., p. 12. 
24
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nullifying it, literature and theology often share a territory, ‘one at once 
aesthetic and theological’. 25  On the one hand, the Second Vatican Council 
argued that ‘the exegete [of the Bible] must look for that meaning which the 
sacred writer, in a determined situation and given the circumstances of his time 
and culture, intended to express and did in fact express, through the medium of 
a contemporary literary form’ (Dei Verbum, nn. 12). On the other, Mary Wedd 
maintains that Romantic poets ‘forged an art that was concerned with the 
deepest and most important elements of human life [. . .] the consciousness of a 
deeper reality than that of everyday material and mundane existence’.26 William 
Blake, for instance, fuses the two areas of religion and literature in developing 
Christianity as the fulfillment of a prophetic tradition through his poetry and 
art.27 
    Likewise, both Coleridge and Wordsworth embody religious ideas explicitly 
and implicitly in their literary works. A number of critics have discussed the 
significance of religion in their work, including Robert Barth, Stephen Prickett, 
David Jasper, and Robert Ryan.28 Such scholars uncover various theological 
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 See Giles Gunn, ‘Literature and Religion’, in Interrelations of Literature, ed. by J. Barricelli and 
J. Gibaldi (New York: The Modern Language Association of America, 1982), pp. 47-66 (pp. 47-8);   
Mason, ‘Romanticism and Religion’, p. 1; see also, Ecospirit: Religions and Philosophies for the 
Earth, ed. by Laurel Kearns and Catherine Keller (New York: Fordham UP, 2007). 
26
 Nicholas Boyle explores the issue of understanding the Bible as a literary work from the 
hermeneutics point of view, in Sacred and Secular Scriptures (Notre Dame: Notre Dame 
University Press, 2005). 
Mary Wedd, ‘Literature and Religion’, in A Companion to Romanticism < 
http://www.blackwellreference.com/subscriber/uid=959/book?id=g9780631198529_97806311985
29> [accessed 3 September 2012]. 
27
 See, Mason, ‘Romanticism and Religion’, p. 1. 
28
 Robert Barth, Coleridge and Christian Doctrine (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1969), Romanticism and Transcendence: Wordsworth, Coleridge, and the religious imagination 
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aspects in the works of Coleridge and Wordsworth. Focusing on the idea of 
imagination in Coleridge and Wordsworth, Barth discusses how the creativity of 
God can be recognised through an imaginative experience. Prickett shows how 
poetry, theology and metaphysics are combined together in the two authors’ 
works. The language of poetry as metaphorical, symbolic and bi-focal, 
empowers the two poets to express transcendent reality through the power of 
the imagination. There is no doubt that their works are fundamentally 
associated with a religious consciousness, but a thorny issue arises with 
Wordsworth’s early poetry in which the idea of God is often regarded as ‘the 
secularization of inherited theological ideas’. 29  Whereas Coleridge wrote in 
1802, ‘if there be any two subjects which have in the very depth of my nature 
interested me, it has been the Hebrew and Christian Theology and the Theology 
of Plato’, he wrote John Prior Estlin in May 1798 that ‘on one subject we are 
habitually silent [. . .] he[Wordsworth] loves and venerates Christ & 
Christianity – I wish he did more.’ 30  Although Wordsworth expresses his 
experience of a spiritual [or mystical] world through nature in his early poetry, 
it seems that he was not interested in the Church’s teachings in the same way. 
Nevertheless, his personal experience can be deeply religious on the grounds 
that the definition of religion is not subject only to a set of teachings and a 
belief system, but is also based upon the dynamic of personal experience. 
Intriguingly, critics like Prickett, Ryan, and Jonathan Bate point out that 
Wordsworth had an enormous influence upon Victorian religious writings. 
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    When we analyse Romantic poetry from an ecotheological perspective, the 
problem of the historical gap between them appears. On the one hand, 
ecotheology is a contextual theology that emerged from the historical context 
of the ecological crisis caused by human destructive and exploitative attitudes 
towards nature that has become evident only since the 1960s. On the other 
hand, the historical context of Romanticism is different in that it was not a 
response to an ecological crisis as such. In this respect, new historicist critics’ 
claims seem to be fair that Romanticism cannot engage with ‘modern 
environmental concerns on the grounds that to use them in this way is a gross 
misrepresentation of the historical realities in which the Romantics wrote and 
thought’.31 In other words, Romanticism should not be used by modern critics as 
a means to construct contemporary ecological criticism. 
    However, attention should be paid to the underlying continuity between the 
concerns of ecotheology and those of nineteenth-century Romantic writers in 
terms of ecological consciousness. Some critics actually attempt to discover 
‘the historical continuity of a tradition of environmental consciousness’ in 
Romanticism. 32  Timothy Clark, for example, locates ‘the initial impetus of 
modern ecocriticism’ in the Romantic tradition of ‘opposition to the destructive 
tendencies of enlightenment ideals of the conquest of nature, the market-based 
economy and industrialism’.33 Referring to Wordsworth’s A Guide through the 
District of the Lakes, Jonathan Bate asserts that Wordsworth was aware of an 
                                            
31
 John J O’Keefe, ‘The Persistence of Grasmere: Contemporary Catholic Environmental 
Theology and the Romantic Impulse’, Journal of Religion and Soceity, 3 (2008) < 
http://hdl.handle.net/10504/24729> [accessed 21 June 2010] (para. 4 of 32). 
32
 Bate, Romantic Ecology, p. 9. 
33
 Clark, The Cambridge Introduction to Literature and the Environment, p. 13. 
 15 
environmental issue related to industrialism. In the Guide, Wordsworth reaffirms 
the harmony between man and his natural environment in a sense that ‘the hand 
of man’ is ‘incorporated with and subservient to the powers and processes of 
Nature’.34 This sense of harmony, however, is threatened by the destructive 
power of industrialism. The poet criticises new residents for building their new 
houses on obtrusive sites where they do not ‘harmonize with the forms of 
Nature’, whereas they should be ‘styled the co-partner and sister of Nature’. 
He describes ‘the larch-plantations’ as ‘all gross transgressions’ because these 
‘artificial’ plantations bring about environmentally and aesthetically – ‘insipid 
and lifeless’ - harmful effects to the ‘original’ landscape. He laments the decline 
of cottage industry due to ‘the invention and universal application of 
machinery’.35 Further, in his letter to the Morning Post, Wordsworth expressed 
his objection to the projected Kendal and Windermere Railway partly because 
he believed large-scale organized Sunday outings would cause environmental 
damage to the landscape.36 In this respect, the historical context of ecotheology 
to some extent finds a common ground with that of Romanticism in terms of an 
environmental consciousness. 
    First of all, in Chapter 1, a theory of ecotheology will be formulated to be 
used as a conceptual framework for reading the works of Coleridge and 
Wordsworth. It is hard to pinpoint one single main stream of ecotheology 
because it is still a developing discipline and has various branches, for example, 
                                            
34
 Guide, p. 201. See also, Bate, Romantic Ecology, pp. 46-47. 
35
 Guide, pp. 209-212, 224. 
36
 ‘Kendal and Windermere Railway’, in Prose, iii, 340-356. Wordsworth’s letter was published in 
the Morning Post on 11 December 1844. It is printed with commentary by the editor in Alexander 
B Grosart’s Prose Works of William Wordsworth . . . in three Volumes (1876), ii. pp. 330-3, see, 
Oliver Goldsmith: The Critical Heritage, ed. by G. S. Rousseau (London: Routledge, 1974; repr. 
1995), p. 301. 
 16 
deep ecology, eco-feminist theology, liberation theology, and process theology. 
Nevertheless, the main purpose of ecotheology is to re-discover the meaning of 
nature, which will be traced through three key elements of ecotheology: the 
interrelatedness of the universe, the independent sacred value of nature, and a 
cosmic eschatology. The intrinsic value of the non-human world will be sought 
by articulating the sacredness of nature through the immanence of God within it, 
by developing the interrelatedness of humanity and nature within the context of 
God’s presence in the universe, and by examining the significance and 
necessity of an eschatological vision for the non-human world. In order to do so, 
the study will identify and analyse mostly the ideas of two theologians, Teilhard 
de Chardin and Moltmann. The former is regarded as a pioneering thinker of 
ecotheology and the latter as one of its major theologians. 
    Chapter 2 will show that the works of Coleridge have two essential 
ecotheological notions, the interrelatedness of the universe and the sacredness 
of the nonhuman natural world. One of Coleridge’s lifelong aims was to discover 
the unity of the universe, which he often identified with the idea of the one life. 
It is noteworthy that his grand theory of unity is always based upon three main 
elements, human beings, nature, and God. When he was interested in 
Unitarianism, he expressed the unity of humanity and nature through the 
Omnipresence of God. Later he uses the theory of Naturphilosophie to articulate 
how all the elements of the universe are interrelated with one another. It will be 
also shown that this notion of the unity brings about an independent sacred 
value of nature in terms of three aspects, sacredness, materiality, and mutuality. 
    Chapter 3 formulates the claim that, like Coleridge, Wordsworth formulates 
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the two ecotheological elements in his poetry. For him, these two elements find 
expression in the notion of dwelling which he continues to develop throughout 
his career as a poet. He always tries to establish the concept of dwelling by 
bringing together three key factors, a dweller, a natural environment, and God. 
In the first phase, he locates the ideal place for dwelling in a valley which, 
together with his cottage, creates a sense of harmony under the presence of 
God. In the second phase, he associates dwelling with the community of the 
living and the dead, which represents a sense of interrelatedness, based on the 
religious notion of immortality in God, and the soothing, beautiful, egalitarian 
and epitaphic aspects of nature. In the final stage, he looks at the heavenly 
dwelling, in which the interrelatedness is still of great significance. 
    Lastly, Chapter 4 will discuss the key role that the natural world plays in 
Coleridge’s and Wordsworth’s eschatological visions. Ecotheology is committed 
to the inclusion of the non-human natural world in eschatology. The two poets 
develop eschatological visions throughout their works. They enthusiastically 
interpreted the French Revolution as an apocalyptic event. After their 
disillusionment with the Revolution, Coleridge located the transformation of the 
world in the transformation of the mind, and Wordsworth in the growth of the 
mind and imagination. Finally, they referred to the final vision of the universe. 
What matters here is that nature constitutes a crucial part in each stage of their 
eschatological visions. 
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Chapter 1 
Ecotheology as a conceptual framework 
 
    In this chapter, an attempt will be made to formulate a theory of 
ecotheology which will provide a conceptual framework for reading the works 
of Coleridge and Wordsworth. Ecotheology is a contextual theology in the sense 
that this new discipline has emerged from the specific historical context of 
ecological crisis.1 It is a theological response to the issue of environmental 
degradation. Concern for the environment and ecology developed and 
intensified during the 1960s and 1970s, and it was during the 1960s that 
environmental concerns became aligned with religious concerns. A number of 
theologians have referred to the necessity of a new understanding of theology 
in the light of a theological response to the environmental crisis.2 Ecotheology 
is thus concerned with the non-human world, discovering its intrinsic value.3 In 
                                            
1
 Celia Deane-Drummond, Eco-Theology (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2008), p. x. 
2
 See H. Paul Santimire, Nature Reborn: The Ecological and Cosmic Promise of Christian 
Theology (Minneapolis, MN, 2000), pp. 6-16; Deane-Drummond, Eco-Theology, p. ix-xv; Ruth 
Page, God and the Web of Creation (London: SCM, 1996), pp. ix-xix; Thomas Berry, ‘The New 
Story’, Teilhard Studies, 1 (1978); Sigurd Bergmann, Creation set free: the Spirit as Liberator of 
Nature (Grand Rapids, Mich.; Cambridge: Eerdmans; [Edinburgh: Alban, distributor], 2005), pp. 
19-21, 41-47; Denis Edwards, Jesus the Wisdom of God: an ecological theology (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis, 1995), pp. 13-15. 
3
 Eco-feminist theology sees the domination of both nature and women by men as the root cause 
of the modern crisis. French feminist Francoise d’Eaubonne set up Ecologie-Feminisme in 1972 
as part of the project of ‘launching a new action: ecofeminism’ and in 1974 published a chapter 
entitled ‘The Time for Ecofeminism’ in her book Feminism or Death. In the United States, the 
term ecofeminism was used at Murray Bookchin’s Institute for Social Ecology in Vermont in about 
1976 to identify courses as ecological, namely, eco-technology, eco-agriculture, and 
ecofeminism. The course on ecofeminism was taught by Ynestra King, who used the concept in 
1980 as a major theme for the conference. King conceptualized ecological feminism as a 
transformative feminism drawing on the insights of both radical cultural feminism and socialist 
feminism. Australian philosopher Val Plumwood extends the analysis of domination initiated by 
d’Eaubonne and King by comparing the debates between deep ecologists, social ecologists, and 
ecofeminists; Ecotheology’s association with liberation theology is concerned with the link 
between development and the environment in relation to development of impoverished parts of 
the world and suppressed native cultures. See Leonardo Boff, Cry of the Earth: Cry of the Poor 
 19 
his article, ‘The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis’ (1967), Lynn White Jr 
blamed Christianity for establishing a dualism between man and nature, being 
the most anthropocentric religion, and exploiting and dominating nature.4 The 
dualistic thinking of Christianity and its emphasis on transcendental monotheism 
are seen as the cause of the ecological crisis in that the separation of human 
from nature on the one hand and God’s absolute otherness from nature on the 
other entitled people to undermine the significance of nature and to exploit it 
for their own sake. In this respect, ecotheology amounts to a critique of 
traditional theology in an attempt at re-discovering the intrinsic value of the 
non-human world.5 
    Here we need to distinguish ecotheology from secular ecological thought. 
Both ecology and ecotheology are concerned with an appropriate relationship 
between humanity and nature, but they differ in their understanding of the value 
of nature. Ecology makes us aware of the significance of nature in the sense 
that it is useful and vital to the well-being and survival of humanity on earth. 
The ethics of ecology is instrumentalist in so far as it does not explicitly defend 
the intrinsic value of nature. By contrast, ecotheology insists upon the origin 
and intrinsic value of nature in terms of God’s creation.6 Nature is significant 
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and meaningful because of this intrinsic value. It can be thus suggested that 
ecotheology understands the significance and value of nature more 
fundamentally than ecology. 
    Having referred to the significance of the intrinsic value of nature, I shall 
discuss it in relation to three elements which, it is claimed, are the central 
pillars of ecotheology: the inter-relatedness of the universe, the presence of 
God, and eschatology. First, we will examine the inter-relationship between 
humanity and nature and God; secondly, we will see how, according to 
ecotheology, the presence of God in the universe is not pantheism but 
panentheism7; lastly, we will see how, for ecotheology, even the non-human 
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world is included in an eschatological vision. The aim here is not to establish a 
new perspective about ecotheology, but to develop some crucial aspects of the 
discipline to help with the understanding of Coleridge and Wordsworth. To do 
so, reference will be made to the ideas of a number of theologians, particularly, 
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and Jürgen Moltmann.8 Teilhard (1881-1955) was a 
French philosopher, Jesuit Catholic priest, paleontologist and geologist. His 
thoughts provide a pioneering and foundational model for a new cosmology. 
Although ecotheology had not emerged during his lifetime, his understanding of 
the universe was very prophetic in relation to ecotheology. Moltmann (b. 1926), 
one of the most influential of contemporary German Protestant theologians, 
developed ecotheology explicitly in his later period with full awareness of the 
contemporary ecological crisis, particularly in God in Creation (1985). My 
intention is not to make comparisons, but rather to use their insights in a 
complementary way in order to articulate the above three key elements. 
 
1. The inter-relatedness of humanity, nature, and God 
1.1. Teilhard: matter and spirit 
    One of the main tasks for ecotheology is to articulate the basic 
presupposition that God created the universe, and that humanity and the natural 
world are deeply interconnected through God. Rejecting the dualistic or 
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hierarchical understanding of matter and spirit, nature and humanity, both 
Teilhard and Moltmann argue that God, humanity and the natural world are 
interrelated with one another. Their understanding of cosmology is 
characterised by the intrinsic value of the non-human world in terms of its 
sacredness and its relationship with God and humanity, and their approaches 
complement each other. 
    First of all, Teilhard rejects the traditional dualism between matter and 
spirit, and instead argues that they are inter-related. According to him, ‘there 
are no longer two compartments in the universe, the spiritual and the physical: 
there are only two directions along one and the same road (the direction of 
pernicious pluralization and that of beneficial unification).’9 That is, they are 
two directions or two aspects of one and the same reality within the evolution 
of the world. Matter and spirit differ in their directions, but inhabit the same 
reality. In other words, they are not radically different entities. 
    This same reality can be explained by the dynamic of communion with God. 
Teilhard not only expresses his love of matter, but also seeks ‘to reconcile it 
with the unique adoration of the only absolute and definitive Godhead’.10 Matter 
can be sacred only because of its relationship with God, and at the same time 
the human can live in communion with God through the sacredness of matter. 
Teilhard suggests that we can have a ‘Communion with God through Earth’.11 
The earth is sacred because of its relationship with God, and human beings 
have a communion with God through the earth. The implication is that matter is 
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an essential element in the relationship between humanity and God. In this 
respect, matter is interconnected with the human and God. 
 
1.2. Teilhard: biosphere, noosphere, and Omega 
    Interestingly, Teilhard also provides a kind of scientific explanation for the 
interrelatedness of humanity and the non-human natural world by developing an 
evolutionary notion of cosmology. As matter and spirit are regarded as two 
directions of the same reality, there is a sense of becoming, movement or 
process, in his notion of cosmology. The whole universe, for him, is not static, 
but is evolving towards a final point, ‘Omega’. Referring to the dynamics of 
evolution, he approaches the universe with two key terms, ‘biosphere’ and 
‘noosphere’. The Austrian scientist Eduard Suess first suggested the term 
biosphere in 1875 in his book The Origin of the Alps, and Teilhard, who was 
interested in the interrelationships within the living world, was an early 
promoter of the concept of biosphere. The term ‘noosphere’ was coined and 
promoted in the 1920s by Teilhard, Edouard Le Roy and Vladimir Vernadsky. 
For his part, Teilhard is concerned with the interaction between the biosphere, 
which is common to all creatures, and the noosphere, which is characteristic of 
humanity.12 
    Teilhard theorizes that there are three major phases of evolution, the 
geosphere (the physical formation of the planet), the biosphere and the 
noosphere. The biosphere is the ‘terrestrial zone containing life’ or ‘the actual 
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layer of vitalized substance enveloping the earth’.13 By contrast, the noosphere 
is human consciousness and self-reflexivity (cognitive and humanistic 
processes). In The Phenomenon of Man, Teilhard describes it as ‘a new layer, 
the thinking layer, that, after having germinated at the close of the Tertiary, 
since that time has been spreading out on top of the plant and animal world. 
Over and beyond the biosphere there is a noosphere.’14 Like matter and spirit, 
biosphere and noosphere are not two separate things but integrated in a 
significant way. The noosphere, to some extent, is a natural extension of the 
biosphere. Teilhard argues that ‘life and thought are bound to the contours and 
fate of the terrestrial mass not just by accident, but by structure’. 15  The 
noosphere is the ‘hominisation’ of the biosphere. As a result, neither man nor 
Earth can be fully understood except in the light of the hominised Earth. 
    The interwoven and interdependent relationship between the biosphere and 
noosphere implies that human consciousness is associated with matter and the 
non-human natural world. This relationship can be regarded as ‘a form of 
balance between the creative world of imagination and the physical domain of 
our material existence’.16  At the same time, the noosphere is deeply involved 
in the evolution of the biosphere. Although the evolution of animal life is 
directional and preferential, it does not imply any purpose. Human 
consciousness, however, has brought an important change into this non-human 
world in terms of purpose and plan. Teilhard maintains that ‘since the 
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appearance of man the living individual being becomes able to plan’ and 
‘arranges matter actively through self-evolution’.17 The emergence of human 
consciousness (the noosphere) thus transforms the face of the Earth with 
regard to purpose and plan. Teilhard argues that this reflexive awareness is not 
a mere variation of elements of the world, but a super-stage of consciousness. 
    Although the notions of biosphere and noosphere may be just conjectures, 
they enabled Teilhard to articulate the inter-relatedness of the universe in a 
scientific manner. He develops this understanding of the universe further 
through theological reflection. He interprets the idea of the biosphere and the 
noosphere theologically by associating it with God’s action in the universe. The 
evolution of the universe, consisting of the biosphere and noosphere, leads to a 
final point, ‘Omega’ (the Christ). Thus it is the Christ who makes the universe 
interrelated, unified, and sacred, on the grounds that He is present in the 
universe and holds all things together as a centre, Omega Point. Christ is the 
final point towards which the evolutionary process moves. Teilhard holds that 
‘Christ is the end point of evolution, even the natural evolution, of all beings; 
and therefore evolution is holy.’18 This universal Christ is ‘the organic centre of 
the entire universe’.19 Christ, as the centre, is also described as the heart or 
soul of the world. As a result, all things in creation are connected with and 
dependent upon Him and finally brought to Oneness or Unity in the universal 
Christ. Teilhard describes this unity as a creative union in which the multiple 
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can become one, not through fusion of identity, but through unity in diversity. In 
other words, ‘in creative union [. . .] everything happens as though the One 
were formed by successive unifications of the multiple [. . .] creative union 
does not fuse together the terms which it associates [. . .] It preserves the 
terms--it even completes them, as we see in living bodies, where the cells are 
the more specialized.’20  He calls this final form of union ‘Omega’ which is 
‘identical with the revealed Christ’.21 
    Theology understand the materiality of nature in a metaphysical sense, but 
ecotheology needs to see the natural world from a materialistic as well as 
metaphysical perspective in order to understand the intrinsic value of nature. 
Teilhard’s account of the biosphere and the noosphere is a useful resource for 
ecotheology in the sense that this approach offers both perspectives. The 
dynamic of the biosphere and the noosphere makes us recognise how the 
human and the non-human natural world are deeply interconnected in terms of 
a materialistic perspective, and at the same time, this inter-relatedness is 
eventually associated with the immanence of God in terms of the theological 
perspective of ‘Omega’ (the Christ). 
    Many theologians agree that Teilhard’s work is broadly ecological in scope, 
and therefore very relevant for contemporary ecotheology as well as being 
resonant with modern cultural and scientific attitudes to evolution.22 His thought, 
however, has been criticised for its theological anthropocentrism in the sense 
that the idea of the development from the biosphere to the noosphere implies an 
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instrumental view of biophysical reality and human dominion over nature. 
Moltmann also argues that Teilhard is negligent of the victims of evolution.23 
He sees Teilhard’s notion of the process as anthropocentric, but a number of 
ecotheologians try to show how his idea of the cosmic Christ provides a cosmic 
and ecological vision that is not anthropocentric. 24  As Santmire put it, all 
creatures, both human beings and non-human beings, are held together and will 
be ‘consummated’ in the cosmic Christ, Omega Point. 25  Although human 
consciousness, the noosphere, is the upper stage of the evolutionary process, 
the final point of evolution will be completed in the cosmic Christ, who holds the 
whole universe together. In the light of this vision of the cosmic Christ, 
Teilhard’s thought is not anthropocentric, but rather cosmic. His concept of 
cosmology thus offers a cosmic and ecological vision to ecotheology. 
 
1.3. Moltmann: the relational dynamic of the Trinity 
    Having examined how Teilhard attempts to articulate the organic 
relationship of the universe in terms of some scientific discoveries (the 
biosphere and noosphere) and spirituality, we now turn to Moltmann. Teilhard 
articulates the immanence of God through the notion of the cosmic Christ, but 
we need to show how the cosmic Christ is related with God who is the Absolute 
Other. This necessity makes us draw on another resource in order to 
comprehend how Absolute Otherness can be present in the universe. Like 
Teilhard, Moltmann suggests the relational dynamic between God and the 
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universe, but his way of understanding cosmology is dogmatic in terms of the 
doctrine of the Trinity. In contrast with the anthropocentric and hierarchical 
understanding of creation, he suggests a renewed theological understanding of 
the relationship between God and humanity and nature by examining the 
relational dynamic of the Trinity and the work of the spirit. 
    Moltmann associates the relationship between God and creation with the 
notion of the Trinity as that relationship can be regarded as a Trinitarian 
process. Rejecting the way of conceiving of God as absolute subject or supreme 
substance, Moltmann expresses the doctrine of the Trinity through the 
dynamics of relationship and fellowship. In the triune God, the Father, the Son 
and the Spirit, each has its own role. The Father is ‘the creating origin of 
creation’, who ‘sends the Son and the Spirit’; the Son is ‘its shaping origin (the 
Word of creation)’, who ‘gathers the world under his liberating leadership and 
redeems it’; the Spirit is the ‘life-giving origin (the creative Energy)’, who 
‘gives life to the world and allows it to participate in God’s eternal life’.26 
Though each of them has its own role, they are united in terms of relations of 
community and fellowship and therefore they are one God. 
    Moltmann’s favourite way of portraying the Trinity is the notion of 
perichoresis which is a Greek term used for ‘the doctrine denoting the mutual 
indwelling or interpretation of the three Persons of the Trinity whereby one is 
as invariably in the other two as they are in the one’.27 That is, the unity of God 
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can be described by the perichoresis of the divine Persons. He argues that ‘the 
Trinitarian persons are not to be understood as three different individuals who 
only subsequently enter into relationship with one another’, as in tritheism28; 
nor are they ‘three modes of being or three repetitions of the One God’, as in 
modalism29; rather ‘the doctrine of perichoresis links together in a brilliant way 
the threeness and the unity, without reducing the threeness to unity, or the 
dissolving the unity in the threeness.’30 In other words, the idea of perichoresis 
can contain both the threeness and the oneness of God simultaneously without 
reducing one to the other. There is ‘genuine unity in difference and authentic 
difference in unity with this concept of perichoresis’.31 And the possibility of 
unity in difference and difference in unity is recognised by the relational and 
communal understanding of God. Through the relational and communal dynamic, 
the Trinity is one in diversity and diversity in one. 
 
1.4. Moltmann: the Trinitarian idea of God and creation 
    For Moltmann, the perichoretic unity of God can be applied to the 
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relationship between God and creation. He insists that the divine perichoresis is 
the ‘archetype’ for the relationship between God and creation. That is, ‘all 
relationships which are analogous to God reflect the primal, reciprocal 
indwelling and mutual interpenetration of the Trinitarian perichoresis: God in 
the world and the world in God; heaven and earth in the kingdom of God, 
pervaded by his glory.’32 Since there is no one-sided relationship of domination 
and superiority in the triune God, the relation between God and creation is also 
characterized by mutuality and reciprocity. As the Trinity is a model for man’s 
relationship to nature, the relationship between humanity and the non-human 
world should be based on mutuality and reciprocity. As a result, the universe is 
characterized not by the sense of domination, but by the dynamic of a mutual 
relationship. 
    For instance, the relationship between body and soul is based on the mutual 
relationship of the Trinity. In terms of the notion of the human, the traditional 
dualistic view considers the human as being composed of body and soul, and the 
latter was regarded as superior to the former. Moltmann, however, rejects that 
view. For him, on the one hand, there is a difference between soul and body, 
between ‘the conscious and the unconscious, the voluntary and the involuntary, 
the centre and the periphery’. 33  On the other hand, the difference is not 
hierarchical, but is characterized by the dynamics of perichoresis. Moltmann 
has understood ‘human likeness to God in this same context of the divine 
perichoresis [. . .] the imago Trinitatis’.34 Accordingly, the differentiation of 
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soul and body is as a perichoretic relationship of fellowship and mutual 
interpenetration. At the same time, there is a unity of body and soul in the spirit. 
‘Spirit is the human being’s comprehensive organizational principle’, but ‘the 
human being’s spirit is not identical with the conscious subjectivity of his 
reason and his will.’ Rather, it ‘comprehends the whole unified structure of his 
body and his soul.’35 
    At the same time, the relationship between humanity and nature also 
reflects the mutual relationship of the Trinity. With respect to the human’s 
relationship to nature, Moltmann explores two aspects of the human: imago 
mundi and imago Dei. First of all, Moltmann’s idea of imago mundi shows how 
the human, as part of nature, is related to all other creatures. As the creation 
narrative of the Genesis in chapter 2 affirms, the human being is part of nature 
in the sense that Adam was formed from the soil and would return to it.36 The 
modern metaphysics of subjectivity, however, refers to our alienation from 
nature. Moltmann argues that ‘the human being does not confront nature: he 
himself is nothing other than one of nature’s products’.37 Further, he, as the 
product of nature, is seen as ‘imago mundi - as a microcosm in which all 
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previous creatures are to be found again, a being that can only exist in 
community with all other created beings and which can only understand itself in 
that community’.38 Thus the human being as part of nature is associated with 
the fellowship of creation and, at the same time, as imago mundi he seems to be 
the embodiment of all other creatures. For Moltmann, the idea of embodiment is 
also described by the idea of evolution. Through evolution the human being 
‘contains within itself all the simpler systems in the evolution of life, because it 
is out of these that the human being has been built up and proceeded [. . .] As 
microcosm the human being represents the macrocosm’. 39  Accordingly, the 
relationship between humanity and nature is conceived not as one of dominance 
and superiority, but as one of mutuality and reciprocity. 
    For Moltmann, this mutual relationship of humanity and nature reflects the 
Trinitarian relationship and also is permeated by the Triune God. It is the work 
of the spirit, like the Christ (Omega point) of Teilhard, that is the key element in 
the interconnectedness between God and humanity and the non-human world. 
The spirit is a unifying principle in creation. The Word is also involved in 
creation along with the Spirit, but its role is different. Moltmann argues that ‘the 
Creator differentiates his creatures through his creative Word and joins them 
through his Spirit’. 40  If the Word is associated with creation in terms of 
differentiation and distinction, the Spirit is associated with creation in terms of 
harmony, co-operation and community. Thus, for Moltmann, the Spirit is the 
‘holistic principle’ which creates ‘harmony’ and ‘mutual perichoreses’ and 
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hence ‘community’ among the individual existents of creation.41 The Word and 
the Spirit do not oppose each other, but ‘they complement one another in the 
unity of created things.’42 
    Moltmann’s relational understanding of the Trinity and its association with 
creation has influenced ecotheology in a significant sense. 43  There is 
widespread agreement in ecotheology that we need to attribute a proper role to 
the Trinitarian Persons in the salvific missions of the Word and the Holy 
Spirit.44  And a number of theologians attempt to re-discover the Trinity in 
relational terms, for example, John Zizioulas, Walter Kasper, Catherine LaCugna, 
and Elizabeth Johnson.45 But Moltmann’s pioneering contribution to ecotheology 
is that he expands the work of the Holy Spirit into the non-human world. He 
successfully links the relational dynamic of the Trinity to the relational dynamic 
of creation, through the Holy Spirit. As Deane-Drummond argues, ‘he has 
succeeded where other theologians have failed in widening out the scope of 
discussion on the Spirit to include creaturely existence that is other than 
human.’46 Thus the appeal of Moltmann’s cosmology lies in his understanding of 
the distinctive role of the Holy Spirit, who is immanent in the whole universe 
and enables all creatures to exist and evolve in an interrelated world and who 
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brings each of them into a communion with the Trinity.47 
 
1.5. A reciprocal relationship over and against a hierarchical one 
    So far, we have shown that, for Teilhard and Moltmann, the non-human 
natural world is not separated from human beings anymore, but is deeply 
interrelated with them and with God. They provide a transformative notion of 
cosmology in that they overcome the separation of humanity and nature, and 
include the non-human natural world within the relationship between humanity 
and God. Thus we can argue for the unity of the universe in a reciprocal sense. 
The idea of interrelatedness, however, can be controversial in the light of 
totality and hierarchy. A perspective stressing organic unity ignores difference 
in the name of unity and so risks committing violence towards elements that do 
not fit in or that somehow resist the unity. Further, organicism is susceptible to 
criticism for ignoring a tension between hierarchy and reciprocity. In Romantic 
Organicism, Charles I. Armstrong provides an investigation into the ways in 
which the thought of German idealists had influenced the writings of British 
Romanticists and a number of twentieth-century critics in the light of 
organicism. Armstrong, however, points out that ‘as romantic organicism was 
caught between the competing principles of reciprocity and hierarchical 
organization, modern theories capsize on the aporia opened up between alterity 
and equal relations of reciprocity’.48 His intention in this book is neither to 
attempt to debunk the idea of organicism, nor to attempt to recuperate it. Rather 
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he tries to express his dream of an organicism in which ‘heterogeneity does not 
exclude re-ciprocity’.49 
    Here two points should be made. First, we cannot avoid a hierarchical 
aspect in understanding the universe. For example, in ecotheology we should 
not deny a hierarchical relationship between humanity and nature and God. God 
as the Creator of the universe is superior to it, and we do not claim a perfect 
equity between humanity and nature either. Secondly, the question is then how 
to maintain both hierarchy and reciprocity and to avoid privileging the one over 
the other or the other way around. One of the key answers lies in the 
relationship between God and the creation. Although God as the Creator is 
absolutely superior to creation, this hierarchical status does not prevent God 
from loving creation. What matters is God’s attitudes towards the universe. 
    Some have criticised the dualistic Western way of understanding the 
relationship between matter and spirit or between human and nature, which 
caused the problems of separation and hierarchy in a dominating sense. What 
ecotheology is trying to do is to change such a point of view and to bring about 
a new perspective on the universe. Armstrong defines organicism as ‘a 
grounding systematics for understanding all holistic structures’ or to put 
matters simply, ‘a way of thinking meaningfully about wholes’.50 In other words, 
‘a way of thinking meaningfully about wholes’ is concerned with our attitude 
towards the universe. In a pamphlet The New Story, Thomas Berry holds that 
our modern crisis is caused by a lack of understanding of humanity’s place in 
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the universe.51 Thus, according to ecotheology, humans need to re-establish 
their place in the universe by articulating the relationship between God, 
humanity and non-human world. Although there is still a sense of hierarchy in 
that relationship, it is associated not with domination, but with a reciprocal 
sense, because the new cosmology offers us a perspective that enables us to 
understand the inter-relatedness of the whole universe. 
 
2. The presence of God in the universe: the sacredness of nature 
2.1. Teilhard: the cosmic Christ and divine love 
    Teilhard and Moltmann develop further the intrinsic value of nature by 
arguing that it is sacred through the immanence of God. The idea of God’s 
immanence in the universe, however, creates a tension between theology and 
ecotheology. Traditionally, theology has stressed the transcendence of God as 
an Absolute Other, being beyond the human and creation. Ecotheology, however, 
aims to articulate the immanence of God in the universe. When Teilhard and 
Moltmann describe the immanence of God through the cosmic Christ and the 
cosmic spirit respectively, two main issues arise: is the immanence of God 
pantheistic?; how can the transcendent God be immanent simultaneously? In this 
section, we will explore ways of thinking of God’s immanence as not pantheism 
but panentheism. 
    Teilhard rediscovers the value of matter by associating it with sacredness. 
In his writings, he often mentions his love for the world or the universe. For 
instance, he affirms that ‘I know myself to be irremediably less a child of 
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heaven than a son of earth’.52 He even wrote a ‘Hymn to Matter’: [. . .] ‘I 
acclaim you [matter] as the divine milieu, charged with creative power, as the 
ocean stirred by the Spirit, as the clay molded and infused with life by the 
incarnate Word’.53 For him, ‘every fragment of force, every spark of life is 
equally sacred.’54 Matter is thus regarded not as merely lifeless and inferior, 
but as sacred. If traditionally it was separated from spirit, he rediscovers an 
intrinsic value of matter in the light of its sacredness. In addition, the 
sacredness of matter reveals God’s action in creation. When we regard all of 
creation as sacred, we ‘must necessarily think of the Earth with the kind of 
reverence that we would accord a lower case sacrament because by sacrament 
is meant a sign pointing to God’s action in our lives’.55 That is, the sacredness 
of nature implies God’s continuous creative action. 
    It is through the cosmic Christ and divine love, for Teilhard, that God is 
immanent in the universe. First, the cosmic Christ as the centre or final point is 
present in the universe. In The Divine Milieu (1927), Teilhard examines how the 
Divine milieu refers to both a centre and an omnipresence. On the one hand, it, 
as ‘a centre’, ‘assembles and harmonizes within itself qualities which appear to 
us to be contradictory’. 56  On the other hand, God is present everywhere 
‘precisely because he is at once so deep and yet so akin to an extensionless 
point that God is infinitely near and dispersed everywhere’; ‘precisely because 
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he is the centre that he fills the whole sphere’.57 He explains how the divine is 
present in the universe: ‘I could already see God as entering the sphere of 
external experience in which we move. Animating the great natural currents of 
life and matter, he penetrated into my own personal essence and into the 
development and growth of all things. He was the soul of everything that 
moves.’58 God’s presence thus makes the universe holy. 
    Secondly, the idea of love is also associated with the immanence of God. 
According to Teilhard, the sense of omnipresence is similar to the idea 
developed by St. Ignatius de Loyola in his meditation Ad Amorem, in which God 
is described as permeating the whole creation through His divine love. 59 
Teilhard wrote that ‘sometime I should gather all my ideas together in a 
synthesis built around the foundation of everything: love’.60 That is, love is the 
crucial mode of God’s presence in the universe. The cosmic Christ, as 
discussed above, holds together all things, and it is the power of love in Him 
that exerts the great unifying force in the universe. Thus ‘the risen Christ is 
universally present, present to each creature and to all creation, through the 
creative love that sustains and unifies creation, and that draws it to himself.’61 
If the risen Jesus is creation’s future central point, he, at the same time, is 
present everywhere through his creative love. As a result, the cosmic Christ 
permeates all realities, all things, all experiences, all our joys and suffering 
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through the outpouring of divine love. 
 
2.2. Moltmann: the cosmic Spirit 
    Like the cosmic Christ of Teilhard, it is through the cosmic spirit that God, 
for Moltmann, is immanent in the universe. Moltmann provides four principles of 
the cosmic Spirit which operates in nature: (a) the Spirit as ‘the principle of 
creativity on all levels of matter and life’ in terms of ‘new possibilities for 
material and living organism’; (b) as ‘the holistic principle’ or ‘the common Spirit 
of creation’; (c) as ‘the principle of individuation’ or ‘differentiation of particular 
working sketches of matter and life on their various levels’; (d) as the principle 
of being ‘open’ towards ‘their common future’.62 The cosmic Spirit works not 
only in humankind but in the non-human world, and therefore God is immanent 
through the cosmic spirit on which the sacredness of nature is based. 
    For Moltmann, the Spirit is the vital energy for creation in the world. He 
asserts that ‘we have to understand the Spirit as the creative energy of God and 
the vital energy of everything that lives’.63 Further, it is more than an energy. 
In terms of the doctrine of the Trinity, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are 
one God, but each is also an independent subject. Thus ‘the Spirit acts as an 
independent subject, and he does so not merely towards men and women; in the 
glorification of the Son and the Father, he acts on the Son and the Father as 
well.’64 Accordingly, God is present as a divine subject in creation through the 
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Spirit. 
 
2.3. The possibility of the transcendence and immanence of God 
    The notion of God’s immanence in Teilhard and Moltmann may be 
understood as pantheistic as they describe God as being immanent in the 
universe and conceive the non-human world as sacred. Their notion of God’s 
immanence, however, is not pantheistic because they also conceive God as the 
Absolute Other, clearly distinct from creation. So long as there is a fundamental 
distinction between God and creation, their notion of God’s immanence cannot 
be pantheism, which stresses the immanence of God over and against the 
distinction between God and creation. 
    The question is how to articulate the idea of God as transcendent and at the 
same time immanent in creation. Moltmann tries to draw a distinction between 
Creator and creation but at the same time to express an intimate relationship 
between them. That is, he attempts to express the immanence and 
transcendence through a relational dynamic in the light of a mutual dwelling, 
zimzum, and creation as process (creatio continua). Though God created the 
world by the energies of the Spirit and is present in it through the Spirit, the 
creation, unlike the Son, is not divine. In other words, ‘the world is not begotten 
by God, as is the Son.’ 65   Thus creation is not divine but is nonetheless 
intimately related to God through the Spirit, which is ‘the immanent 
transcendence in all things’ and as such ‘the ground and source’ of all that is 
contingent.66 Moltmann distinguishes between God’s indwelling and the world’s 
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indwelling. God the Spirit dwells in creation, and in this way ‘God and the world 
are related to one another through the relationship of their mutual indwelling 
and participation; God’s indwelling in the world is divine in kind; the world’s 
indwelling in God is worldly in kind.’67 There is a mutual indwelling between 
God and the world, but their indwellings are not the same. 
    Concerning this mutual indwelling, Moltmann provides a core notion of God: 
zimzum, the kabbalistic doctrine of self-limitation. Moltmann suggests that ‘in 
order to create something outside himself, the infinite God must have made 
room for this finitude beforehand, ‘in himself.’ But does not creation as opera ad 
extra then presuppose an inversion of God which releases that extra in the first 
place?’68 The extra Deum implies ‘a self-limitation of the infinite, omnipresent 
God, preceding his creation’.69 Thus there is a distinction or distance between 
God and creation. The act of creation, however, also happens in God. Moltmann 
argues that creation must be viewed as ‘God’s act in God and out of God’.70 In 
other words, creation is different from God but simultaneously is in God. 
    The notion of creatio continua also shows that God is different from 
creation but immanent in creation. Moltmann speaks of three types of creation: 
creatio originalis, creatio continua, and creatio nova. He writes, ‘we can see 
initial creation as the divine creation that is without any prior conditions: creatio 
ex nihilo; while creation in history is the laborious creation of salvation out of 
the overcoming of disaster. The eschatological creation of the kingdom of glory, 
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finally, proceeds from the vanquishing of sin and death, that is to say, the 
annihilating Nothingness.’ 71  The concept of creatio originalis by affirming 
creatio ex nihilo refers to the transcendence of God. That is, God is understood 
as the Absolute Other in the initial creation in that it is not subject to any 
preconditions or presuppositions. Thus there is a fundamental distinction 
between God and creation. By contrast, creatio continua and creatio nova 
describe a mutual relationship between God and creation. ‘The initial creation’, 
according to Moltmann, ‘has to be understood as creatio mutabilis’, and 
therefore creation is ‘not closed within itself’ but ‘open for history’.72  The 
creation is, to some extent, still in process. ‘Moltmann’, as Deane-Drummond 
put it, ‘urges us to see creation as an open process, with an eschatological 
thread between initial creation, salvation history, and the kingdom of glory.’73 In 
the end, creation in process is associated with the future. Moltmann argues that 
the goal of creation ‘is not a return to the paradisal primordial condition’ but 
rather ‘the revelation of the glory of God’.74 If creatio ex nihilo and creatio 
originalis conceive God as a transcendental Absolute Being, creatio continua 
and creatio nova describe how God is continuously engaged with creation and 
therefore how He is immanent in it. 
    The idea of creation as process is also central for Teilhard. For him, God’s 
creation is not a single act, but a process that is going on now in world history. 
In his words, ‘the world is still being created.’75 The evolutionary process of 
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becoming in the universe is the continuation of God’s creation. Although 
Teilhard mentions that ‘the true evolution of the world takes place in souls and 
in their union’, we should not regard his idea of evolution as being separated 
from matter.76 For him, matter and spirit are not separated from each other. 
Matter is deeply interconnected with the spiritual aspect of evolution in the 
sense that ‘through all nature I was immersed in God’.77 Thus the spiritual 
aspect of evolution does not exclude the physical domain of living systems. Just 
as Moltmann understands that God is present in the ongoing process of creation, 
Teilhard maintains that God is involved in the continuation of creation. 
    Accordingly, by discovering the immanence of God, Teilhard and Moltmann 
develop the sacredness of the non-human world, but their idea of immanence is 
not pantheistic, but panentheistic. After Philip Clayton evoked ‘the panentheistic 
turn’ in the theology of the twentieth century, the term, panentheism, has 
become popular.78 In addition, this panentheistic turn refers to a fundamental 
shift in ontology, signaling the shift ‘from a substance ontology to a relational 
ontology’.79 This idea of panentheism, however, is challenged by traditional 
theism which criticises panentheism for its inadequate distinction between God 
and the world. For traditional forms of theism, one of the key issues is to 
articulate the absolute otherness of God, and therefore the Creator should not 
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be influenced by the creature at all. In panentheism, however, the notion of 
immanence tends to diminish the absolute freedom of God. John Cooper argues 
that ‘Divine freedom is an oxymoron in almost all panentheism’, and that 
Moltmann’s notion of zimzum is an example of how transcendence and 
immanence contradict each other in panentheism.80 
    Cooper’s criticism, however, is not fair, because God’s self-limitation is 
different from an actual limitation. If God should be immanent in the universe 
because of his limitation, that means a restricted freedom of God. But the idea 
of zimzum implies that God exists as an absolute other but he empties Himself 
for the love of the world. Even in this self-limitation, God is still conceived as 
an absolute other. The notion of self-emptying in Philippians (2:5-8) shows 
well how the transcendence and immanence of the divinity co-exist in Jesus 
without diminishing each other. For Moltmann, ‘the trinitarian concept of 
creation integrates the elements of truth in monotheism (transcendence) and 
pantheism (immanence)’, and ‘in the panentheistic view, God, having created the 
world, also dwells in it, and conversely the world which he has created exists in 
him.’81 Accordingly, God remains absolutely transcendental even in immanence. 
    In Teilhard’s case, the concept of differentiation maintains a proper balance 
between transcendence and immanence. Teilhard does not refer explicitly to 
panentheism, but he often regards himself as a ‘Christian pantheist’, rejecting 
other forms of pantheism and monism.82 His idea of pantheism is the pantheism 
of differentiation, which is very panentheistic. He argues that ‘the reflective 
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centers of the world are really one with God’, and that ‘this state is not 
obtained by identification (God becoming all), but by the differentiating and 
communicating action of love (God all in all)’.83 Although God is immanent in the 
world, the distinction between identification and differentiation implies that God 
does not become the world, and vice versa. In this respect, God is regarded as 
both transcendent and immanent. 
    One of the possibilities of the balance is, as discussed above, the relational 
dynamic of God and the world. The relationship between God and creation is 
not static, but dynamic, in that God’s creation has not finished yet, and He 
continues to be involved in the process of creation. The way of God’s 
immanence is His continuation of the activity of creation in the universe. When 
the non-human world is conceived as sacred through the immanence of God, 
the sacredness implies not the union of one substance between God and 
creation in a static sense, but the union of a relational dynamic. In this relational 
dynamic, God is involved in the process of creation and at the same time is 
distinct from it. As a result, for Teilhard and Moltmann, transcendence and 
immanence do not contradict each other, but they maintain a proper balance 
between them. 
 
3. Cosmic eschatology 
3.1. The significance of eschatology in ecotheology and theology 
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    In the previous sections, we have discussed how ecotheology argues for 
the intrinsic value of nature by articulating the inter-relatedness between 
humanity, nature, and God, and by discovering the sacredness of nature through 
the immanence of God. Now we need to investigate the importance of nature in 
terms of the issue of eschatology. Christian faith is concerned with the future 
as well as the present. Both in the Old Testament and the New Testament, the 
people are always given a promise for the future, for example, a better land, or 
redemption. In Christianity time has a beginning and an ending, but the end is 
not the annulment of the universe but a new beginning, for example, ‘a new 
heaven and a new earth’. In conventional theology, the non-human world is 
usually excluded from the narrative of a final redemption. If the non-human 
world is not included in the picture of the final salvation, it may be reduced to 
simply being thought of as existing for the wellbeing of human beings. At the 
same time, it is not clear that the non-human world needs a final redemption. In 
this respect, the intrinsic value of nature needs to be examined in the light of 
eschatology. We will investigate three points: first, the definition of 
eschatology; secondly, the significance of a cosmic eschatology; and thirdly, the 
transformation of the universe in eschatology. 
    It was in the twentieth century that eschatology emerged as a focal point of 
theology. There are a number of theologians who have stressed the significance 
of eschatology. Ernst Kasemann argues that the ‘Apocalyptic was the mother of 
all Christian theology’, 84  and Karl Barth also complained that Protestant 
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theology had lulled us ‘to sleep by adding at the conclusion of Christian 
Dogmatics a short and perfectly harmless chapter entitled – “Eschatology”’.85 
Albert Schweitzer discovers that the essence of Jesus’ message is deeply 
eschatological.86 More recently, Moltmann emphasises the place of eschatology 
by developing the theology of hope and locating eschatology at the beginning of 
theology rather than at the end, on the grounds that hope for the future is a 
fundamental characteristic of faith.87 The implication is that eschatology is not 
an option, but a fundamental element in faith. If we look at the Old Testament 
and the New Testament, we realise that their key message is concerned with 
hope for the future and the fulfillment of the promise. In the former the 
promised land is a recurring motif, and Jesus proclaims the Kingdom of God in 
the latter. The issue of eschatology cannot be detached from Christian faith. As 
Jenson put it, faith and eschatological expectation are two aspects of one mode 
of existence.88 The emergence of eschatology is thus of great significance. 
    It is not easy to define what eschatology is, given that the language about 
eschatology in the Bible is very enigmatic. ‘Eschaton’ is the Greek word for 
‘end’, and, in traditional Christian theology, eschatology is understood as the 
study of the end times in light of four major last things: resurrection, judgment, 
heaven and hell. 89  Both millenarianism and apocalypse refer to a kind of 
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eschatology. Millenarianism, based upon a strictly literal interpretation of the 
Book of Revelation 20:1-15, is the teaching that before the Last Judgment 
Christ will return to the earth in order to establish a kingdom which will last for 
1,000 years.90 The notion of apocalypse, which comes from the Greek word 
apokalypsis, meaning unveiling, uncovering, or revelation, had begun to be 
formulated around the period of the Exile (587-538 B.C.).91 And apocalyptic 
writing completely replaced the older prophetic style after the return of the 
first Jewish exiles - the postexilic age.92 Particularly it is the Book of Daniel 
that has the most complete form of apocalypse in the Old Testament. 93 
Christianity inherited the apocalyptic tradition, and it appears that John took 
much of his source material from the Book of Daniel in the Book of Revelation, 
the last book of the New Testament and one of the finest examples of this 
literary form.94 Although the language of eschatology is puzzling, the common 
basic message of eschatology in the Old Testament and the New Testament is 
that salvation will entail the judgment of this world and the resurrection of the 
faithful to a blessed heavenly existence. Eschatology refers to the end times, 
but, at the same time, is concerned with a new world. 
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    My main concern here is to show how eschatology is associated with 
ecotheology. That is, the view to be defended is the following: along with 
mainstream thinkers in ecotheology, it can be argued that cosmic eschatology is 
an indispensable element of a constructive theology emphasising earthly 
renewal and responsibility. Eschatology deals with the salvation of the human, 
and some traditional theologians are skeptical of whether the non-human 
natural world will be included in the final judgment and redemption. Denis 
Edwards conceives eschatology as God transforming the universe as a whole, 
but he raises a crucial question: will every sparrow that falls be redeemed?95 
As Phan argues, the perspective of traditional eschatology was heavily 
anthropocentric in that it viewed the redeemed cosmos mainly as the new 
habitat for glorified humanity.96 A number of theologians, however, have tried 
to articulate the relationship between eschatology and cosmology in different 
terms. McFague claims that the good news is not only for individual human 
beings [. . .] but for the entire creation.97 Phan also holds that the resurrection 
is not only an event happening to the individual but also an ecclesial and cosmic 
event.98  For Karl Rahner, the presuppositions for eschatological statements 
involve not only man as spiritual person but also man as a reality to whom there 
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necessarily belongs a world as the milieu and environment in which he 
actualizes his existence.99  The world and environment where human beings 
exist cannot be excluded from the vision of eschatology, but rather share in the 
final destiny of humanity. Rahner rightly writes that ‘Christian anthropology 
would be incomplete and even false if it wanted to understand the individual’s 
final state merely as the salvation of an abstract human soul, and if it wanted to 
ascribe immortality only to this soul and to make its destiny independent of the 
transformation of the world’.100 
 
3.2. Cosmic eschatology in Teilhard and Moltmann 
    In a similar vein, Moltmann explains some crucial reasons for the 
inseparable relationship between the human and the universe in an 
eschatological vision. First, he points out that eschatology, without cosmology, 
would become a gnostic myth of redemption concerned only with redemption 
from, and not of, the body and the world. 101  Secondly, according to his 
theological anthropology, ‘there is no such thing as a soul separate from the 
body, and no humanity detached from nature [. . .] no redemption for human 
beings either without the redemption of nature [. . .] no eternal life for human 
beings without the change in the cosmic conditions of life.’102  Further, the 
Creator is the redeemer in his doctrine of the Trinity. If God does not redeem 
all that He creates, He would contradict Godself.103 Both humanity and the non-
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human world are part of creation, and therefore both of them should be included 
in the final redemption. In the long run, Moltmann, like Rahner, refers to the 
significance of a cosmic eschatology. 
    Having referred to the importance of a cosmic eschatology, it seems 
possible to argue that the non-human world must be included in the vision of 
the promise and hope for the future. We still have, however, difficulty in 
understanding a clear picture of ‘a new heaven and a new earth’ simply because 
it is beyond our limited human comprehension and imagination.104 Nevertheless, 
eschatology plays a crucial role in history. Most of all, the meaning of 
eschatological narratives should not be accepted literally, but needs to be 
interpreted, on the grounds that ‘eschatology is not some idle speculation about 
the future, nor is it some kind of report of what goes on in the next world’.105 
Eschatological narratives offer not the literal facts, but a kind of paradigm 
through which people may try to understand the current situation and search for 
hope. For instance, eschatological narratives were often created during times of 
difficulties, and the symbols and images of apocalyptic revelation have provided 
words of exhortation and consolation that meet the problems of the day, 
offering encouragement in the face of persecution, support in the wake of 
historical disaster, and courage in times of helplessness. 106  A number of 
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theologians argue that the eschatological imagination, whatever its intended 
meaning is, is a tool or a pattern of thought, which helps people deal with 
present problems and shape a vision for the future.107 The symbols and imagery 
of apocalyptic imagination are enigmatic, but they, as a paradigm, still enable 
people to be aware of where they are and where they are heading. 
    If we look at the cosmic eschatology of Moltmann and Teilhard, we realise 
that their understanding of cosmic eschatology becomes a paradigm for 
analysing the present and suggesting a vision for the future. First, their 
eschatological vision is not the dichotomy between, but the integration of, the 
present and the future. We have already seen how both Moltmann and Teilhard 
develop the organic relationship of the whole universe with the concept of 
evolution. Teilhard theorizes that there are three major phases of evolution, the 
geosphere, the biosphere and the noosphere, and Moltmann speaks of three 
types of creation, creatio originalis, creatio continua, and creatio nova. Creation 
proceeds towards its final destiny, and the present is already part of the final 
point in the light of the notion of evolution. The present and the future are 
deeply inter-related in evolution. As a result, the eschatological imagination, as 
a tool, a pattern of thought, does not attempt to destroy the old order, but to 
transform it. Though eschatology is concerned with the future, it is not the 
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denial of the present. Jesus teaches that the Kingdom of Heaven has already 
come in the New Testament.108 Moltmann, in particular, developed the famous 
notion of the kingdom, ‘the kingdom is already – but not yet here,’ in his 
theology of hope. For him, ‘this earth is the real and sensorily experienceable 
promise of the new earth.’109 Eschatology thus should not be understood as ‘pie 
in the sky when you die’, but is already embedded in the here and now.110 An 
eschatological vision is never fully realised under the conditions of history, and 
therefore the world is directed to a point which is not the end of its existence, 
but the end of its unfinished and continually developing history. 111  In this 
respect, the present is already part of an eschatological vision. ‘A new heaven 
and a new earth’ is not the denial, but the transformation, of the present world. 
    For Teilhard, the transformation of the universe in eschatology is 
essentially based upon the risen Christ. The evolution of the universe 
eventually leads to a final point, ‘Omega’, in which ‘all the fibers, the threads, 
the generating lines, of the universe are knit together’.112 Teilhard conceives 
the risen Christ as the Omega of evolution, the goal and fulfilment of the whole 
process. He argues that the risen Christ is present to the whole universe 
through the incarnation and the resurrection, and therefore God’s universal 
presence ‘has transformed itself for us into the omnipresence of 
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christification’.113 Finally, Christ the Omega draws the universe to its future in 
God and already empowers the whole process of evolutionary emergence from 
within because Omega already exists and is at work in the deepest part of the 
thinking mass.114 In other words, the risen Christ radiates the energy that leads 
the universe to its transformation in God. 
    Moltmann, like Teilhard, understands the risen Christ as the key to a 
cosmic eschatology. The resurrection of Jesus has become the universal law, 
not only for human beings, but also for all cosmic life systems, and therefore 
the raised body of Christ acts as an embodied promise for the whole creation.115 
And the risen Christ draws all things into his future.116 The whole creation will 
be perfected or transformed through the risen Christ, and they will become new 
and participate in the glory of God. As a result, the temporal creation, as the 
consummation of creation, will become an eternal creation because all created 
beings will participate in God’s eternity.117 Both Teilhard and Moltmann show 
the possibility of the transformation of the universe through the risen Christ. 
But this notion of transformation is not the denial of, but the consummation of, 
the present. 
    We have examined the definition of eschatology, the relevance and 
significance of a cosmic eschatology, and the transformation of the universe in 
eschatology as a paradigm. Although the concrete picture of the final 
redemption is beyond our limited human comprehension and imagination, it has 
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been argued that an eschatological imagination as a tool or pattern of thought 
plays a crucial role in analysing the present and shaping a vision for the future. 
Both Moltmann and Teilhard express a cosmic eschatology that the whole 
creation will be transformed through the risen Christ. Their cosmic 
eschatological vision is a paradigm for analysing the present and suggesting a 
vision for the future in two important ways. First, their notion of a cosmic 
eschatology is critical of contemporary society, particularly in its insistence on 
seeing the non-human world included in the final redemption. And secondly, it 
provides a vision for the future that creation will be transformed through the 
risen Christ at the final judgment. In this respect, it is claimed that their cosmic 
eschatological imagination consolidates the intrinsic value of the non-human 
world in terms of its transformation in the final redemption. 
    Describing and analysing mainly the works of Teilhard and Moltmann, an 
attempt has been made to articulate the intrinsic value of the non-human world 
by developing three key elements: the inter-relatedness of the universe, the 
presence of God in the universe, and eschatology for the universe. This 
perspective of ecotheology enables us to re-discover and to re-establish our 
relationship with the universe on the grounds that we are inter-related with 
nature and God in a reciprocal way; nature needs to be conceived as sacred 
owing to the presence of God; the non-human world is also included in the final 
vision of eschatology. Ecotheology as a conceptual framework thus provides us 
with a transformative understanding of the non-human natural world. Now it is 
time to explore Coleridge and Wordsworth in the light of three key terms of 
ecotheology, and show that their works relate to recent developments in 
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ecotheological theory. 
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Chapter 2 
Coleridge’s quest for the unity of the universe 
 
 
    In this Chapter, it will be argued that the works of Coleridge reflect two 
ecotheological elements, the interrelatedness of the universe and the 
independent sacred value of the non-human natural world. Throughout his 
career as a poet and thinker Coleridge makes a constant and determined effort 
to discover how we can conceive the universe as a unity rather than as a 
collection of different parts. Two ideas are key to his lifelong search for unity. 
In his early years, he was enthusiastic about the idea of the one life, and later 
he turned to Naturphilosophie. Intriguingly, each idea provides its own 
conceptual frame which enables the poet to articulate the universe as a whole. 
Thus it will be shown how both of them offer an ecotheological perspective in 
their way of unifying the universe. 
    One of the difficulties in examining Coleridge is the uncertainty that 
surrounds ideas of his early and late periods. With respect to the works of 
Coleridge, the critics often draw a line between an early period and a later 
period for various reasons. M. H. Abrams describes Coleridge as a bard in the 
years 1796-1798 and as metaphysician and critic in the years 1815-1819, the 
distinction depending on the genres of his works.1 In The Life of Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, R. Ashton also maps out the critical biography of Coleridge by 
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splitting his life into two parts, part one 1772-1803 and part two 1803-1834.2 
B. Brice and W. Christie attempt to show how Coleridge’s philosophical and 
theological ideas had changed from his early period to his later years in their 
Coleridge and Scepticism and Samuel Taylor Coleridge: A Literary Life.3 In his 
early years, Coleridge was a Unitarian and radical in politics, and studied 
Hartley’s philosophy (associationism and necessitarianism). However, he 
rejected necessitarianism and turned to Anglican orthodoxy later. Though 
Coleridge changed his views on philosophy and theology, a question remains 
about how his later period relates to his early years. Favouring either continuity 
or discontinuity, the critics are split on this question.4 For instance, according 
to those who chose continuity, Coleridge never left the Church of England. 
Ronald Wendling argues that Coleridge’s Unitarianism has sympathy for 
Anglicanism and ‘all of this seems to indicate an emotional withholding of 
himself from a Christian orthodoxy that he fundamentally accepted even as a 
young man— the withholding masking itself as intellectual scruple.’ 5  Peter 
Mann, however, points to a fundamental reorientation of his theological views in 
a sense that, for example, ‘by 1798 C[oleridge] had moved toward the 
traditional Christian view of evil as personal, innate, absolute, and prior to all 
conditions and circumstances’.6 
    Both continuity and discontinuity have their own justifications, but here, 
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neither agreeing nor disagreeing with any of them, I would like to focus on the 
continuity between two periods from another perspective, Coleridge’s on-going 
project on the unity of the universe. As mentioned above, one of his life-long 
ends was to search for the unity of the universe, which was the main driving 
force for his intellectual quest in both his early and later years.7 The doctrine 
of the one life is often regarded as ‘part of the parochial lumber that he shook 
off once he encountered Kant,’ but, as Seamus Perry argues, the idea is 
‘centrally important for much of his intellectual life and even a key to the 
Coleridgean predicament.’8 Although his interest in Unitarianism and Hartley’s 
associationism shifts to orthodox Christianity and natural philosophy later, his 
primary concern for the one life permeates through both periods. Accordingly, 
attention needs to be paid to the continuity between the two periods in terms of 
the unity of the universe, rather than to the division between them. 
 
1. The inter-relatedness of the universe 
1.1. The monistic idea of God: Priestley and Spinoza 
    In his early works, Coleridge develops the idea of the one life in his quest 
for the unity of the universe. Most of all, it is important to underline the 
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religious aspect of the idea in that ‘each Thing has a Life of it’s own, & yet they 
are all “One Life”’, and this ‘One Life’ is based on God: ‘In God they move & 
live, & have their Being.’9 There are some critics who announce religion as a 
central idea in Coleridge’s thought. Perry regards Coleridge’s philosophy of 
mind and poetry as being intricately involved with his religion.10 Hedley also 
holds that ‘the intellectual parameters of Coleridge’s thought are more 
theological than is sometimes assumed’.11 Further, Cutsinger points out how 
critics often fail to recognise the centrality of God in his idea of oneness.12 It 
can be argued that, for Coleridge, religion as a unifying principle plays a central 
role in formulating the idea of the one life. In other words, Coleridge tries to 
formulate the inter-relatedness of the universe through his religious faith in a 
sense that the oneness of the universe is based upon the notion of God whose 
presence permeates the whole universe. And it is Unitarianism that influenced 
Coleridge’s idea of God. 13  Concerning Unitarianism, we should explore 
Priestley and Spinoza because there is no doubt that they contributed 
significantly to the development of Coleridge’s religious thoughts. 
    Joseph Priestley, the founder of Unitarianism, influenced Coleridge’s idea of 
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God to the extent that his idea of God was a kind of precursor to Coleridge’s 
notion of the oneness of the universe. In his early years Coleridge was 
converted to Unitarianism. Writing to Southey in 1794, Coleridge declared 
himself ‘a Unitarian Christian’.14 A 1798 letter to John Prior Estlin, a Unitarian 
minister, also shows the strength of his belief in a Unitarian religion: ‘to the 
cause of Religion I solemnly devote my best faculties – and if I wish to acquire 
[. . .] to defend Religion ably, and by my reputation to draw attention to the 
deference of it.’15 Priestley endeavours to articulate the oneness of God and the 
creation. Challenging the dualism of matter and spirit, Priestley discusses the 
continuity between them. First of all, in his Disquisitions relating to Matter and 
Spirit, Priestley claims that we should not ‘consider matter with that contempt 
and disgust, with which it has generally been treated’ but matter should ‘rise in 
our esteem’. Matter has ‘no properties but those of attraction and repulsion’, 
and at the same time it is not ‘impenetrable and inert substance’.16 For him, 
matter is a kind of energy or force, and ‘the whole universe is spiritual force.’17 
Priestley identifies God with this kind of energy: ‘God, as a spirit was superior 
to, but not different in kind from matter, that is to say energy.’ 18 God and 
matter share one common element, energy. ‘If then our ideas concerning matter 
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do not go beyond the powers of which it is possessed, much less can out ideas 
go beyond powers, properties or attributes with respect to the Divine Being.’19 
But we should note that God is the very source of this power: ‘The Divine Being 
and his energy are absolutely necessary to that of every other being. His power 
is the very life and soul of everything that exists; and strictly speaking, without 
him we are, as well as can do nothing.’20 Thus matter, as an extension of the 
Divine Being, ‘resolved into nothing but the divine agency exerted according to 
certain rules’.21 
    Priestley shows the oneness of God and creation through the dynamic of 
energy. By conceiving God and all nature as the same energy, Priestley seems 
to describe God as pantheistic. He, however, seemed to be aware of the danger 
of Spinozistic pantheism and tried to affirm the transcendence of God: ‘Nor, 
indeed, is making the Deity to be, as well as to do every thing, in this sense, 
any thing like the opinion of Spinoza; because I suppose a source of infinite 
power, and superior intelligence, from which all inferior beings are derived; that 
every inferior intelligent being has a consciousness distinct from that of the 
Supreme Intelligence.’22 Being aware of the danger of Spinoza’s idea of God, 
Priestley tries to make a distinction between Spinoza’s notion and his by 
stressing the transcendence of God. In fact, it is questionable whether this 
dualism of God and the creation can be consistent with the oneness of God and 
the creation in terms of the dynamic of energy, but the main focus here is that 
Priestley’s idea of the oneness of God and the creation influenced Coleridge’s 
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notion of the one life. 
    Probably one of Coleridge’s earliest references to Spinoza appears in a 
letter to Southey in 1799: ‘however, sunk in Spinoza, remain as undisturbed as a 
Toad in a Rock.’ A year later he also wrote to Humphry Davy that ‘as soon as I 
settle, I shall read Spinoza & Leibnitz – and I particularly wish to know wherein 
they agree with, & wherein differ from’. In Spinoza’s The Ethics, one of the 
primary and most controversial notions is substance.23 At the beginning of the 
book, he argues that ‘by substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is 
conceived through itself’. 24  If Descartes understood mind and matter as 
different kinds of substance, Spinoza conceived them as different ‘attributes’ of 
one substance. In other words, for Spinoza, there is only one substance which is 
infinite, eternal, all-inclusive, all-embracing reality, self-sufficient, and 
necessary. And he identifies this one substance with God: ‘God is one, that is, 
only one substance can be granted in the universe.’25 Nothing can exist or be 
conceived without God, and therefore God is ‘the indwelling and not the 
transient cause of all things’. Everything is ‘in God’ and there is no any 
substance but God. There is ‘nothing in itself external to God’.26 
    Further, in order to exist each thing needs to be conditioned by another 
particular thing, and ‘the force whereby each particular thing perseveres in 
existing follows from the eternal necessity of God’s nature.’27 God is the force 
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through which all things maintain their existence. Individual things as ‘the 
modifications of the attributes of God’ are the very expressions of the attributes 
of God. Spinoza affirms that ‘the more we understand particular things, the 
more we understand God’.28 For Spinoza nature or the universe is identified 
with God. All is one and in God, and all is God. His idea of God brings about the 
oneness and interconnectedness of the universe, but this idea, based on the 
unreflective substance monism, causes some crucial problems, pantheism, 
atheism, determinism, or Godless materialism. 29  Whereas traditional theism 
tries to hold together both transcendence and immanence in spite of the 
Incarnation, Spinoza sacrifices ‘God’s personality for the sake of his infinity’ but 
see ‘God and the world as one’ in a pantheistic sense.30 
    Coleridge repeatedly portrays God as being present in the whole universe. 
In Religious Musings, God is ‘all in all!’ (ll. 43-44), and in ‘Frost At Midnight’, 
He is ‘Himself in all, and all things in himself’ (ll. 62). The way in which God is 
‘Himself in all, and all things in himself’ will be discovered by the dynamic 
relationship between the universe and God. In ‘The Eolian Harp’,31 Coleridge 
depicts that: 
 
And what if all of animated nature 
Be but organic harps diversely framed, 
That tremble into thought, as o’er them sweeps 
Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze, 
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At once the Soul of each, and God of All? (ll. 44-48) 
 
Although the poem seems to be a love poem to Sara in a local landscape, the 
poet ‘deftly picks up elements of his larger vision’ in developing a natural 
symbolism.32 At first the harp is likened to a ‘coy maid half yielding to her 
lover’ (ll. 15), but it becomes a contemplative instrument through which finite 
individuals are related to the infinite in this passage, which clearly shows the 
poem’s theme that God is present in everything in the sense that one 
intellectual breeze, activating the animated nature as organic harps, is the Soul 
of each and God of All.33 If we look at the second draft of the poem, the 
meaning of ‘the Soul of each, and God of all’ will be clearer: 
 
Thus God would be the universal Soul, 
Mechaniz’d matter as th’ organic harps 
And each one’s Tunes be that, which each calls I.34 
 
God as the universal Soul is intimately implicated with the essence of an 
individual identity as He ‘organizes and shapes it and endows it with its own 
living individuality’. 35  Accordingly, the universal Soul implies the 
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interconnectedness of the universe in a sense that the correspondence between 
‘all the components of this scene, linked as it is by the intellectual breeze’, 
points to ‘a link between all living things, including human beings’.36 
    Further, in ‘Frost at Midnight’, Coleridge provides the idea of a God who, 
even after creation, deeply engages with the universe by shaping, moving in, 
and expressing Himself through nature. Addressing the sleeping child, Hartley, 
the poet closes the poem with a passage of blessing for him by contrasting the 
deficiency of his own early education with Hartley’s future in nature. Whereas 
the poet himself was ‘reared / In the great city, pent ’mid cloisters dim, / And 
saw nought lovely but the sky and stars’ (ll. 51-3), he expresses the hope that 
his son will attain an intimate relationship with nature and discover a sense of 
freedom in its permanent beauty:37 
 
But thou, my babe! shalt wander like a breeze 
By lakes and sandy shores, beneath the crags 
Of ancient mountain, and beneath the clouds, 
Which image in their bulk both lakes and shores 
[. . .]  
Therefore all seasons shall be sweet to thee (ll. 54-57, 65) 
 
For Coleridge, nature in this passage is not just the natural world, but a 
revelation of a divine creative process.38 He understands the natural world as 
the language of God: 
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The lovely shapes and sounds intelligible 
Of that eternal language, which thy God 
Utters, who from eternity doth teach  
Himself in all, and all things in himself. (ll. 59-62) 
 
He also refers to ‘Religious meanings in the forms of Nature!’ in ‘Fears in 
Solitude’ (ll. 24). At the same time, God engages Himself with the universe 
actively through the language of nature in a sense that Coleridge ‘encourages 
Hartley to look forward to the divine instruction of an immanent God’: ‘Great 
universal Teacher! He shall mould / Thy spirit, and by giving make it ask’ (ll. 
63-4).39 As Coleridge declared to Southey, ‘I am a Berkleian’, it may be worth 
pointing out that George Berkeley (1685-1753) developed an account of the 
visible worlds as God’s language in terms of an interaction between the Creator 
and the creature40: 
 
This Visual Language proves not a Creator merely, but a provident 
Governor, actually and intimately present, and attentive to all our interests 
and motions, who watches over our conduct, and takes care of our 
minutest actions and designs throughout the whole course of our lives, 
informing, admonishing, and directing incessantly, in a most evident and 
sensible manner.41 
 
In a letter to John Thelwall, Coleridge also communicates God’s active 
involvement with the world: ‘there is an Omnipresent Father of infinite power, 
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wisdom, & Goodness, in whom we all of us move, & have our being.’42 Thus 
‘God is everywhere! [. . .] Himself our Father, and the World our Home.’43 
‘God’s animating and inclusive ubiquity’ can be extended to non-humans in a 
sense that Coleridge calls ‘even my Cat Sister in the Fraternity of universal 
Nature. Owls I respect & Jack Asses I love [. . .] May the Almighty 
Pantisocratizer of Souls pantisocratize the Earth.’ 44  In the long run, for 
Coleridge, God as the universal Soul and Teacher is intimately immanent in the 
universe in a way that He is involved in each individual of the natural world as 
well as human beings, upon which the inter-relatedness of the universe is 
based. 
 
1.2. The power of love 
    With respect to his searching for the unity of the universe, Coleridge’s idea 
of God is clearly based on Priestley and Spinoza. By conceiving God as being 
closely related with the essence of each individual in the universe, he 
emphasises a unity, rather than a distinction, between God and the universe. 
Yet, for Coleridge, the power of love, which springs from God, also plays a key 
role in discovering the inter-relatedness of the universe. The Rime of the 
Ancient Mariner has been understood from various perspectives, but the main 
focus here will be on the relational aspect between the Mariner and the 
albatross, and the Mariner and the community. One of the Mariner’s central 
experiences throughout the poem is a profound sense of isolation: the 
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background of the tale he tells the Wedding Guest indicates his separation from 
the community; the story of his experience is associated with a sea which has 
never been explored before and is a remote place far from the community and 
civilisation; and the murder of the albatross leaves him completely alone in a 
primitive place. Such isolation lends weight to one of the most unsettling 
elements of the poem: the Mariner’s unmotivated murder of the bird. Why did 
he kill it? Although it appears to be motiveless, the inexplicable act of violence 
has the disastrous result of rendering him alone. After killing the albatross, the 
Mariner is gripped by: ‘fear at my heart, as at a cup, / My life-blood seemed to 
sip!’ (ll, 204-5), issuing in a scene wherein his fellow sailors die in a 
nightmarish vision of Life-in-Death: 
 
One after one, by the star-dogged Moon, 
Too quick for groan or sigh, 
Each turned his face with a ghastly pang, 
And cursed me with his eyes. 
 
Four times fifty living men, 
(And I heard nor sigh nor groan) 
With heavy thump, a lifeless lump, 
They dropped down one by one. (ll. 212-19) 
 
Finally, the Mariner succumbs to his exile in a vast desolate sea: 
 
Alone, alone, all, alone, 
Alone on a wide wide sea! 
And never a saint took pity on 
My soul in agony. (ll. 232-35) 
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Whereas his motive for the murder is unclear, the result of his act of violence is 
clear, leading as it does to an experience of disconnectedness and isolation. 
Worse still, he experiences a deep separation from God and, feeling his ‘heart 
as dry as dust’, a detachment from the power of human and religious love45: 
 
I looked to heaven, and tried to pray; 
But or ever a prayer gusht, 
A wicked whisper came, and made 
My heart as dry as dust.   (ll, 244-47) 
 
    If we further explore the religious and biblical allusions within the poem, 
the Mariner’s experience comes to signify a dynamic of sin and punishment. In 
fact, in his ‘Prefatory Note’ to the fragmentary ‘Wanderings of Cain’, Coleridge 
explains how ‘The Ancient Mariner was written instead’ of ‘Wanderings of 
Cain’.46 Just as the Mariner undergoes a nightmarish voyage after his act of 
murder, so Cain is driven into exile after killing his brother. Interestingly, both 
metaphors – of voyage and of exile - frame murders with shared consequences. 
Like the Mariner, Coleridge’s Cain expresses a wounded sense of abandonment: 
 
The Mighty One that persecuteth me is on this side and on that; he 
pursueth my soul like the wind, like the sand-blast [. . .] I desire to die 
[. . .] the clouds in heaven look terribly on me; the Mighty One who is 
against me speaketh in the wind of the cedar grove; and in silence am I 
dried up [. . .] the spirit within me is withered, and burnt up with extreme 
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agony [. . .] I have prayed, and have not been heard; and how can I be 
afflicted more than I already am? (WC, 33-47, 164-172). 
 
As Coleridge was aware, one of the fatal consequences of sin in the Old 
Testament is an exile (most notably, the exile of Adam and Eve), which implies 
a broken relationship between God and his people. Cain’s cries for his unheard 
prayer resonate with his experience of suffering following his devastating 
separation from God and community, an exile motif Coleridge repeats in the 
Mariner’s voyage in order to directly connect it back to a dynamic of sin and 
punishment. 
    First of all, after going through a nightmarish drama caused by his act of 
murder, the Mariner begins to recognise the life of nature around him: 
 
The moving Moon went up the sky. 
And no where did abide: 
Softly she was going up, 
And a star or two beside— 
 
Her beams bemocked the sultry main, 
Like April hoar-frost spread; 
But where the ship’s huge shadow lay, 
The charmed water burnt alway 
A still and awful red. (ll. 263-271) 
 
He then watches the water-snakes whose attire was ‘Blue, glossy green, and 
velvet black,’ and, for him, ‘every track / Was a flash of golden fire.’ In other 
words, he is now able to see the life and the significance of nature through his 
imagination in a sense that he describes them as ‘O happy living things.’ He 
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mentions that ‘no tongue / Their beauty might declare.’ Further, he deepens this 
newly recognised relationship by blessing them: ‘A spring of love gushed from 
my heart, / And I blessed them unaware’ (ll. 282-285). At that moment he ‘could 
pray’ and finally his neck became free from the Albatross which ‘sank like lead 
into the sea’. It is through the power of love that the Mariner can re-establish 
his broken relationship with the world beyond himself. As Harding puts it, the 
‘spring of love enables the Mariner to transcend his selfhood for the first 
time.’47 Just as the motivation for the murder is not shown, so the reason for 
the ‘spring of love’ is not stated. As Barth suggests ‘in the depth of his despair, 
love can come to him only by grace’,48 and it may be God that allows him to feel 
love for something other than himself. Following this argument, Harding also 
refers to the divine origin of the ‘spring of love’.49 In fact, at the end of the 
poem, the Mariner refers to the source of love in God: ‘He prayeth best, who 
loveth best / All things both great and small; / For the dear God who loveth us, / 
He made and loveth all.’ (ll. 614-167). 
    What needs to be observed here is the act of interpretation which brings 
about the summarized Christian moral virtue as a crucial way into understanding 
the Mariner’s attempt to recover his broken relationship. The sole authority for 
the narrative of the Mariner’s experience is the Mariner himself, who 
experienced the events as an eye witness. As experience requires 
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interpretation in order to be shared with others within the context of a 
community, the Mariner tries to articulate the events of his voyage in order to 
convey his experience to others. In other words, his telling of his experience 
implies his willingness to belong to the human community. The poem has a 
double structure in terms of the setting: the repetition of the tale in a social 
context, and the content of the tale framed by a primitive sea. In the final Part 
VII, which itself takes place in a social setting, the Mariner offers a well-
summarized Christian moral virtue; ‘O sweeter than the marriage-feast, / To 
walk together to the kirk / With a goodly company!-/And all together pray’ (ll. 
601-6). That is, the Mariner takes from his nightmarish and primitive voyage a 
Christian moral virtue. Though the voyage of the Mariner is coloured by its 
primitive setting, supernatural powers and the primitive mind of the Mariner, his 
summary of his experience indicates a Christian value. This echoes back 
through Part I, where the Albatross is called ‘a Christian soul’, and the bird is 
said to perch ‘for vespers nine’. After the murder of the bird, there are a 
number of Christian images and the language of a society, ‘God’s own head’, ‘O 
Christ!’, ‘the cross’, and ‘a hellish thing’ and ‘Twas right’, in Part II. 
    The use of Christian language in the narrative of the tale, however, is not 
random or arbitrary. If we look at the two interruptions of the Wedding Guest 
during the narration, it can be suggested that the Mariner is actually re-
interpreting his experience according to the context and language of 
Christianity and the society to which the Wedding Guest belongs. In Part III, the 
Mariner describes the scene of his shipmates dropping dead one by one, each 
turning his face with a ‘ghastly pang’ and cursing the Mariner ‘with his eyes’ (ll. 
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212-23): and, at the beginning of Part IV, the Wedding Guest interrupts him, ‘I 
fear thee, ancient Mariner! / thy glittering eye, / And thy skinny hand, so brown’ 
(ll. 224-229). This interruption is then followed by his tormenting cry of 
loneliness, a rather subdued tone of voice; ‘the many men, so beautiful! / And 
they all dead lie; / And a thousand thousand slimy things / Lived on; and so did 
I’ (ll. 236-9), and haunting cry of agony using Christian language; ‘I looked to 
heaven, and tried to pray / My heart as dry as dust / An orphan’s cry,’ etc. (ll. 
244, 247, 257). 
    In Part V the Wedding Guest also interrupts him after hearing how the dead 
sailors rise like ghosts, ‘groaning’, ‘stirring’, without ‘speaking’ and ‘moving 
their eyes’; it was strange and eerie ‘even in a dream’ (ll. 331-334). When the 
Wedding Guest interrupts him in an anxious voice, he tries to pacify his fears by 
saying, ‘Be calm, thou Wedding-Guest! / ’Twas not those souls that fled in pain, 
/ Which to their corses came again, / But a troop of spirits blest:’ (ll. 345-9). At 
the same time, he narrates the more beautiful scenes of his story using a series 
of eery metaphors: ‘when it dawned [. . .] Sweet sound rose slowly through 
their mouths [. . .] the sky-lark sing / [. . .] all little birds [. . .] now like a 
lonely flute; / And now it is an angel’s song [. . .] like of a hidden brook / In the 
leafy month of June, / That to the sleeping woods’ (ll. 350-371). As Raimonda 
Modiano argues, ‘the Mariner borrows the metaphors composing his aural 
reverie from a landscape that belongs to the Wedding Guest’s shore world. Only 
in this world would one normally hear sounds of skylarks, lonely flutes or 
hidden brooks.’50 
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    In the long run, in Parts IV and V, the frightful descriptions of the sailors’ 
death and rising as ghosts are followed by the interventions of the Wedding 
Guest, and the Mariner appears to placate his anxieties and fears by providing a 
calmer narrative and using familiar images and metaphors. That is, ‘the 
Wedding Guest’s intervention occasions a sudden shift of narrative perspective 
in the Mariner’s tale which meliorates the horror of previous scenes.’51 If we 
take into consideration the summarized Christian moral virtue in Part VII and 
the dynamics of the interchanges between the Mariner and the Wedding Guest 
in Parts IV and V, it can be argued that we can see ‘in his account some of the 
marks of events reinterpreted to harmonize with a more comfortable theology, 
particularly, later in the poem, with the Wedding-Guest’s more orthodox ideas 
and fears about ghost and spirits’. 52  When the Mariner moves from his 
experience into a social language shared by those around him, the process of 
interpretation seems to be inevitable. And it is through this process of 
interpretation that he can extend his experience of ‘a spring of love’ in ‘the 
water-snakes’ to the Christian moral virtue of love, which expresses the 
interrelatedness of the universe. 
    Coleridge also develops an account of the way the power of love brings 
about a sense of the inter-relatedness of the universe in his Conversation 
Poems. After proclaiming ‘the one Life within us and abroad’ in ‘The Eolian 
Harp’, the poet confesses that the power of love permeates ‘the one Life’: 
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Rhythm in all thought, and joyance every where— 
Methinks, it should have been impossible 
Not to love all things in a world so fill’d; 
Where the breeze warbles, and the mute still air 
Is Music slumbering on her instrument.53 (ll. 29-33) 
 
Further, in ‘This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison’, Coleridge urges us to be aware 
of the love between nature and us: 
 
[. . .] Henceforth I shall know 
That Nature ne’er deserts the wise and pure; 
No plot so narrow, be but Nature there, 
No waste so vacant, but may well employ 
Each faculty of sense, and keep the heart 
Awake to Love and Beauty!  (ll. 59-64) 
 
In fact, Coleridge was not able to join his friends for a walk around his cottage, 
owing to an accident.54 He, however, transcends this physical separation by 
confirming the connectedness of nature, his friends and himself in terms of the 
‘Love and Beauty’ held in his poetic imagination. It is a sense of love that brings 
together humanity and nature into the experience of interrelatedness or 
communion. 
 
1.3. Natural philosophy: polarity and opposition 
    While Coleridge focuses on a monistic idea and love of God in his early 
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years, he turns to natural philosophy in searching for his grand theory for the 
unity of the universe in his later years. If Coleridge was interested in the 
external appearances of nature in his early years, he showed an enthusiasm for 
nature as an object of a scientific investigation in his later years. For Coleridge, 
the idea of polarity is a governing structure in a sense that he tries to 
categorise the natural phenomena according to it.55 Perhaps the most succinct 
of Coleridge’s definitions of the idea of polarity is found in a footnote to one of 
the numbers of his periodical, The Friend: ‘EVERY POWER IN NATURE AND IN 
SPIRIT must evolve an opposite, as the sole means and condition of its 
manifestation: AND ALL OPPOSITION IS A TENDENCY TO RE-UNION. This is 
the universal Law of Polarity or essential Dualism.’56 Particular attention must 
be paid to two phrases, ‘IN NATURE AND IN SPIRIT’ and ‘A TENDENCY TO 
RE-UNION’. The idea is dialectical in that two opposites tend to re-union, and 
it is concerned with immateriality as well as materiality. In this respect, 
Coleridge proposes the dialectical principle of polarity as the basis for all of life. 
    First of all, Coleridge explains how God created the Light from the 
Darkness through division and separation, and ‘the two poles of the material 
Universe are established, viz. Light and Gravitation.’57 The different things are 
divided and separated, but they are re-connected. In the Notebooks, Coleridge 
provides some empirical evidences for how ‘Extremes meet’: ‘Insects by their 
smallness, the Mammoth by its hugeness, terrible. Sameness in a Waterfall, in 
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the foam Islands of a fiercely boiling Pool at the bottom of the Waterfall, from 
infinite Change [. . .] Dark with excess of Light. Self-absorption & Worldly-
mindedness [. . .] Despotism and ochlocracy.’ 58  Interestingly, Coleridge 
observes that each pair consists of two different things but they appear to have 
something in common. Further, he uses the analogy of magnetic power in order 
to explain the one power of two opposite forces. ‘The Magnetic Power’ works 
‘at once positively and negatively, Attraction and Repulsion’, but they are ‘the 
two Forces of the one magnetic Power’. Coleridge mentions that ‘Opposite 
powers’ are the two forms but are ‘always of the same kind, and tend to 
union’.59 As the one magnetic power is the combination of an attraction and a 
repulsion between the two poles, two opposite forces are associated with one 
power in the dynamic of polarity. 
    Coleridge develops a dialectical way of understanding the re-union of two 
opposite powers. For him, ‘the Identity of Thesis and Antithesis is the 
substance of all Being’, and ‘the opposite energies are retained in that 
Synthesis.’60 In his the Theory of Life, Coleridge asserts that ‘life is the unity of 
thesis and antithesis, position and counterposition [. . .] these unite in a 
synthesis’.61 Thus ‘the Life of Nature consists in the tendency of the Poles to 
re-unite, and to find themselves in the re-union.’62 Every thing or phenomenon 
subsists in the identity of two counter-powers, and it needs to be noted that the 
two opposing powers, energies, or counterpositions, do not disappear, but are 
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retained in synthesis. In this sense, the idea of unity is regarded as distinction-
in-unity, the unity-of-distinction, distinction without division, or multeity in 
unity, etc. The unity of two opposing powers is the one of not homogeneity, but 
diversity. 
    One of the challenges in Coleridge’s understanding of polarity is that he 
applies this concept to the whole of nature. He conceives polarity as ‘a Law 
which reigns through all Nature [. . .] the manifestation of one power by 
opposite forces’. 63  Polarity is a law and principle which exists throughout 
nature. The problem is how we recognise the law acting through the whole of 
nature. In fact, Coleridge admits that we cannot explain it rationally: ‘in the 
question of Life, I know no possible answer, but God.’64 Barfield maintains that 
‘the apprehension of polarity is itself the basic act of imagination’.65 That is, the 
idea of polarity can be comprehended by the power of imagination. The 
following two passages enable us to see how Coleridge senses ‘the 
manifestation of one power by opposite forces’ through the power of 
imagination: 
 
O said I as I looked on the blue, yellow, green, & purple green Sea, with 
all its hollows & swells, & cut-glass surfaces [. . .] But it was not, the 
mind within me was struggling to express the marvelous distinctness & 
unconfounded personality of each of the million millions of forms, & yet 
the undivided Unity in which they subsisted.66 
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Still as I rise, I am more & more enamoured of the marvellous playfulness 
of the surface of the Hills/such swellings, startings, sinkings, and yet all 
so combined as to make it impossible to look at as many/no! it was a 
manifold One!67 
 
When he sees the various differences in nature, he apprehends in his 
imagination the manifestation of unity which is revealed by the different things. 
Although Coleridge provides some empirical evidences and analogies for the 
idea of polarity, it seems to be conjectural rather than empirical and scientific. 
    The idea of polarity as being conjectural, for Coleridge, is a kind of 
conceptual structure through which he attempts to understand the relationship 
of the differences in the universe. As Cutsinger put it, knowledge is often 
involved in causing ‘the problem of barriers or dividing surfaces’.68 We have 
witnessed how the increase of knowledge set up a barrier between the subject 
and the object, or the self and the other. In a similar vein, Coleridge makes a 
distinction between substantial knowledge and abstract knowledge. While the 
former is concerned with existence which is ‘its own predicate, self-affirmation, 
the one attribute in which all others are contained, not as parts, but as 
manifestations’, the latter argues that ‘we think of ourselves as separated 
beings, and place nature in antithesis to the mind, as object to subject, thing to 
thought, death to life’.69 In both the Statesman’s Manual (1817) and his letter to 
Lord Liverpool of the same year, Coleridge argues that man has lost ‘all 
communion with life and the spirit of nature’ by adopting a few brilliant 
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inventions or discoveries. 70  Although the increase of knowledge deepens 
divisions in the universe, Coleridge tries to find a way of conceiving different 
things (nature vs. the mind, object vs. subject) as being related. According to 
the principle of polarity, two different things are not separated, but inter-
related or re-united. The concept of polarity is a conceptual structure through 
which knowledge needs to be understood for Coleridge. 
 
1.4. The idea of evolution: individuation 
    Coleridge continues to develop this idea by applying the dynamic of polarity 
and opposition to the relationship between humanity and the non-human natural 
world. It is through the process of an evolution that the latter is related with the 
former. For him, nature is not static but dynamic in that it is an evolutionary 
process, based upon polarity and progressive individuation as the principle of 
its direction. Coleridge defines ‘life as the principle of individuation, or the 
power which unites a given all into a whole that is presupposed by all its 
parts’.71 As the definition implies, the principle of individuation is involved in 
both differentiation and reunion. All classes of nature have the tendency to 
independent existence which is shown by the process of individuation, and 
therefore they are able to maintain for themselves a distinction from the 
universal life of the planet, for example, from the first rudiments of 
individualized life in the lowest classes of its two great poles, the vegetable and 
animal creation, to its crown and consummation in the human body.72 At the 
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same time, this process of individuation, however, is neither separation nor 
fragmentation in that it unites all classes into a whole. In life, thesis and 
antithesis, or position and counter-position, unite in a synthesis, and Coleridge 
explains how the synthesis of fish and insect can be found in birds and how the 
vegetable and animal worlds, thesis and antithesis, are united in a higher form.73 
The principle of individuation is not just differentiation, but ‘unity in multeity’.74 
    The process of individuation is evolutionary because ‘the individuation 
itself must be a tendency to the ultimate production of the highest and most 
comprehensive individuality’.75 For Coleridge, it is in man that the progressive 
individuation of nature’s evolution is completed. He describes man as ‘the 
highest of the class’.76 Moreover, we need to be aware that the principle of 
individuation as the synthesis of thesis and antithesis does not exclude thesis 
and antithesis, but includes them in synthesis. Accordingly, man as the highest 
of the class has all the previous stages and forms in nature: ‘The whole force of 
organic power has attained an inward and centripetal direction. He has the 
whole world in counterpoint to him, but he contains an entire world within 
himself [. . .] Man himself is a syllepsis, a compendium of Nature the 
Microcosm ! [. . .] he is a revelation of Nature! [. . .] the sympathy and the 
inter-communion with Nature.’77 The implication is that humanity and the non-
human natural world are not separated from, but interrelated with each other in 
terms of the evolutionary process of individuation. 
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    Yet, Coleridge describes the uniqueness of man as the image of God: ‘that 
last work, in which Nature did not assist as handmaid under the eye of her 
sovereign Master, who made Man in his own image, by superadding self-
consciousness with self-government, and breathed into him a living soul.’78 As 
a result, he admits that there is a ‘wide chasm between man and the noblest 
animals of the brute creation, which no perceivable or conceivable difference of 
organization is sufficient to overbridge’.79 It is questionable whether the idea of 
the wide chasm is compatible with the idea of the one life and the 
interrelatedness of the universe. The uniqueness of man and the idea of the 
wide chasm are likely to bring about a sense of hierarchy in the relationship 
between humanity and non-human natural world. 
    So far, it has been argued that Coleridge tries to recognise the unity of the 
universe through, firstly, a monistic notion and love of God in his early years; 
secondly, the concepts of polarity, individuation and evolution, in his later years. 
Now the question is how this idea of inter-relatedness is associated with 
ecotheology. Although it seems that Coleridge is able to understand the unity of 
the universe through a religious faith in his early years and natural philosophy 
in his later years, each way of attaining it has its own drawbacks from the 
perspective of ecotheology. What matters in ecotheology is the independent and 
sacred value of the natural world within the context of the immanence and 
transcendence of God. But Coleridge’s thought about the unity of the universe 
in his early and later years raises some issues in relation to ecotheology: (i) 
Coleridge understands nature in terms of materiality in his monistic notion and 
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love of God, and evolutionary idea of individuation. Yet, it is often pointed out 
that it became a sheer projection of his mind; (ii) The idea of evolution seems to 
foster a hierarchical relationship between humankind and the natural world, and 
it is also arguable whether the scientific and philosophical notion of the inter-
relatedness can be religious; (iii) The monistic idea of God in Priestley’s 
Unitarianism causes the problem of pantheism. Now each issue will be 
examined separately, and so it will be shown that Coleridge’s way of dealing 
with the problems has ecotheological implications. 
 
2. The relationship between the mind and nature 
2.1. Nature as a projection of the mind 
    With regard to the independent value of nature, one of the difficulties is that 
Coleridge’s notion of nature is often understood merely as the construction of 
the mind. In his early poetry he clearly shows his interest in the beautiful 
outward form of nature, but some critics argue that he eventually rejects the 
materiality of nature and conceives it as a projection of the mind. Discussing a 
passage from The Friend, Anya Taylor claims that the oneness of man and 
nature is only the creation of the mind. The quoted passage is this: ‘the 
productive power, which is in nature as nature, is essentially one (i.e. of one 
kind) with the intelligence, which is in the human mind above nature.’80 This 
passage is used as a statement that the creative force in nature is the same 
kind of force as that which activates human imagination, but Taylor criticises 
this view: the passage is ‘wrenched out of context’ and just ‘one among many 
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possible hypotheses’. 81  According to him, human beings have a religious 
instinct that tends to find meaning in everything, for example, nature, trees, 
running streams or even stones. Further, this instinct engenders the belief that 
‘a coherence out there corresponds to the coherence we imagine we perceive’ 
and finally ‘nature and man share an essential oneness.’ Taylor, however, 
argues that ‘the belief is not a fact discovered about the external world but a 
creation of man’s own’. Thus the oneness of the universe is just a construction 
of the mind, engendered by the religious instinct. In addition, Taylor points out 
that Coleridge himself refers to the chasm between human perception and the 
external world in his comments on science: in order to find connections with the 
life of animals and plants the scientist needs to find ‘a correspondent 
mechanism’, and must remind himself that this sense of connection ‘originates 
in the mind [. . .] and could never [. . .] have been derived from outward 
experience’.82 
    Edward Kessler even perceives in Coleridge a hostility to nature. Coleridge 
asserts that ‘every appearance of origination in Nature is but a shadow of our 
own casting [. . .] a reflection from our own Will or Spirit’, and therefore 
‘Nature itself creates neither form nor matter; hence man is superior to 
Nature.’83 It is true that Coleridge made a number of statements concerning 
counter-sensuous anti-empiricism in his later years. First of all, praising the 
‘power of abstraction’, Coleridge complained at ‘the despotism of the eye’ and 
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‘the tyranny of the Eye’, and attempts ‘to emancipate the mind from’ it.84 For 
him, the ‘inward sense’ which is able to perceive ‘invisible realities or spiritual 
objects’ is superior to any outward sense.85 Thus he makes ‘the Senses out of 
the Mind – not the Mind from the Senses’.86 Further, Coleridge identifies the 
self with mind87: ‘I seem to exist, as it were, almost wholly within myself, in 
thoughts rather than in things.’88 Belittling sensory experience and elevating 
instead the power of the mind, Coleridge leaves us with an impression that he 
rejects the materiality of nature and regards it as the construction of the mind. 
    On the one hand, their argument, to some extent, is feasible. The 
interpretation of nature is given not by nature itself, but by human perception, 
and therefore knowledge about nature is liable to be projected by the latter. As 
a result, there is an inevitable gap between nature itself and human perception. 
Coleridge himself appears to be aware of the problem, and, in Dejection: An 
Ode, he famously mentions that ‘We receive but what we give, / And in our life 
alone does Nature live’ (ll. 47-48). On the other hand, as John Beer asserts, 
nature and its relationship to humanity and God ‘was always at the heart of 
Coleridge’s career, from his early minute observations of nature to his final 
meditations on God’.89 If nature is concerned with the issue of the source for a 
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poetic imagination and knowledge in his early period, he treats nature with a 
scientific and philosophic knowledge in his later period. And we should note that 
nature always becomes ‘an active partner in the human mind’s quest’ to find the 
unity of the universe. 90  In the previous section, it was already seen that 
Coleridge essentially associates the scientific and philosophic understanding of 
nature with the unity of the universe in terms of the ideas of polarity and 
individuation. Discussing ‘The Eolian Harp’ and ‘Dejection: An Ode’, I shall 
argue that, in spite of the tension between the imaginative power of the mind 
and the sensory experience of nature, the materiality of nature plays a crucial 
role in a poetic imagination and knowledge. 
 
2.2. The problems of solipsism and dualism 
    First of all, it is necessary to clarify the implication of the idea of nature as 
a projection of the mind in relation to solipsism and dualism. Whereas early 
Scholasticism had conceived God, the soul and the world as substances, the 
individual began to be understood as a conscious self after the Enlightenment. 
When we regard nature as the construction of the mind, we presuppose that the 
source of the meaning is the human mind. In other words, the self as the 
conscious self is understood as the source of meaning that is able to create 
meaning. The self defines reality, rather than being defined by it.91 As R. Cohen 
argues, the self has become the unifying centre of knowing.92 And yet, the 
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conscious self is beset with the problem of solipsism. If the self is regarded as 
source of meaning, it is not able to recognise the identity of the other any more. 
The implication is that the real ceases to be truly distinct from the self.93 For 
example, the notion of nature for Coleridge and Wordsworth has been often 
criticised as the mere projection of the poets. 
    Further, the self as the conscious subject confronts another problem in 
dualism. Although Descartes’ idea of res cogitans describes the self as the 
conscious self, he understands the person as consisting of two substances, mind 
and body. The notion of res cogitans thus leads to a dualism in the sense that 
only the mind is associated with the source of meaning. In order to bridge the 
gap between body and mind, the French materialists of the eighteenth century, 
La Mettrie, Diderot, Holbach, and Condillac, reduced the self to the dynamic of 
materialism. According to them, the mind, like the body, can be explained in 
terms of the interactions of forces and the simple or complex arrangement of 
material particles.94 
 
2.3. David Hartley: a scientific approach to the body and mind 
    Intellectuals had attempted to explain the nature of the human in the light of 
scientific investigations since the Enlightenment. One of the key issues was 
how to understand the relationship between body and mind on a scientifically 
proven basis. Historians of neuroscience, of biological psychology, and of 
neurology agree to view the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries ‘as a 
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crucial period for the emergence of an unprecedented series of hypotheses and 
discoveries concerning the brain and nervous system’ in the sense that various 
attempts were made to find a continuity between body and mind or to articulate 
an embodied notion of mind, by thinkers such as Darwin, Gall, Priestly, Cabanis, 
and Bell.95 In The Poetics of Sensibility, Jerome McGann also mentions that 
writers from Locke to Priestly tried to be ‘involved in overturning the 
traditional understanding of the relations of mind and body’.96 This historical 
context accounts for ‘a Romantic fascination with the brain, the nerves, and the 
continuity between body and psyche’, and the new dimensions of terms like 
‘sensibility’, ‘nervous’, ‘organic’, ‘natural’, ‘universal’, and ‘brain’, in the 
Romantic discursive field.97 Especially Hartley’s Observations on Man was a 
very influential work, which dominated psychological thinking in this period. In 
1774, Priestly wrote that the Observations ‘contains a new and most extensive 
science’ and promised that ‘the study of it [. . .] will be like entering upon a 
new world’. He added: ‘I think myself more indebted to this one treatise, than to 
all the books I ever read beside; the scriptures excepted.’98 It was a pioneering 
attempt ‘to treat mind as a scientific object, to explain mental events in terms of 
principles or laws analogous to those which appear to be operative in physical 
events’.99 Hartley’s ideas, being associated with neurophysiological psychology, 
thus played a key role in viewing the mind as being embodied, and in 
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understanding the continuity between body and mind in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. 
    Intriguingly, Coleridge was very interested in this philosophy. There are a 
number of passages which show that Coleridge read his works and became an 
ardent follower of his philosophy. He had mentioned Hartley, when writing to 
his brother George on 6 November, 1794: ‘And after a diligent, I may say, an 
intense study of Locke, Hartley and others who have written most wisely on the 
Nature of Man — I appear to myself to see the point of possible perfection at 
which the World may perhaps be destined to arrive.’100 And in December, he 
wrote to Robert Southey: ‘I am a compleat Necessitarian — and understand the 
subject as well almost as Hartley himself — but I go farther than Hartley and 
believe the corporeality of thought — namely, that it is motion.’101 In fact, I 
have already mentioned Bate and Kroeber who endeavoured to uncover a 
material aspect of nature in Romantic poetry. More recently, some critics try to 
find a new way of articulating the relationship between the mind and nature or 
to reaffirm the importance of the natural history tradition, challenging the limits 
of conventional ‘ecocriticism’ or the dominance of ‘the technological hubris’.102 
                                            
100
 CL I, p. 127. 
101
 CL I, p. 138 
102
 In Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics (Cambridge, Mass; London: 
Harvard UP, 2007), Timothy Morton examines the idea of nature in Romanticism, and he claims 
that ‘Nature wavers in between the divine and the material. Far from being something “natural” 
itself, nature hovers over things like a ghost’. He regards ‘Nature’ as ‘a transcendental term in a 
material mask’. Accordingly, for him, it is ‘the idea of nature itself’ that inhibits genuinely 
‘ecological politics, ethics, philosophy, and art’. Then he proposes ‘a new way of doing ecological 
criticism’, which he calls ‘dark ecology’. In dark ecology, ‘far from remaining natural, ecocriticism 
must admit that it is contingent and queer’, see pp. 14-5, 140-43; Jonathan Skinner raises the 
question of the relationship between an inside and an outside, and points out that ‘the natural 
history tradition which helped sharpen’ an awareness of an ‘interrelatedness’, ‘a discipline of 
close, scrupulous observation of nature, is disappearing’. We need to ‘revalue the “nature walk,” 
and to venerate the humble, empirical tasks of “natural history”, in ways that were lost to the 
technological hubris of the last century’, see ‘Editor’s Statement’, ecopoetics 1 (2001): 5-8. 
 91 
    There is no doubt that Hartley’s philosophy contributed to the development 
of Coleridge’s thought on epistemology, but the question is in what sense 
Coleridge’s works represent his philosophy about the relationship between the 
mind and nature. Let us turn to Hartley’s ideas about the process of acquiring 
knowledge in terms of the relationship between the inside and the outside.    
The Observations comprises two parts; the first contains the physical doctrine 
of the vibrations and the operations of the mind, and the second is concerned 
with Christian religion. Hartley’s scientific understanding of the connection 
between body and mind is mainly dependent upon his two theories, ‘the doctrine 
of vibrations’ and ‘the doctrine of associations’ which are the living organism of 
brain and nervous system and in the universe. For him, the ‘component 
particles’ that constitute the nerves and brain, interact with the physical 
universe suggested by Newton – a world of ‘force of attraction and repulsion’.103 
Thus sensation, thought, and motion, is the result of the vibration of the minute 
particles of the medullary substance of the nerves, and the aether functions as a 
vibrating medium. Hartley proposes that, ‘Since therefore sensations are 
conveyed to the mind, by the efficiency of corporeal causes [. . .] it seems to 
me, that the powers of generating ideas, and raising them by association, must 
also arise from corporeal causes’.104 It should be noted, however, that there is 
no direct and immediate route from sensation to perception. The sensory stimuli 
of the vibrations do not produce perceptions, emotions, thoughts, and actions, 
out of sensations directly and immediately, and we need to construct and 
reconstruct continuously the vibrations and sensations in order to make sense 
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of the world.105 
    The reason why the sensations and vibrations could not leave ‘any traces 
or images of themselves, i.e. any ideas’ is that they are ‘infinitely divisible, in 
respect of time and place’.106 Accordingly, these infinitely divisible parts need 
to cohere together through the principle of associations through which sensory 
inputs are turned into meaningful perceptual categories. Hartley defines ideas 
as all ‘internal feelings that are not sensations’.107 The first among the ideas 
thus generated are the ‘Vestiges, Types, or Images of sensations, which may be 
called, Simple Ideas of Sensation’.108 The notion of simple ideas originates from 
Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). According to 
Locke’s understanding of the relationship between simple ideas and complex 
ideas, the former are produced through passive reception, but the latter are 
associated with the active production of perceptual categories. ‘The mind’, 
writes Locke, ‘is wholly passive in the reception of all its simple ideas’, but ‘it 
exerts several acts of its own’ through which ‘the others are framed’ out of its 
simple ideas. These actions involve the capacities ‘to unite ideas together, or to 
set them by one another, or wholly separate them’ in order to combine simple 
ideas into complex ones.109 
    Although Locke’s ideas appear to be similar to Hartley’s notion of 
association in terms of the process from simple ideas to complex ones, Hartley 
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renounces Locke’s distinction between the passive reception and the active 
production in the mind. 110  If, for Locke, the starting point is the passive 
reception of simple ideas, the very beginning of the process of construction, for 
Hartley, is concerned with generating ideas. Hartley, in proposition 11, states 
that ‘ideas, and miniature vibrations, must first be generated [. . .] before they 
can be associated’.111 The power of association always requires the power of 
generating ideas, and therefore association is the basic mechanism of 
construction without the distinction between the passive reception and the 
active production. As Allen put it, ‘the several acts by which Locke thought the 
mind frames complex ideas, relations, and abstractions out of the materials and 
foundations of simple ideas as thus reduced to one: the mechanism of 
association recurring over and over again – an operation generating complexity 
out of simplicity through repetition.’112 Accordingly, it appears that simple ideas, 
generated through the dynamic of vibrations, are already involved in the 
doctrine of association in terms of the act of generating ideas. For Hartley, the 
whole process of making sense of the world is not a double process of 
reception and production, but the sole mechanism of association. 
    Hartley is able to show a correlation between the outside and the inside, 
between what is there outside and what is experienced inside by investigating 
the mental processes through the two doctrines of vibration and association. It 
should be, however, noted that he did not intend to propose ‘a philosophy of 
materialism or skepticism’, but his aim was ‘to provide a scientific proof of the 
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validity of religious and ethical ideas’.113 Eventually he attempts to articulate 
the idea of selfhood and Christian belief through natural laws. He regards the 
human mind as ‘indued with the faculties of memory, imagination or fancy, 
understanding, affection, and will’, and ‘the affections have pleasures and pains 
for their objects.’114 Pleasure and pain as the common property of all biological 
organisms, which are ‘internal feelings’, refer to ‘the ways in which the nerves 
and brain respond to stimuli’.115 As a result, we are inclined to seek pleasurable 
sensations and to avoid painful ones. One of the significant features of the 
dynamic of emotion is its movement. For Hartley, emotion moves around from 
one experience to word or memory. He gives an example of how ‘the 
appearance of the fire, or of a knife, especially in circumstances like those in 
which the child was burnt or cut, will raise up in the child’s nervous system 
painful vibrations of the same kind with, but less in degree than, those which 
the actual burn or wound occasioned’.116 An experience will be transferred onto 
the words, and other symbols, which denote such experience, and therefore 
both emotion and language are associated with each other. For Hartley, this 
generative psychological operation is the transference of emotion, and the 
affections after the transference are intellectual affections. 
    Both emotion and language play a key role in the emergence of selfhood in 
the sense that individual human personalities are formed by the emotions and 
the narratives of our past experience. The experience of emotion is involved in 
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the act of judgement as ‘the opinions of others concerning us, when expressed 
by corresponding words and actions, are principal sources of happiness and 
misery’.117 We recognise ourselves as being separate from others by seeking 
praise and approval and by avoiding criticism, and become aware of self-
consciousness by being aware that others are inclined to judge us. In addition, 
we, as users of language, are dependent upon narratives or other words in 
terms of forming our selfhood. Hartley mentions: because ‘we think in words, 
both the impressions and the recurrencies of ideas will be attended with words’; 
hence, ‘when a person relates a past fact, the ideas do in some cases suggest 
the words, whilst in others the words suggest the ideas.’118 As the affections 
are transferred onto the words, our memories or past experiences are also 
transferred onto the words or other symbols. In the long run, the sense of 
selfhood and the cores of our personalities are constructed by affection and 
language, or intellectual affections and the words, which are subject to natural 
principles. 
    Furthermore, in Part II of the Observations, Hartley continues to discuss 
the sense of selfhood in relation to his Christian belief. As we tend to associate 
emotions with their causes, we must come to associate all emotions of the self 
‘with the ultimate cause, the idea of God’.119 The reason lies in the fact that 
‘Since God is the source of all Good’ and is ‘associated with all our Pleasures, it 
seems to follow [. . .] that the idea of God, and of the ways by which his 
Goodness and Happiness are made manifest, must at last take the place of, and 
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absorb other Ideas, and He himself become [. . .] All in All’.120 Hartley regards 
this state as ‘perfect self-annihilation’ which is not the annullment of being a 
person in a passive and negative sense, but refers to the growth and 
transformation of the self, through which human beings will become ultimately 
‘partakers of the divine nature’, and they learn to love both others and God.121 
What matters for Hartley is that the realisation of the process is found in a 
natural environment. If a mental process, selfhood, and self-annihilation are 
explained according to natural laws, the experience of the external world 
fundamentally corresponds to the experience of the internal worlds of the mind 
and religion. Overcoming dualism and solipsism, both physical events and 
mental events attain a sense of unity without denying or undermining either of 
them. Hartley attempts to articulate an internal vision through natural principles. 
 
2.4. The unity between the external and the internal in ‘The Eolian Harp’ 
    If we look at ‘The Eolian Harp’, we find that the poem is deeply embedded 
in Hartley’s philosophy. As already seen, the poem is concerned with a vision 
about the unity of the universe, but this vision is crucially associated with the 
external world in the sense that the poet tries to read the vision in a natural 
environment. Accordingly, the relationship between the vision and the physical 
universe can be articulated within the context of Hartley’s thought. First of all, 
nature becomes an activator for a mental process. As, for Hartley, the functions 
of the mind are determined by physical stimuli, the awakening of a poetic mind 
in ‘The Eolian Harp’ is dependent upon the harmony of a natural landscape. One 
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of the main features in the Conversation Poems is their circular structure, one 
which they open with a landscape description, and move into inner meditation, 
and finally return to an initial landscape. Likewise, ‘The Eolian Harp’ opens with 
the invocation of ‘My pensive Sara!’ and the description of the setting, and it 
turns to the mind of the poet. Finally, it returns to the initial surroundings. 
    In order to establish a link between nature and the poetic mind, the poet 
uses the image of the harp. Abrams first called ‘attention to the wind-harp as 
that favorite romantic toy, which he read as a serious analogy of the 
relationship of the poetic mind to nature in the late Eighteenth century’.122 As 
the harp, being struck by the wind, produces music, the imagination of the poet 
is activated by nature. Thus ‘Coleridge transformed the harp into an image of 
inspiration in which the poet was a harp over whom the winds of inspiration 
blow.’123 It seems to be a feeling that the harp brings about first after being 
struck by the wind. Coleridge wrote a letter to Southey in 1803 which alludes to 
Hartley’s enduring influence in terms of the dynamic of feeling. Recalling the 
room in Bristol that he shared with Southey in 1795, Coleridge says: 
 
It argues, I am persuaded, a particular state of general feeling — & I hold, 
that association depends in a much greater degree on the recurrence of 
resembling states of Feeling, than on Trains of Idea [. . .] I almost think, 
that Ideas never recall Ideas, as far as they are Ideas — any more than 
Leaves in a forest create each other's motion — The Breeze it is that runs 
thro' them / it is the Soul, the state of Feeling — . If I had said, no one 
Idea ever recalls another, I am confident that I could support the 
                                            
122
 Richard Matlak, ‘Swift’s Aeolists and Coleridge’s Eolian Harp’, The Coleridge Bulletin: The 
Journal of the Friends of Coleridge, New Series, 20 (2002), 44-53 (p. 46); See, M. H. Abrams, the 
Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1953), p. 51. 
123
 Magnuson, ‘The “Conversation” poems’, p. 34. 
 98 
assertion.124 
 
According to this passage, it is the feeling [the Breeze] that evoked ideas. As 
the feeling of pleasures and pains is inherent in each idea in Hartley’s 
associationsim, feeling, for Coleridge, plays a crucial role in conjuring up 
ideas.125 ‘The Breeze’ from this passage reminds us of ‘the desultory breeze’ in 
‘The Eolian Harp’ which caresses ‘that simplest Lute’ and creates a sense of 
love in a ‘coy maid half yielding to her lover’. 126 
    Then ‘its strings boldlier swept’ to the extent that it produces the pictures 
of ‘Fairy-Land’, and eventually his poetic imagination bears the vision of ‘the 
one Life’. In other words, the mental process leads to a philosophical and 
theological speculation through physical stimuli. What is significant here is the 
relationship between the physical stimuli of landscape and the vision of ‘the one 
Life’. If the breeze belongs to an external world, the vision is part of an internal 
sphere of a poetic imagination. The question is whether the experience of an 
external world is separated from that of an internal sphere and the vision exists 
only in a poetic imagination, or the former is correlated with the latter. The first 
case causes the problems of dualism and solipsism, but the second one 
suggests a sense of unity. There are two reasons that allow one to contend that 
Coleridge tries to achieve a unity between them. 
    First, the experience of the one life takes place not only in a poetic 
imagination but also in an external world. Coleridge tries to describe the unity 
of the one life through the harmony of two images, light and sound, which 
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conveys ‘varying manifestations of a single identity’: ‘A light in sound. A sound-
like power in light’ (ll. 28).127 This harmonious world is full of ‘joyance’, and it 
is ‘impossible not to love all things’ (ll. 29-31). Intriguingly, this world is also 
found in the description of a landscape at the beginning of the poem in the 
sense that the poet feels the wholeness of a natural environment around his Cot. 
In a late afternoon, ‘the clouds were rich with light’, and ‘the stilly murmur of 
the distant Sea / Tells us of silence’ (ll. 6, 11-2). At the same time, in the 
middle of this harmonious landscape, the poet and his ‘pensive Sara’, whose 
‘soft cheek reclined on his arm’, generate the blessedness of love with ‘white-
flower’d Jasmin, and the broad-leav’d Myrtle’, the emblems of ‘Innocence and 
Love!’. Secondly, he extends the vision of the one life to a religious thought by 
associating the presence of God with the one life. The one life is not just a 
universe of harmony and love, but also a universe of God’s presence because 
God is ‘the Soul of each, and God of all’ in this universe. Accordingly, we can 
sense the presence of God in a natural environment as the poet identifies God 
with ‘one intellectual breeze’. As the vision of the one life is found in a physical 
experience as well as in a poetic imagination, the presence of God is 
experienced not only in the immaterial sphere but also in nature. In this respect, 
like Hartley, Coleridge attains a unity between physical events and mental 
events by showing that the experience of the internal worlds of the mind and 
religion fundamentally corresponds to the experience of the external world. 
 
2.5. The passivity and activity of the mind in ‘The Eolian Harp’ 
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    And yet, his effort to combine materialism and idealism has a tension at its 
heart. First, the notion of God as ‘one intellectual breeze’ in nature causes the 
problem of pantheism. Right after the vision of ‘God of all’, the poet mentions 
that Sara disapproves of his idea: ‘thy more serious eye a mild reproof.’ 
Rejecting ‘such thoughts’, she ‘biddest me walk humbly with my God’ (ll. 51-2). 
He regards the notion as ‘vain Philosophy’s aye-babbling spring’ (ll. 57). It will 
later be seen how the poet deals with the problem of pantheism. Secondly, the 
issue of the passivity and activity of the mind arises. In his later period, one of 
the reasons why Coleridge rejected Hartley’s ideas is that the process of 
association seemed to imply a passive and mechanical approach to perception 
and mental acts.128 In Coleridge’s view, Hartley’s notion of associationism, in 
which ‘all the reality’ is dependent upon ‘the primary sensations’ and ‘the 
impressions’, is only involved in ‘controlling, determining, and modifying the 
phantasmal chaos of association’. Rather than ‘distinct powers’, for example, 
‘will’ and ‘reason’, it is a ‘blind mechanism’ and ‘mere lawlessness’, and 
therefore ‘our whole life would be divided between the despotism of outward 
impressions, and that of senseless and passive memory.’129 In this respect, for 
Coleridge, association is a passive process which is not able to formulate the 
mind. 
    If we look at the early versions of ‘The Eolian Harp’, we find how the poet 
was struggling with the issue of the passivity and activity of the mind. In the 
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version of 1817, we can notice the sense of passivity in that ‘many a thought 
uncall’d and undetain’d / And many idle flitting phantasies, / Traverse my 
indolent and passive brain’ (ll. 39-41). But the second draft of the poem (1797) 
expresses the idea of passivity more clearly. Instead of ‘passive brain’, the 
draft uses ‘passive Mind’ explicitly. In addition, the different understandings of 
‘organic Harps’ imply a tension between passivity and activity. Unlike the final 
version, the second draft provides a longer version of the famous culminating 
metaphysical vision: 
 
And what if all of animated nature 
Be but organic Harps diversely fram’d, 
That tremble into thought, as o’ev them sweeps 
Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze, 
At once the Soul of each, and God of all? (the final version of 1817) 
 
And what if All of animated Life 
Be but as Instruments diversly fram’d 
That tremble into thought, while thro’ them breathes 
One infinite and intellectual Breeze, 
And all in different Heights so aptly hung, 
That Murmurs indistinct and Bursts sublime, 
Shrill Discords and most soothing Melodies, 
Harmonious from Creation’s vast concent— 
Thus God would be the universal Soul, 
Mechaniz’d matter as th’ organic harps 
And each one’s Tunes be that, which each calls I (l, 36-46) (the second 
draft) 
 
Here attention should be given to the understanding of ‘organic Harps’. 
Whereas the Harps are described simply as ‘diversely fram’d’ in the final 
 102 
version, the second draft stresses the diversity of the harps by articulating the 
sense of their individualities in detail. All the harps are different from one 
another on the grounds that they hang ‘aptly’ ‘all in different Heights’, and each 
one’s tunes reveal ‘I’. Magnuson makes an interesting comment on the ‘I’ of the 
second draft. If the ‘I’ is like a tune which is ‘wild’, ‘various’, and ‘random’, then 
selfhood is ‘an indefinite collection of random notes, unpredictable, unconnected, 
and without a unifying consciousness’.130 Here the ‘I’ as ‘an indefinite collection 
of random notes’ seems to imply the passivity of the mind over and against the 
notion of God as ‘the universal Soul’.131 
    Coleridge himself is aware of the disharmony of ‘diversely fram’d harps’, 
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but he is able to perceive harmony out of such disharmony. Their ‘Murmurs’ are 
‘indistinct’, but ‘Bursts sublime’; they create ‘Shrill Discords’, but ‘most soothing 
Melodies, / Harmonious from Creation’s vast concent—’. These ‘diversely 
fram’d harps’ are ‘Mechaniz’d matter’, which implies the passivity of the mind in 
relation to Hartley’s mechanistic understanding of the mind, but ‘One infinite 
and intellectual Breeze’ creates the unity of the universe. In spite of ‘Shrill 
Discords’, the passive mind can produce a sense of unity owing to the unifying 
force of God. In this strange cluster of images that seem to contain 
contradictions Coleridge is working his way towards or trying to find a way to 
express an idea of God as the unifying force behind this discord. 
    In consequence, the differences between the second draft and the final 
version hint that the poet is struggling between the ideas of the passivity and 
the activity of the mind. While the passivity stands out in the early version, it 
becomes less conspicuous in the final version. Whether it is passivity or activity, 
there is no doubt that Coleridge’s main concern is to convey the unity of the 
universe. On the one hand, the second draft produces the unity of the universe 
in a mechanistic sense through the interaction between ‘Mechaniz’d matter’ and 
‘One infinite and intellectual Breeze’. On the other hand, the final version 
creates the idea of ‘the one Life’ through the interaction between ‘that simplest 
Lute’ and ‘the desultory breeze’ even before the vision of ‘organic Harps’. And 
‘the one Life’ brings about the sense of joy and love contrasted with the sense 
of mechanism. Yet, the fact that brain is described as ‘passive’ and Coleridge’s 
‘organic Harps’ are subject to ‘one intellectual breeze’ suggests an anxiety 
about the status of the activity of the mind. In this respect, William Scheuerle 
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points out rightly that the vision of ‘organic Harps’ is not a hymn, but a question 
about the exercise of the mind. 132  Furthermore, that issue causes another 
tension between an external world and the mind. If an external world is 
dependent upon the creativity of the mind, its meaning can be regarded simply 
as a projection of the mind. The complexities of this problem are explored more 
fully in Coleridge’s ‘Dejection: An Ode’. 
 
2.6. An external world and the mind in ‘Dejection: An Ode’ 
    The two most famous lines of ‘Dejection: An Ode’ have generated a great 
deal of critical attention, ‘we receive but what we give / And in our life alone 
does Nature live’. They have been taken as ‘a monumental mark of the turn of 
English thought from empiricism to idealism’.133 Hailing the ode as one of the 
two greatest and most representative poems of the early nineteenth century, M. 
H. Abrams argues that ‘Coleridge’s theory of mind’ was ‘revolutionary’.134 The 
revolution or shift has been understood to occur between different pairs of 
terms by different critics: ‘idealism and empiricism (or associationism)’, ‘active 
and passive’, ‘inner and outer’, ‘Kant and Hartley’, ‘mind and nature’.135 Yet, 
some critics, including Murray Krieger and I. A. Richards, cast doubt on the 
integrity of these binaries. While the former regards the typical Coleridgean 
dichotomy of mind and nature as a ‘deceptive opposition’, the latter argues that 
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it is just ‘linguistic illusion’. 136  Although Coleridge seems to shift from 
empiricism to idealism and to develop hierarchical dualisms, attention must be 
paid to the tension between mind and nature developed in the poem. If we look 
closely at the interaction between them in the poem, we find that they influence 
each other in terms of creating meaning and it is hard to tell which of them is 
the primary cause for it. 
    In ‘Dejection: An Ode’, the poet reveals a desperate state of his mind in a 
confessional tone. It is a failure of his ‘genial spirits’ and his ‘shaping spirit of 
Imagination’, or, according to Andrew Keanie, a ‘depression’ in a psychological 
sense in that the poet is ‘trapped in a colorless consciousness’ and ‘removed 
from the real throb of the senses’, expressing ‘pure dullness’.137 Whether it is a 
depression or failure of imagination, the fatal consequence is that he cannot feel 
the beauty of nature. In Stanza II, the poet conveys ‘the sense of ‘A grief 
without a pang, void, dark, and drear’ which is caused by the fact that he can 
‘see’, but cannot ‘feel’, the beauty of ‘the balmy and serene eve’, ‘its peculiar 
tint of yellow green of the western sky’, ‘thin clouds’, ‘the stars’ and ‘crescent 
Moon’. Interestingly, referring to his past experience with an external nature, in 
Stanza I he voices hopes that she will bring back his ‘genial spirits’: 
 
Those sounds which oft have raised me, whilst they awed, 
And sent my soul abroad, 
Might now perhaps their wonted impulse give, 
Might startle this dull pain, and make it move and live! (ll. 17-20) 
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Here it should be noted that external nature has been a stimulus to his ‘genial 
spirits’ in the past, and the poet is still yearning for the similar interaction. The 
Stanza II displays his desperate effort to retrieve the power through the act of 
gazing: ‘Have I been gazing on the western sky [. . .] And still I gaze.’ 
    Yet, from Stanza III to VI, he proclaims that he abandons hope of such 
inspiration from an external nature but instead he turns to look within. Most of 
all, he concludes that it was ‘a vain endeavour’ to ‘gaze for ever on that green 
light in the west’ for ‘winning the passion and the life’, and realises that their 
‘fountains are within’. He then makes the famous declaration: 
 
O Lady! We receive but what we give 
And in our life alone does Nature live (ll. 47-48) 
 
For Coleridge, nature becomes a projection of the mind on the grounds that it 
cannot affect our feelings and emotions any more, and becomes dependent upon 
the mind in terms of its meanings. Therefore the inner ‘soul’ itself ‘must issue 
forth a light, a glory, a fair luminous cloud, enveloping the Earth’. Notably, ‘Joy’, 
which is given only ‘to the pure’, is thought of as ‘the spirit and the power’ 
which ‘wedding Nature to us gives in dower / A new Earth and new Heaven’. 
This new Earth and new Heaven does not correlate with an external world but 
is a sheer projection of the mind in that it is ‘undreamt of by the sensual’ but 
exists ‘in ourselves’. 
    But, after going through the painful experience of ‘a grief without a pang’, 
in stanza VII he appears to regain his ‘shaping spirit of Imagination 
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Hence, viper thoughts, that coil around my mind, 
Reality’s dark dream! 
I turn from you, and listen to the wind, 
Which long has raved unnoticed. (ll. 94-97) 
 
Overcoming ‘Reality’s dark dream’ or ‘dull pain’, the poet now can interact with 
an external world by noticing the power of ‘the wind’, which comes not from 
within, but ‘without’. As Barth pointed out, the poet ‘had projected his own 
feelings onto the wind – and so could hear only his own depression’ until stanza 
VI.138 But he became aware of the wind which is sensory and external, and his 
‘shaping spirit of Imagination’ began to mediate between the poet and nature, 
telling ‘a tale of less affright, and tempered with delight’. In fact, it is not clear 
whether it is the stimulus of an external nature, or the recovery of joy in 
himself, that enables the poet to turn away from ‘viper thoughts’ and to feel 
again the beauty of nature. Although it is difficult to define the source of the ‘A 
tale of less affright’, it is clear that it originates with the interaction between 
the mind and an external world. 
    In this respect, it is not fair to view the two famous lines simply as a 
manifesto for the shift from empiricism to idealism. They need to be understood 
in terms of the context of the process of poetic inspiration of which they only 
form a part. As Andrew Keanie points out, the poem is ‘not primarily 
Coleridge’s formal recognition of his inability to win ‘from outward forms [. . .] 
The passion and the life, whose fountains are within’. Rather it suggests his 
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awareness of the ubiquity of his melancholy in himself.139 Paradoxically, in spite 
of this melancholy or ‘a grief without a pang’, Coleridge manages to ‘make his 
negative emotions poetically viable’.140 One of the reasons for his capability is 
that the poet’s declaration of the deadness of his poetic imagination ‘could not 
disguise the apparent accuracy of the self-assessment’.141 In consequence, his 
expression of the hope for regaining his poetic imagination through his 
interaction with nature in Stanza I already presupposes the returning of the 
power in Stanza VII. If we understand the poem as the process of retrieving his 
genial spirits, rather than a shift from empiricism to idealism, it can be argued 
that the famous two lines reflect partly the state of the poet’s failure to interact 
with nature owing to melancholy, or depression, or ‘dull pain’. 
    If ‘The Eolian Harp’ is questioning whether the mind is dependent solely 
upon sensory and external experience, ‘Dejection: An Ode’ is concerned with 
whether nature has its own independent reality or it is just a projection of the 
mind. Whereas the former is associated with empiricism, the latter is often dealt 
with in the context of idealism. One of the tantalising issues in Coleridge is that 
there is no clear boundary between empiricism and idealism, between nature 
and the mind, in terms of the source for creating meanings. Strikingly, the poet 
himself is aware of this tension, and his impressive letter to James Gillman in 
1825 communicates spiritedly a battle between two rival artists, the Mind and 
Nature: 
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In Youth and early Manhood the Mind and Nature are, as it were, two rival 
Artists, both potent Magicians, and engaged, like the King's Daughter and 
the rebel Genie in the Arabian Nights' Enternts., in sharp conflict of 
Conjuration — each having for it's object to turn the other into Canvas to 
paint on, Clay to mould, or Cabinet to contain. For a while the Mind seems 
to have the better in the contest, and makes of Nature what it likes; takes 
her Lichens and Weather-stains for Types & Printer's Ink and prints Maps 
& Fac Similes of Arabic and Sanscrit Mss. on her rocks; composes 
Country-Dances on her moon-shiny Ripples [. . .] But alas! alas! that 
Nature is a wary wily long-breathed old Witch, tough-lived as a Turtle 
and divisible as the Polyp, repullulative in a thousand Snips and Cuttings, 
integra et in toto! She is sure to get the better of Lady MIND in the long 
run, and to take her revenge too — transforms our To Day into a Canvass 
dead-colored to receive the dull featureless Portrait of Yesterday [. . .] 
she mocks the mind with it's own metaphors, metamorphosing the Memory 
into a lignum vitae Escrutoire to keep unpaid Bills & Dun's Letters in, with 
Outlines that had never been filled up.142 
 
This is a wry account of how the poet has been struggling between the mind 
and nature or between subject and object. His personal defeat sounds 
pessimistic in that ‘the mind, having once been the master, has become the 
slave’. 143  As Abrams put it, ‘Coleridge implicitly describes his having 
succumbed, with the passage of time, to the actuality in his own experience of a 
concept of the mind in perception against which his own philosophy of the 
active, projective, and creative mind had been a sustained refutation.’ 144 
Although this summary expresses ‘the stream of pessimism that all [some 
essential shaping and organizing power] was lost’, John Beer points out how 
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Coleridge paradoxically describes this perpetual struggle ‘imaginatively’ and 
how ‘his mind was ranging as vividly as before’.145 
    It is arguable whether Coleridge was able to integrate these two rival 
artists finally into unity or became an idealist by abandoning empiricism. He 
wrote to Thomas Poole in 1801: ‘If I do not greatly delude myself, I have not 
only completely extricated the notions of Time, and Space; but have overthrown 
the doctrine of Association, as taught by Hartley, and with it all the irreligious 
metaphysics of modern Infidels — especially, the doctrine of Necessity.’146 This 
passage has been taken by critics to suggest that Coleridge was enthusiastic 
about Hartley for a few years but he later criticised his association theory for 
its mechanical and materialistic aspects.147 Thus in studies of Coleridge the 
thought of Hartley is often regarded as the idea which influenced Coleridge for 
a few years and then disappeared later. 
    What all this shows is that Coleridge never completely ceased to vacillate 
between the mind and nature or between idealism and empiricism. What matters 
in the middle of the tension is the significance of nature as a sensory 
experience. Whether it is the primary or secondary cause creating meaning, the 
poet associates the materiality of nature with the power of imagination. 
Hartley’s theory of sensory experience still remains in his later years.148 Over 
and against the idealistic perspective, Coleridge had to admit that he could not 
avoid the feeling that the interpretation of nature was only a human 
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perception.149 For him, that limitation, however, is not necessarily subject to a 
chasm between human perception and external nature in the sense that the 
materiality of nature matters even in his later years in terms of its relationship 
with humanity and God. 
 
3. A mutual relationship and a religious aspect in evolution 
3.1. A mutual relationship in a passage from The Statesman’s Manual 
    From an ecotheological perspective, there is another problem in the 
relationship between humankind and nature. Although the complex interactions 
between them reveal the significance of nature as a physical reality, their 
relationship still generates the unresolved tension of hierarchy with regard to 
the issue of epistemology. According to Coleridge’s terms, there is the question 
of who is the master between the two rival Artists. In addition, as pointed out 
already, for Coleridge, in spite of the interrelatedness between man and the 
noblest animals of the brute creation, there is a wide chasm between them in 
his idea of evolution to the extent that the human body is the crown and 
summation of the evolution. We cannot deny the impression that the thought of 
Coleridge assumes the superiority of humankind over nature, but it can be 
asserted that he understands their relationship not in terms of dominance, but in 
a reciprocal and mutual way. Besides, in this section, it will be seen that 
Coleridge’s attempt to find the unity of the universe through the scientific and 
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philosophical ideas of the process of evolution is essentially associated with his 
religious thought. 
    If we look at a passage from The Statesman’s Manual, it will be noted that 
Coleridge is aware of the problem of domination in the relationship between 
humankind and nature, but at the same time he attempts to establish a 
reciprocal and mutual relationship between them within the context of his 
religious ideas: 
 
I seem to myself to behold in the quiet objects, on which I am gazing, 
more than an arbitrary illustration, more than a mere simile, the work of 
my own Fancy. I feel an awe, as if there were before my eyes the same 
Power as that of the Reason – the same power in a lower dignity, and 
therefore a symbol established in the truth of things. I feel it alike, 
whether I contemplate a single tree or flower, or meditate on vegetation 
throughout the world, as one of the great organs of the life of nature. Lo!-
with the rising sun it commences its outward life and enters into open 
communion with all the elements, at once assimilating them to itself and to 
each other [. . .] in incorporating the one extreme becomes the symbol of 
the other; the natural symbol of that higher life of reason, in which the 
whole series (known to us in our present state of being) is perfected, in 
which, therefore, all the subordinate gradations recur, and are reordained 
“in more abundant honour”. We had seen each in its own cast, and we now 
recognise them all as co-existing in the unity of a higher form, the Crown 
and Completion of the Earthly, and the Mediator of a new and heavenly 
series. Thus finally, the vegetable creation, in the simplicity and 
uniformity of its internal structure symbolising the unity of nature, while it 
represents the omniformity of her delegated functions in its external 
variety and manifoldness, becomes the record and chronicle of her 
ministerial acts, and inchases the vast unfolded volume of the earth with 
the hieroglyphics of her history.150 
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Most of all, Coleridge clearly articulates an idea of the organic relationship of 
the whole universe in the sense that all the elements of the universe hold 
communion with one another. Rejecting a mechanistic view of nature and the 
mind, the poet constructs a vision of the communion through the interaction 
between ‘the creative powers of the mind and the powers of growth in organic 
nature’.151 Yet, this vision implies the issue of superiority and inferiority as 
each part of the universe is regarded as inferior or superior to other parts. The 
phrases, ‘in a lower dignity’, ‘higher life of reason’, ‘subordinate gradations’, 
indicate implicitly that Coleridge himself is aware of a hierarchical system of 
the universe, but he tries to overcome the sense of hierarchy not by destroying 
it, but by looking at it from another perspective. 
    In particular, attention should be paid to the phrase, ‘in more abundant 
honour’, which implies the significance of ‘all the subordinate gradations’. The 
phrase is a quotation from 1 Corinthians 12:24, and St. Paul, in this chapter, 
argues that our body consists of many members; all the members make one 
body; and at the same time, ‘God has so arranged the body, giving the greater 
honour to the inferior member.’152 The implication is that the inferior members 
of the body are given their own unique value by God, and therefore the different 
members of the body maintain a reciprocal relationship rather than the 
relationship of dominance. Interestingly, Coleridge uses this quotation in 
articulating the relationship of the universe. For him, man as the completion of 
the progressive evolution is a higher form, but this idea of superiority does not 
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presuppose man’s dominance over nature. As the inferior member of the body is 
given the great honour by God, so is nature re-ordained ‘in more abundant 
honour’ by the divinity.153 Although humanity is regarded as superior to the 
non-human natural world in some senses, the relationship between them is 
characterised not by dominance, but by reciprocality and mutuality in terms of 
the dynamics of communion and re-ordination ‘in more abundant honour’. 
    This reciprocal and mutual relationship is also based on the one-and-many 
theory of the one life described in the first section of this chapter.154 The 
universe expresses a sense of unity through the divine presence which is 
ubiquitous, but this ‘one Life’ does not diminish the being of each part of the 
universe. Rather each of them maintains its own unique being. Concerning the 
relationship between humanity and nature in the one life, Coleridge holds that 
‘Nature has her proper interest’.155 Seamus Perry translates this idea into these 
terms: ‘natural objects in their own right have the noblest of callings, for they 
are, in a most literal way, and while remaining entirely themselves, living 
evidences of God’. 156  As a result, the notion of the one life represents a 
reciprocal and mutual relationship. Coleridge asserts a similar idea in the last 
part of The Ancient Mariner: 
 
He prayeth well, who loveth well 
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Both man and bird and beast. 
 
He prayeth best, who loveth best 
All things both great and small; 
For the dear God who loveth us, 
He made and loveth all.   (ll. 612-617) 
 
The mariner experienced a sense of aloneness by being isolated from his 
community and God, and he shows that he could reestablish the broken 
relationship through the power of love. Interpreting his experience according to 
the language of Christianity and the society to which the Wedding Guest 
belongs, the Mariner provides a final summarizing moral.157 When we look at 
the two phrases, ‘Both man and bird and beast’ and ‘All things both great and 
small’, it is clear that Coleridge makes a distinction between humankind and the 
non-human natural world in terms of superiority and inferiority. But, at the 
same time, he attempts to establish a reciprocal relationship between them, 
rather than a relationship of separation and dominance, through the power of 
love. Although the universe consists of different parts, both ‘great and small’, 
each of them has its own intrinsic value which is based on the power of God’s 
love. Because of that, in spite of the distinctions of superiority and inferiority, 
they are able to develop a mutual and reciprocal relationship. For Coleridge, the 
possibility of such love is opened up by his religious faith, God ‘made and loveth 
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all’. Whereas the creation is characterised by variety, sometimes carrying with 
divisions of superiority and inferiority, the intrinsic value of each part of 
creation does not spring from that differentiation, but from the power of love. 
 
3.2. Martin Buber’s idea of I-Thou 
    Martin Buber’s work is a help to understand what Coleridge seems to be 
getting at. In his best-known book, I and Thou (1923), Buber offers two 
different ways of understanding the dynamic of relationship, I-Thou and I-It. 
The former is remarkably similar to Coleridge’s understanding of love between 
humanity and nature. For Buber, the world is twofold in terms of man’s attitude 
and basic words, and the basic words consist of a pair, ‘one basic word is the 
word pair I-Thou. The other basic word is the word pair I-It.’158 As ‘in the 
beginning is the relation’, the essential dynamics of the basic words is that of 
relation.159 The I-Thou relation establishes a reciprocal relationship, whilst the 
I-It relation rejects the reciprocal dynamic. In the former, ‘my Thou acts on me 
as I act on it’, and therefore ‘he (thou) is no thing among things nor does he 
(thou) consist of things.’160 In the latter, the I ‘is not bodily confronted by a You 
but surrounded by a multitude of contents’, and, as a result, ‘the relationship is 
permeated by means.’ The Thou becomes ‘an object among objects, possibly 
the noblest one and yet one of them, assigned its measure and boundary’.161 
    His concept of two types of relation is involved in two levels, between God 
and man, and between man and man. If the one is ‘essentially an epistemological 
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issue dealing with the peculiar ways in which God is known’, the other is 
‘mainly an ethical question regarding the proper way to act toward other human 
beings’.162 The I-Thou relation as a way of knowing is concerned with mystical 
knowledge about God, and as a moral way it shows how other people need to be 
treated in the world. Particularly, the ethical level of the distinction between I-
Thou and I-It is important in assessing how the modern world encourages 
humans to treat others as objects and instruments to be exploited and used 
within the context of technological progress. If ‘I-Thou relation refers to an 
intimate, caring relation which accepts another person for what he is’, ‘I-It 
relation refers mainly to the inevitable use of objects and persons for private, 
selfish purposes.’163 
    Interestingly, Buber’s idea of the two different types of relation reflects on 
the different relations between the human and nature. In other words, the 
dynamics of the I-Thou and I-It relationships can be applied to the relationship 
between the human and nature. It has often been pointed out that the 
anthropocentric Western view of nature established a dualism of man and 
nature, and saw nature as existing only to serve human ends. Further, the 
domination and exploitation of nature has been accelerated by the progress of 
science and technology. This kind of relationship between the human and nature 
can be described by the I-It relation in that the I-It is ‘a world where there are 
objects to be used by the I, observed by the I [. . .] the I stands unrelated to the 
It, as a user [. . .] not being personally or subjectively involved’.164 In addition, 
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the I-It world, as Buber points out, ‘induces man to consider the It-world as the 
world in which one has to live and also can live comfortably – and that even 
offers us all sorts of stimulations and excitements, activities and knowledge’.165 
Nature in the I-It relation only exists for human needs. 
From the I-Thou’s point of view, nature is no longer treated as an object or 
instrument with purely functional value, but is regarded as a whole and as a 
unity with its own independent intrinsic values. As the I-Thou relationship is 
reciprocal, there is an interactive relationship between the human and nature, 
not in an exploitative and dominant sense, but in a caring and organic sense. 
Likewise, Coleridge’s understanding of the relationship between humanity and 
nature signifies the I-Thou relation as it refers to the interconnectedness of 
humanity and nature, based on love and reciprocity, rather than dominance. 
 
3.3. A religious aspect in imagination and symbol 
    We have discussed that the power of divine love plays a key role in 
overcoming a hierarchical relationship between humankind and nature in 
Coleridge’s scientific and philosophical notion of the inter-relatedness of the 
universe. Yet, another question arises from the perspective of ecotheology 
whether the notion represents the idea of the divinity. In order to examine that 
question, I shall return to the passage quoted above from The Statesman’s 
Manual, in which the presence of God can be revealed in the interactions 
between the elements of the universe through the powers of imagination and 
symbol. 
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    According to the passage, all the elements of the universe are not only in 
communion with one another, but also interact with one another through the 
dynamic of symbol in that ‘the one extreme becomes the symbol of the other’. 
In order to perceive the dynamic of the symbol in the universe, we need to 
understand Coleridge’s idea of imagination. Coleridge’s understanding of 
imagination has been subject to a very great deal of critical discussion, but here 
the main focus will be on its religious implications. Coleridge’s idea of 
imagination is basically religious in the sense that it is concerned with the sense 
of transcendence and the knowledge of God.166 In Chapter XIII of Biographia 
Literaria, the famous definition of ‘The primary IMAGINATION’ describes the 
transcendental power of the imagination as ‘the living Power and prime Agent 
of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act 
of creation in the infinite I AM’. 167  Elsewhere, Coleridge also called the 
imagination ‘a dim analogue of Creation, not all that we can believe but all that 
we can conceive of creation’.168 For him, the power of imagination enables the 
human mind to participate in the activity of the divine mind.169 As the human 
mind can be associated with the I AM through the imagination, Coleridge claims 
that the imagination enables the mind to experience a sense of transcendence. 
    When we look at its relationship with reason, the religious implication of 
imagination will be clearer. The human understanding has two distinct organs, 
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‘the outward sense, and the mind’s eye’. Reason is this mind’s eye, ‘an organ of 
inward sense’.170 Reason also needs to be mediated by imagination because the 
latter is completed by the former, which has the power of clearness, depth, and 
understanding.171 Reason impregnated with the imagination becomes ‘intuitive, 
and a living power’.172 Thus reason contains the imagination within itself, and 
the former needs to be mediated by the latter. The power of imagination, 
exerted by reason, is deeply religious in that reason is the highest human power, 
the breath of the power of God, a pure influence from the glory of the 
Almighty.173 God, the soul, and eternal truth are the objects of reason, but at 
the same time we name ‘God the Supreme Reason’. 174  Accordingly, the 
transcendental power of imagination itself is fundamentally involved in the 
Supreme Being. 
    This power of imagination is a cognitive power through which we are able 
to recognise not what is there, but what is not there.175 Coleridge also applies 
the dynamic of polarity to the cognitive power of imagination. In Chapter XIV of 
Biographia Literaria, he suggests that the power of imagination ‘reveals itself in 
the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities: of sameness, 
with difference; of the general, with the concrete; the idea, with the image; the 
individual, with the representative’.176 In a polar unity, two distinct realities 
neither oppose nor separate from each other, and therefore this dynamic of 
                                            
170
 Friend I, pp. 155-159. 
171
 SM, pp. 69-70. 
172
 Ibid, pp. 69-70. 
173
 Gallant, Coleridge’s Theory of Imagination Today, p. 5. 
174
 Grosvenor Powell, ‘Coleridge’s “Imagination” and the Infinite Regress of Consciousness’, ELH, 
39 (1972), 266-278 (p. 269). 
175
 Gallant, Coleridge’s Theory of Imagination Today, p.5; McVeigh, ‘Coleridge’s Doctrine of the 
Imagination’, p. 7. 
176
 BL II, p. 16-17. 
 121 
polarity in imagination provides the perception of the connectedness between 
human and divine. As Cutsinger put it, Coleridge had glimpsed ‘a world 
translucent to deity’ through the polar unity of imagination.177 Accordingly, the 
cognitive power of imagination, opening our eyes to the revision of immanence 
and transcendence, the reality of the self and the reality of God, compels us to 
see the divine reality which permeates the universe. 
    Likewise, the beginning of the quoted passage implies that for Coleridge the 
power of imagination enables the poet to see beyond ‘the quiet objects’. 
Although he is ‘gazing on’ ‘a single tree or flower’, he can perceive something 
more than that which brings about a sense of ‘an awe’, which is more than the 
work of his Fancy but is based on ‘the Reason’, the Supreme Reason. In this 
respect, the natural world is regarded not just as material reality but also as an 
idea, contemplated by the power of imagination. For Coleridge, there is unity 
between nature and an idea in that ideas are ‘CONSTITUTIVE, and one with the 
power and Life of Nature’.178 As ‘an idea, in the highest sense of that word, 
cannot be conveyed but by a symbol’, the natural world as an idea is able to 
interact with others by becoming a symbol.179 Coleridge argues that the one 
becomes the symbol of the other ‘in incorporating’, and therefore the natural 
world becomes the symbol of human reason. It must also be noted that human 
reason as ‘a higher form’ is ‘the Crown and Completion of the Earthly, and the 
Mediator of a new and heavenly series’. In other words, the human reason as 
the Mediator ‘is in its turn a symbol of that divine Reason, the Logos, which is 
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the life and the light of men’.180 Coleridge names ‘God the Supreme Reason’.181 
Accordingly, the natural world as a symbol of human reason participates in the 
reality of humanity, and human beings as a symbol of the Supreme Reason take 
part in the reality of the divinity. The quoted passage maintains that all are ‘co-
existing in the unity of a higher form’. As a result, what the poet feels is ‘the 
same Power as that of the Reason- the same power in a lower dignity, and 
therefore a symbol established in the truth of things’. The implication is that 
humanity and the natural world are in communion with each other by sharing in 
the reality of the Divinity through the power of the symbols. 
    Here it might seem necessary to clarify further the idea of symbol in order 
to show that the vision, conveyed by the contemplation of the mind and dynamic 
of the symbols, displays an ontological sense as well as an epistemological 
sense. As Catherine Wallace suggests, ‘symbols communicate ideas more 
adequately than discursive logical formulations, because a symbol holds 
together the contradictions that logic can only break apart.’182 Symbols can 
approach what is beyond our senses. Further, a symbol, for Coleridge, is not a 
metaphor or allegory or any other figure of speech or form of fancy, but an 
actual and essential part of that, the whole of which it represents, and therefore 
‘it always partakes of the Reality which it renders intelligible.’183 In other words, 
the one is able not only to represent but also to participate in the reality of the 
other by becoming the symbol of the other. Therefore a symbol is interrelated 
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with what it symbolises in an ontological sense as well as an epistemological 
sense. 
 
3.4. Symbol and sacrament in nature 
    Accordingly, if the natural world becomes the symbol of humanity, it can be 
‘a natural home for humanity’s ultimate identity’ through the dynamic of 
symbols.184 The natural world, contemplated by the power of the imagination, is 
not just a physical reality, but also ‘prophetic of history, of the moral and 
religious life of human beings’.185 In consequence, the human mind becomes 
‘the hermeneutical key to nature’ and ‘discloses it as a system of identifications’ 
in a sense that ‘all the subordinate gradations recur and are reordained in more 
abundant honour’ in the human mind. 186  In addition, nature ‘provides the 
symbolism with a language for the divine’ because the ‘Power’ of ‘the Reason’ 
can be found ‘in a lower dignity’ as well as in a ‘higher life’.187 In this respect, 
the power of symbols enables the universe to represent the idea of communion 
within the sense of the divinity. Even all elements are ‘perfected’ ‘in the natural 
symbol of that higher life of reason’. 
    In addition to the dynamic of symbol, the sacramental language of the 
passage also suggests how the natural world is permeated by the presence of 
God and participates in the reality of the Divinity. Some phrases in the passage 
refer to sacramental implications, for example, ‘communion’, ‘re-ordained’ and 
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‘ministerial acts’. For Coleridge, the sun appears to be ‘the traditional metaphor 
for God’s power, the source of growth and self-realisation’.188 He mentions that 
‘Man knows God only by revelation from God – as we see the Sun by his own 
Light’.189 Further, in the Statesman’s Manual, from which the passage is quoted, 
Coleridge claims that ‘the natural sun is a symbol of the spiritual’.190 When 
‘with the rising sun’ nature enters into ‘open communion with all the elements’, 
it is shown that the communion of the whole universe is sacred in the light of 
the rising sun, which symbolises the power of God. At the same time, in the 
sacredness of the communion, ‘all the subordinate gradations are reordained’ 
‘in more abundant honor’. We have already seen the significance of this phrase 
in terms of the I-Thou relationship between humanity and the non-human 
natural world. Here the focus must be on the word, ‘reordained’. This term 
expresses definitely the sense of a sacrament in that the act of ordination 
embodies God’s act in relation to the creation. When the nature is reordained in 
‘more abundant honour’, the act of reordination refers to the establishment of 
the relationship between God and the creation. The prefix ‘re’ is worth noting. 
The nature was already ordained through the creation of God, but Coleridge 
seems to emphasise its sacredness by regarding it as being ordained again. 
    Interestingly, Coleridge even describes nature as performing an act of 
ministry associated with the idea of sacrament. In the passage quoted from The 
Statesman’s Manual, he propounds the idea that ‘the vegetable creation 
becomes the record and chronicle of her ministerial acts’. If nature is in 
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communion with itself in terms of the rising sun and is reordained, her 
‘ministerial acts’ alludes to the sense of sacrament. The natural world, for 
Coleridge, is conceived not just as a natural phenomenon, but also as the act of 
sacrament in relation to its sacredness. The idea of sacrament is usually linked 
with humanity, but Coleridge clearly applies it to nature in this passage. It is not 
inappropriate to relate nature with the sense of sacrament. When we regard all 
of creation as sacred, we ‘must necessarily think of the Earth with the kind of 
reverence that we would accord a lower case sacrament because by sacrament 
is meant a sign pointing to God’s action in our lives’.191 Accordingly, the non-
human natural world, for Coleridge, communicates the idea of sacrament. 
 
4. The problem of pantheism 
4.1. Coleridge’s struggle with pantheism 
    When ecotheology attempts to express the oneness and sacredness of the 
universe through the immanence of God, it has to face the problem of pantheism. 
Whereas, traditionally, theology has stressed the transcendence of God as an 
Absolute Other, ecotheology tries to articulate the immanence of God in the 
universe, which sometimes blurs the distinction between the finite and the 
infinite. It is crucial for ecotheology to maintain both the immanence and the 
transcendence of God. Likewise, pantheism had become a thorny issue for 
Coleridge even from his early years in the sense that he often struggled with 
the tension between pantheism and Christian orthodoxy. As McFarland mentions 
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that ‘it is almost as though literary commentators have entered a kind of silent 
conspiracy never to challenge one another as to the exact meaning of these 
ideas [pantheism], or to the appropriateness of their invocation’, it is hard to 
define the meaning of pantheism.192 For example, pantheism means that ‘every 
single thing is divine’, or it denotes that ‘it is the Whole, the unitary All, that is 
the only God’.193 First of all, the problem of pantheism in Coleridge appears to 
originate in his involvement with the thoughts of Priestley and Spinoza. 
    In a letter to John Thelwall in 1797, he expresses a desire for a kind of 
totality through a universally transforming power: 
 
I can at times feel strongly the beauties, you describe, in themselves, & 
for themselves – but more frequently all things appear little – all the 
knowledge, that can be acquired, child’s play – the universe itself – what 
but an immense heap of little things? – I can contemplate nothing but parts, 
& parts are all little - ! – My mind feels as if it ached to behold & know 
something great – something one & indivisible – and it is only in the faith 
of this that rocks or waterfalls, mountains or caverns give me the sense of 
sublimity or majesty! – But in this faith all things counterfeit infinity!194 
 
This passage explicitly indicates that Coleridge is eager to discover the 
oneness in various parts. Presupposing the power of ‘one and indivisible’, the 
poet is able to feel ‘the sense of sublimity or majesty’ in nature. In addition, ‘all 
things’ appear to represent ‘infinity’ through the power. Accordingly, for him, 
nature is more than a mere object. In the second section, it was seen that 
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Coleridge describes nature as the place of divine presence by focusing on the 
immanence of God, rather than the Absolute Otherness: ‘the Universal Soul’, 
‘the Soul of each, and God of all’ in ‘The Eolian Harp’, ‘God its Identity: God all 
in all!’ in Religious Musings, ‘All-conscious Presence of the Universe!’ in The 
Destiny of Nations. In this respect, nature is not just a physical natural world, 
but becomes more than a mere object through its close association with divine 
presence. 
    The sense of divine presence empowers nature to be animated and active. 
In The Destiny of Nations, God is pronounced as ‘Nature’s vast ever-acting 
Energy! [. . .] Impulse of All to All!’, and He becomes ‘Plastic and vast, one 
intellectual breeze’ which ‘animates nature’ in ‘The Eolian Harp’. The idea of 
active and animated nature is also prevalent in other Conversation Poems. In 
‘This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison’, the poet imagines that his friends ‘wander 
on / In gladness all’ in nature, but he describes in a touching way how ‘my 
gentle-hearted Charles’ may be ‘most glad’ in this beautiful landscape in a 
sense that he: 
 
[. . . ] hast pined 
And hunger’d after Nature, many a year, 
In the great City pent, winning thy way 
With sad yet patient soul, through evil and pain 
And strange calamity! (ll. 27-32) 
 
Further, the poet shows that ‘my friend struck with deep joy’ experiences a 
spirit as well as solace in nature: 
 
 128 
[he] gaze till all doth seem 
Less gross than bodily; and of such hues 
As veil the Almighty Spirit, when yet he makes 
Spirits perceive his presence. (ll. 40-43) 
 
Intriguingly, the poet provides a more detailed description of this passage in his 
earlier version of the poem: 
 
[. . .] gaze till all doth seem 
Less gross than bodily, a living thing 
Which acts upon the mind—and with such hues 
As cloath the Almighty Spirit, when he makes 
Spirits perceive his presence. (from Annual Anthology)195 
 
In this earlier text, all nature is explicitly conceived as ‘a living thing’ that, ‘in 
the manner of God’, ‘acts upon the [human] mind’ –‘a statement that can be 
read as compatible with the ‘animated nature’ and ‘intellectual breeze’ in “The 
Eolian Harp”’.196 And it is the presence of ‘the Almighty Spirit’ that makes all 
nature ‘a living thing’. In a similar vein, in ‘The Nightingale’, the moon, emerging 
from behind a cloud, ‘awakens earth and sky / With one sensation, and those 
wakeful birds / Have all burst forth in choral minstrelsy, / As if some sudden 
gale had swept at once / A hundred airy harps!’. (l, 78-82). Like ‘intellectual 
breeze’, ‘the moon’ appears to animate all nature. 
    The idea of God as ‘the Universal Soul’ and ‘intellectual breeze’, which is 
resonant with the thoughts of Priestley and Spinoza, appears to cause the 
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problem of pantheism. As the creation is identified with God in the dynamic of 
energy in Priestley and the idea of substance in Spinoza, Coleridge conveys the 
impression of the identification of God and the universe in the intimate 
relationship between God and nature, in which nature becomes animated. 
Modiano points out that this ‘metaphoric equivalence established between God 
and nature via the unifying “intellectual breeze”’ inevitably made Coleridge 
liable to ‘the stigma of pantheism’.197 In fact, Coleridge himself became fully 
aware of the problem of pantheism in the thoughts of Priestley and Spinoza. 
    In a letter to John Edwards in 1796, Coleridge argues: ‘how is it that Dr 
Priestley is not an atheist? – He asserts in three different Places, that God not 
only does, but is, everything – But if God be every Thing, every Thing is God -
 : which is all, the Atheists assert.’198 A year later Coleridge wrote in his note 
that ‘Unitarian/travelling from Orthodoxy to Atheism’.199 In addition, Coleridge 
shows an ambivalent attitude towards Spinoza.200 He describes Spinozism as a 
skeleton in a number of places: ‘Spinoza’s is the only true philosophy; but it is 
the Skeleton of the Truth, to scare & disgust – and an imperfect Skeleton, 
moreover.’201 On the one hand, he praises the philosophy of Spinoza. On the 
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other hand, he rejects it. Richard Berkeley explains this dual attitude to Spinoza 
in terms of the crisis between reason and faith. He claims that Coleridge’s 
binary view of Spinoza is an attempt at ‘establishing a pattern of trying to 
reconcile Spinoza’s reason with his own faith’.202 Coleridge refers to the clash 
between reason and faith in Biographia Literaria: ‘For a very long time indeed I 
could not reconcile personality with infinity; and my head was with Spinoza, 
though my whole heart remained with Paul and John.’203 
    Coleridge’s fundamental dilemma over the idea of God lies in the tension 
between the immanence and the transcendence of God. He wants to conceive 
God as being present in the universe, but at the same time he tries to be loyal 
to the Christian orthodox idea of God as Absolute Otherness. In fact, this on-
going struggle reveals a significant aspect about the continuity and discontinuity 
of Coleridge’s thinking about religion and philosophy. At the beginning of the 
chapter, it was mentioned that his interest in Unitarianism and Hartley’s 
associationism later shifted to orthodoxy Christianity and natural philosophy, 
but he never entirely overcame the tensions implicit in this shift. His primary 
concern to conceive the universe as a whole remained a crucial part of 
Coleridge’s thinking, and it is, for Coleridge, a divine presence that empowers 
the universe to attain a sense of unity. As a result, he remained reluctant simply 
to discard the pantheistic ideas of God he had found in Priestley and Spinoza. 
 
4.2. The pantheist controversy in Germany 
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    In order to examine the process of how Coleridge tries to overcome the 
problem of pantheism, it seems that we need to understand the historical and 
intellectual contexts of pantheism during early German Romanticism with which 
Coleridge was familiar. As has been acknowledged, there were three crucial 
intellectual happenings of the 1780s, which contributed considerably to the 
formation of the so-called German Romantic circle in 1790s; the breakout of the 
pantheist controversy (Pantheismusstreit), the instant enthusiasm for Immanuel 
Kant’s critical philosophy, and the transforming power of the French 
Revolution. 204  Especially, reference should be made to the pantheist 
controversy, which is considered as a springboard leading to German 
Romanticism. Friedrich Jacobi had a conversation with Lessing in 1780 and was 
convinced that he was a clear Spinozist in his last days: Jacobi: ‘You [Lessing] 
surprised me [. . . ] there is nothing that I would have suspected less, than to 
find a Spinozist or a pantheist in you. And you blurted it out to me so suddenly. 
In the main I had come to get help from you against Spinoza.’205 Jacobi sent a 
private letter to Moses Mendelssohn with a long account of his conversation 
with Lessing. Disagreeing with Jacobi’s thought on Lessing and Spinoza, 
Mendelssohn published Morgenstunden, or Lectures on the Existence of God in 
1785, in which he tries to justify their philosophy as ‘a morally and religiously 
acceptable purified pantheism (gelauterter Pantheismus)’ which can be 
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‘consistent with any positive religion’: ‘Lessing envisaged pantheism in the 
totally refined manner I have scribed to him: in complete harmony with 
whatever has a bearing on life and happiness; indeed, that he was on his way to 
link pantheistic concepts even with positive religion.’ 206  As an immediate 
counter to it, Jacobi published On the Doctrine of Spinoza which is a collection 
of his talks with Lessing and his idea on Spinoza. Jacobi conceives Spinozism as 
‘atheism’ in the sense that, according to Spinoza’s principles, ‘outside thinking 
finite things there cannot be yet another particular infinite will and 
understanding, together with a particular infinite absolute thought’.207 In other 
words, for Jacobi, Spinoza’s idea of God is not God at all because He has 
neither will nor intellect which is infinite and unconditioned, but He is only an 
immanent God. 
    Interestingly, this pantheist controversy ‘proved an epoch-marking event, 
for it brought into the open the underground current of Spinozist sympathy, 
where it rapidly revealed itself as having swollen to a Romantic tide’.208 A 
number of [early] Romantics responded enthusiastically to the controversy, 
Herder, Schleiermacher, Schlegel, Novalis, Schelling. One of the reasons they 
were fascinated with it is their aim to find the unity of the universe, for example, 
in terms of the relationship between the world and God, the finite and the 
infinite, over and against dualism. Jacobi observes that ‘whenever Lessing 
wanted to represent a personal Divinity, he thought of it as the soul of the All; 
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and he thought the Whole after the analogy of an organic body’.209 Lessing 
himself says to Jacobi, ‘the orthodox concepts of the Divinity are no longer for 
me; I cannot stomach them. Hen kai pan! I know of nothing else [. . .] I have 
come to talk to you about my hen kai pan.’210 This phrase means ‘one and all’ 
which, according to Lessing, was the inscription on a temple of the ancients.211 
Likewise, the Romantics were definitely willing to discover their own hen kai 
pan. Although the Romantics attempted to formulate the notion of the unity by 
linking the finite with the infinite through Spinozism, they were caught in a 
thorny dilemma between the atheism – the pantheism of Spinozism - and the 
Absolute Otherness of orthodoxy Christianity. If they follow the idea of 
substance in Spinoza, they can attain the wholeness of the universe but cannot 
avoid the criticism of pantheism and atheism. By contrast, orthodox Christianity 
is often subject to the dualism between the finite and the infinite. In order to 
find a way of holding together both the finite and the infinite without obscuring 
the boundary between them, they developed a natural philosophy in which they 
were able to attain the unity but at the same time to maintain the distinction. 
Now I shall contextualise the dynamic in terms of the relationship between God 
and the world in German Romanticism. 
 
4.3. Kant’s transcendental idealism 
    The rise of the natural philosophy which had a considerable impact on 
Coleridge in his later period is related closely to the development of 
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transcendentalist thought in Germany that started with the works of Immanuel 
Kant.212 There is no need to underline the significance of Kant’s philosophy in 
the German Romantics in that the latter spurred on by and grew out of the 
former. 213  Mentioning the visionary idealism of Berkeley and the skeptical 
idealism of Descartes, Kant describes his idea of idealism as ‘transcendental 
idealism’.214 For the former two tendencies in idealism, the reality of external 
objects is doubted or regarded as a merely imaginary entity. Kant, however, 
opens up the possibility of external reality through the supposition of outer 
experience: ‘All cognition of things merely from pure understanding or pure 
reason is nothing but sheer illusion, and only in experience is there truth.’215 
For him, the idea of experience is not purely empirical, but is associated with 
the idea of the transcendental. He ‘calls all cognition transcendental that is 
occupied not so much with objects but with our manner of cognition of objects 
insofar as this is to be possible a priori.’216 The transcendental ‘would concern 
the origin of our cognitions of objects insofar as that cannot be ascribed to the 
objects’.217 Thus the transcendental is not concerned with objects themselves, 
but with how to know them. When Kant refers to the possibility of truth ‘only in 
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experience’, the notion of experience is conditioned by the idea of the 
transcendental. 
    In this respect, Kant’s philosophy can be seen basically as ‘an effort to 
resolve the conflict between dogmatism (especially, Leibnzian) and skepticism 
(especially, Humean)’.218 While he argues against the dictatorship of dogmatism 
that human reason should be ‘set to limits’ owing to the possibility of truth only 
in experience, he argues against the skepticism of empiricism that we have ‘a 
priori knowledge independent of all experience, a kind of knowledge which 
makes all our experience possible’.219 Although Kant’s transcendental idealism 
appears to overcome the limitations of empirical skepticism and idealistic 
dogmatism, it is still subject to dualism. In the First Critique, Kant makes a 
distinction between phenomena and noumena: ‘Appearances, to the extent that 
as objects they are thought in accordance with the unity of categories, are 
called phaenomena. If, however, I suppose there are to be things that are 
merely objects of understanding and that, nevertheless, can be given to an 
intuition, although not to sensible intuition [. . .] such things would be called 
noumena.’ 220  In order to allow human beings to have freedom in terms of 
morality, he points out another difference between them that ‘there is no 
freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with the 
[mechanical] laws of nature [cause and effect]’, but there is in ‘man a power of 
self-determination, independently of any coercion through sensuous impulses’. 
Kant explains that ‘every effect in the world must arise either from nature or 
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freedom, or whether instead both, each in a different relation, might be able to 
take place simultaneously in one and the same occurrence’. 221  He tries to 
bridge the gap between noumena and phenomena by conceiving human actions 
as being both spontaneous and subject to the mechanical laws of the natural 
world of phenomena, but, as Lakshmipahty points out, Kant is ‘unclear about 
how exactly the interaction between them is possible’. 222  As a result, the 
dualism still remains. 
    In addition, Kant’s philosophy is prone to another dualism between the 
‘regulative’ and the ‘constitutive uses of pure reason’. In fact, Kant formulates a 
philosophy of science that repudiates the mechanical understanding of nature 
but conceives it as dynamic. In his Physical Monadology and Critique of the 
Power of Judgment, Kant argues that both attractive and repulsive forces are 
required for natural phenomena.223  For example, he explains how the solar 
system was formed by means of the interaction of attractive and repulsive 
forces in Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens.224 Nature is 
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defined as not a ‘motive power’ but a ‘formative power’ which is associated 
with ‘self-propagating formative power’ and produces a product ‘in which 
everything is an end and reciprocally a means as well’. 225  Although Kant 
describes nature as a dynamic power, it is regarded as just ‘the mathematical 
whole of all appearances and the totality of their synthesis’.226 He differentiates 
the regulative principle from the constitutive principle: the former is ‘a principle 
of the greatest possible continuation and the extension of experience, in 
accordance with which no empirical boundary would hold as an absolute 
boundary’, but only the latter can ‘anticipate what is given in itself in the object 
prior to any regress’.227 And, for him, ‘a natural end is no constitutive concept 
of understanding or of reason, but it can still be a regulative concept for the 
reflecting power of judgment, for guiding research into objects of this kind.’228 
Accordingly, ‘all appearances, are ‘not things, but rather nothing but 
representations, and they cannot exist at all outside our mind.’229 In addition, he 
distinguishes matter from substance, and identifies the former with appearance. 
Matter as ‘a mere form or a certain mode of representation of an unknown 
object’ ‘seem to cut themselves loose from the soul, as it were, and hover 
outside it’.230 Thus matter is ‘substantia phaenomenon’ (phenomenal substance), 
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not a thing in itself.231 
    Kant’s transcendental idealism attempted to overcome the limitations of 
empiricism and dogmatism by bringing about a unity between external reality 
and the subject, but it could not solve the dualism. Unlike the empiricists, Kant 
develops the idea of a priori, and at the same time, unlike the idealists, he 
acknowledges the reality of external objects to the extent that nature has a 
dynamical power. Yet, in his transcendental idealism, the knowledge is based on 
the subject of the ‘I’ on the grounds that ‘objects of experience are never given 
in themselves, but only in experience, and they do not exist at all outside it’.232 
As a result, there is an irreducible dualism between phenomena and noumena. 
 
4.4. Schelling’s idea of nature as self-subsistence 
    Criticising this lack of spirit in nature, Schelling develops Kant’s notion of 
nature as a formative power into a state of self-subsistence by ‘transferring the 
only possible positive conception of per-se-ity to things’.233  For Schelling, 
nature is not just an object, but it has its own absolute origin. He argues that ‘as 
the object [qua ‘conditioned condition’] is never absolute/unconditioned 
(unbedingt) then something per se non-objective must be posited in nature; this 
absolutely non-objective postulate is precisely the original productivity of 
nature’.234 The idea of nature is not just a sum of outer products, but also an 
absolute producing subject. If Kant relates the transcendental, things in 
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themselves, with the subject I, Schelling associates nature with the conscious 
being. Nature thus ‘carries within itself the ground of its own existence’.235 
This way of understanding nature not only re-interprets the essence of nature 
but also marks an important turning point in the relationship between the world 
and God. Whereas Kant is unclear about the interaction between phenomena 
and noumena, Schelling opens up the possibility of a unity between nature and 
God by conceiving nature as self-subsistence. 
    But the idea that nature has the ground of its own existence is similar to 
Spinoza’s notion of substance which is subject to pantheism. Being aware of the 
issue of pantheism with regard to the ground of nature, Schelling tries to 
differentiate nature from the Absolute.236 He explains how God is different from 
nature: ‘we understand by nature the absolute identity, insofar as it is to be 
contemplated not as existing, but as the ground of its own being. Here the 
existing absolute identity is to be distinguished from the not-existing, which is 
merely the ground of its existence, and only the latter is called nature [. . .] the 
existing absolute identity (God understood immanently; God as subject) must be 
set above nature, the not-existing absolute identity.’237 Schelling regards God 
as the existing absolute identity, and nature as the not-existing absolute 
identity. Nature can be identified with God in terms of the ground of its own 
being, but it needs to be differentiated from God in that it is not fully realised 
yet like God himself. 
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4.5. The Trinitarian notion of God in Coleridge 
    So far, we have tried to contextualise the issue of pantheism in German 
Romanticism by discussing the pantheism controversy, the dualism of Kant, and 
the philosophy of Schelling. The focal point of the context was the idea of 
nature and its relationship with God in the attempt to unify the whole universe. 
In Coleridge and Kantian Ideas in England, 1796-1817, Monika Class pointed 
out that Coleridge was searching for ‘an Absolute Unity’ through ‘the possibility 
of metaphysics’ but his ‘thorough study of Kant appears to have entailed an 
element of disappointment’.238 First, Coleridge, like Schelling, criticises Kant 
for the dualism of matter and spirit.239 He tries to show that matter is not 
merely an object, but is deeply related to spirit. We have seen that, for Kant, 
matter consists of two distinct powers, ‘attraction’ and ‘repulsion’, and 
Coleridge mentions that Kant regards matter as merely these two powers.240 
For Coleridge, however, the two powers are just the properties of matter: 
‘Matter [is] assumed as a datum, the subject of the powers / tho’ two of these 
powers are elsewhere taken as constituting matter!’241 Further, he disagrees 
with the Kantian understanding of nature as regulative but not constitutive.242 
According to Aristotle and Kant, Ideas are regulative only, but Coleridge 
maintains that they are ‘CONSTITUTIVE, and one with the power and Life of 
Nature’.243 For him, ‘AN IDEA is an educt of the Imagination actuated by the 
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pure Reason, to which there neither is or can be an adequate correspondent in 
the world of the senses.’244 The implication is that the notion of ‘An Idea’ is 
transcendental in terms of Kantian terms but this ‘Idea’ is not separated from 
nature, but is one with it. Like German Romantics, Coleridge tries to empower 
nature to be more than a mere object. 
    Secondly, whereas Coleridge agrees with Schelling’s rejection of the 
dualism, he disagrees with his concept of nature because of pantheism. In a 
letter he argues that: 
 
Schelling is the Head and Founder of a philosophic Sect, entitled Natur-
philosophen, or Philosophers of Nature. He is beyond doubt a Man of 
Genius, and by the revival and more extensive application of the Law of 
Polarity (i.e. that every Power manifests itself by opposite Forces) [. . .] 
his System is extremely plausible and alluring at a first acquaintance. And 
as far as his attack on the mechanic and corpuscular Philosophy extends, 
his works possess a permanent value. But as a System [. . .] it is reduced 
at last to a mere Pantheism.245 
 
This passage shows that Coleridge was influenced by Schelling in terms of 
natural philosophy and at the same time how he criticises his notion of nature 
as pantheistic. Although Schelling tries to avoid pantheism by distinguishing 
nature from the Absolute, nature as a self-subsistent reality, for Coleridge, is 
still equivalent to the pantheistic equation of God with nature.246 If, Coleridge 
argues, ‘God as God be the one necessary Existence, if he be Ens semper 
perfectum, and all-sufficient, the material World cannot be necessary – and if it 
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be, then God as God is not self-sufficing – i.e. he is not GOD, but a part of the 
universe, nay, a product of the same.’ 247  If nature is conceived as self-
subsistent in itself, God cannot be ‘the one necessary Existence’. Accordingly, 
Schelling’s idea of nature leads to pantheism and atheism. Coleridge always felt 
the need for much clearer distinctions between the natural world and the 
Absolute, but Schelling violates the boundary between them. 
    Coleridge’s solution to the tension between the immanence and the 
transcendence of God was to turn eventually to the Trinitarian notion of God. In 
his philosophical lectures he states that: 
 
First of all the highest and best of men felt by an impulse from their 
reason and necessity to seek an unity, and those who felt wisely like Plato 
and Socrates, feeling the difficulties of this, looked forward to that Being 
of whom this necessity and their reason was a presentiment to instruct 
them.248 
 
While he suggests that the power of reason encourages us to look for unity, it is 
through divine revelation that we can attain the goal. Coleridge tries to 
reconcile the clash between reason and faith by arguing that unity is based on 
faith. He argues continually that ‘without personality there can be no God for 
Religion: & that the Xtn Trinity is the only possible Medium’. 249  What the 
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Trinitarian idea of God enables him to do is to make compatible both the 
transcendence of God and the immanence of God. In terms of the Trinity, God 
as ‘the Universal Soul’ is present in the whole universe, and at the same time 
He as the transcendental Being remains the Absolute Other. 
    It is through the relational dynamic of the Trinity that Coleridge overcame 
the problem of pantheism. In theology, one of the main tasks for the 
understanding of the Trinity is to maintain both the unity of God as one divine 
subject and the dynamic mutuality of the Triune God. To understand the Trinity 
as a relational dynamic has great significance in a sense that it can overcome 
the dangers of tritheism and modalism. Interestingly, Coleridge is one of the 
pioneering thinkers who introduced the relational notion of the Trinity to 
England, but we often overlook this fact. We are, according to Stephen Ford, 
‘indebted to Coleridge for contributing to English-speaking theology the 
technical Trinitarian term “interpenetration”, the equivalent of 
“perichoresis”’. 250  He used the term ‘perichoresis’ twice: ‘it is an eternal 
proceeding from the Father to the Son and from the Son to the Father, but such 
procession being in its nature circular [. . .] the Greek Fathers have entitled the 
‘perichoresis or co-eternal intercirculation of Deity’; ‘in the synthesis of these, 
in the Life, the Love, the Community, the Perichoresis, or Inter(cir)culation – 
and that there is one only God.’ 251  As Coleridge mentioned, this term, 
perichoresis, is traced back to the Cappadocians, the Eastern tradition, and 
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Richard of St Victor. 
    The idea of the Trinity as perichoresis represents not the unity of a 
substance, but that of a community or communion in which there are three 
subjects, Father, Son and Spirit. Perichoresis refers to the mutual dwelling of 
the divine persons in which the subjects are not separate or isolated 
individualities, but maintain an interpersonal relationship. As Grabowsky puts it, 
there are two different kinds of understanding of person in the past, ‘person 
understood as substance and person being seen as constituted by relation’.252 
This relationality is not in opposition to personal identity but is constitutive of 
what being a person means. Thus ‘by virtue of their eternal love, the divine 
persons exist so intimately with one another, for one another and in one 
another that they constitute themselves in their unique, incomparable and 
complete unity.’253  Likewise, Coleridge explains this cyclical movement like 
this: ‘the Holy Spirit proceedeth from the Father to the Son’, and ‘is returned 
from the Son to the Father’ and ‘in this circulation constitutes the eternal unity 
in the eternal alterity and distinction- the life of Deity in actu purissima’.254 As 
a result, the Trinity is construed as a communion of three divine subjects who 
interact with one another through knowledge and love of one another. 
    Further, this interrelationship of the Trinity tends to include the world by 
opening up their relations. The dynamic of the Trinity is involved in creation in 
the sense that ‘the Spirit-Word polarity is reflected in all the powers, forces, 
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and products of the natural world’.255 Coleridge describes ‘the Father as Ipseity, 
the Son as Alterity, and the Spirit as Community’, and the Word (Alterity) is 
associated with the distinction and the Spirit (Community) with the unity in 
relation to creation.256 As Coleridge conceives the life of nature as the principle 
of polarity, the process of creation is that of the polarity of the Word and the 
Spirit.257 ‘The act of creation’, as Perkins put it, ‘is accomplished through a 
polarization which transforms indistinction into unity (the peculiar quality of the 
Spirit of Love and Community); and multeity into individuality (the peculiar 
quality of the “Word”, who is distinction, “alterity”)’. 258  As a result, for 
Coleridge, the act of creation is fundamentally based upon the Trinitarian idea 
of God. 
    When Coleridge first came up with the notion of the one life, perhaps he did 
not fully understand it. At this initial stage he might not have been aware of a 
relational notion of the Trinity, but I would argue that Coleridge worked 
towards this idea of a relational Trinity in his attempts to overcome the dualism 
of matter and spirit and avoid the dangers of pantheism. Just as the relational 
idea of the Trinity represents ‘distinction-in-unity’, so the idea of the one life 
could point towards a relational idea of unity. When ‘one intellectual breeze’ 
makes nature ‘animated’, it does not mean that nature becomes God but that 
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nature becomes related to God through the Spirit of love, community and unity. 
And all things become one in diversity through this relational dynamic. The 
notion of the relational Trinity finally enabled the poet to hold together his early 
interest in the immanence and his later concern about the transcendence. In this 
respect, Coleridge’s thinking is less like pantheism but more like Moltmann’s 
notion of the cosmic spirit as panentheism. 
    It has been shown that Coleridge tries to locate the unity of the universe 
through a monistic idea and love of God in his early years, and the thoughts of 
polarity and evolution in his later years. Coleridge’s notion of the unity 
expresses two key ecotheological tendencies, the independent sacred value of 
nature, and the inter-relatedness between humanity, nature, and God. First, the 
presence of God enables the poet to articulate the relational aspect between 
humanity and nature, and the relationship develops further through God’s love, 
which permeates it. The evolutionary process of individuation also formulates 
the inter-relatedness, and, at the same time, that inter-relatedness is 
characterised by a mutual and reciprocal relationship; it is fundamentally 
associated with the sense of sacrament and the religious aspects of imagination 
and symbol. Secondly, the on-going tension between the mind and nature in 
terms of the passivity and activity of the mind, and nature as an object of 
natural philosophy, show that, for Coleridge, nature matters as materiality. In 
addition, this nature is perceived as being sacred as God is present in it as a 
power. In these respects, it can be argued that the works of Coleridge relate to 
two ecotheological aspects. 
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Chapter 3 
Wordsworth’s yearning for the sense of dwelling 
 
 
    This chapter aims to argue that we can see Wordsworth working towards 
two ideas that have been very important in ecotheological writing: the 
interrelatedness of the universe and the independent sacred value of nature. 
Just as the core issue of ecotheology is nature’s relationship with humanity and 
God, Wordsworth attempts ceaselessly to make sense of human life and the 
world by scrutinising and contemplating the relationship between them. With 
respect to his grand project of The Recluse Wordsworth announced to James 
Tobin on 6 March 1798: ‘My object is to give pictures of Nature, Man, and 
Society. Indeed I know not any thing which will not come within the scope of my 
plan.’1 Two letters of 1804 underline the seriousness of his commitment: in a 
letter to Sir George Beaumont in December, he mentioned that The Recluse ‘is 
the chief object which my thoughts have been fixed these many years’, and, in a 
letter to Thomas De Quincey in March, he said, ‘to this work I mean to devote 
the Prime of my life and the chief force of my mind.’2 Intriguingly, Wordsworth 
pronounces the relationship between ‘Nature, Man, and Society’ as ‘one 
Household under God’ in the ‘Prospectus to The Recluse’, Home at Grasmere, 
which is the First Book in the First Part of The Recluse.3 Particular attention 
should be paid to this phrase, which I take as a crucial element in understanding 
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Wordsworth’s idea of dwelling from the perspective of religion. 
    If Coleridge was yearning to discover the unity of the universe throughout 
his life, Wordsworth was longing to discover an ideal place for dwelling. In 
other words, one of the essential thoughts with which Wordsworth is concerned 
throughout his poetry is the idea of dwelling. It appears as early as The Vale of 
Esthwaite (1787), his first sustained original poem.4 His way of understanding 
the notion has an ecotheological dimension. It is concerned with ways of being 
human on earth in a relational dynamic between humanity, nature, and God, and 
it places an emphasis upon nature’s intrinsic independent value in terms of its 
sacredness and materiality. I shall examine how the notion of dwelling in 
Wordsworth relates to an ecotheological point of view. 
 
1. The idea of Dwelling 
1.1. Dwelling and the natural environment 
    Hubbell points out that Wordsworth’s epistemology of dwelling has been 
explored in various ways over the last few decades, but answering the question 
of what is dwelling for Wordsworth remains challenging.5 A difficulty may arise 
from the complexity of the notion of ‘dwelling’ itself and his changing attitude 
towards it. As the poet continues to develop the idea of dwelling, various 
elements -- death, memory, imagination, transcendence -- begin to emerge in 
the formulation of the idea. One of the key driving forces in his continuous 
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exploration of the issue is his own experience of death and loss, which reminds 
him of the vulnerability and mortality of humans. He appears to be obsessed 
with finding a safe dwelling place immune to the transience and mortality of 
human life. In the middle of his searching for such a place, his idea of dwelling 
becomes more complicated in that the dynamics of memory, poetic imagination, 
and transcendence develop a complex relationship with a physical geography. 
The idea of dwelling is based on multiple layers of meaning: the natural 
environment, the psychological and emotional aspects of life, and the idea of 
transcendence. In other words, for Wordsworth, dwelling is not just about a 
place to live, but a way of being in the world through a relational dynamic 
between humanity, nature, and God. 
    Focusing on the importance of geography and locality, the relationship 
between culture and nature, and organic natural process, Bate, McKusick and 
Kroeber refer to the significance of dwelling in the natural environment for 
Wordsworth. They argue that Wordsworth associated the sense of dwelling with 
the natural environment, and they articulate Wordsworth’s sense of what he 
considers the appropriate and positive relationship between humanity and 
nature. The thought that ‘human identity is somehow tied to location’ has ‘both 
a long ancestry over the centuries and a wide currency across cultures’, but 
Bate tries to establish Wordsworth as ‘the founding father for a thinking of 
poetry in relation to place, to our dwelling on the earth’ by claiming that his 
‘poetry of place began to be inspired by place itself’, rather than by an 
‘occasion’ of ‘a patron’s request, or a historical event or association’. 6  In 
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 J. E. Malpas, Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), p. 2. 
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particular, Bate coins the term ecopoetics, which asks ‘in what respects a poem 
may be a making (Greek poiesis) of the dwelling place – the prefix eco- is 
derived from the Greek oikos, the home or place of dwelling’, and we can 
regard the poetry of Wordsworth as an imaginary natural environment in which 
we can ‘accommodate ourselves to a mode of dwelling’. 7  The notion of 
ecopoetics in Wordsworth reflects a close relationship between human dwelling 
and the natural environment. 
    For example, at the beginning of Michael: A Pastoral Poem, Wordsworth 
suggests that Michael, a shepherd, is interrelated with his natural surroundings 
in terms of his way of dwelling. He dwells ‘Upon the forest-side in Grasmere 
vale’ and nature becomes an essential part of his life: 
 
Fields, where with cheerful spirits he had breathed 
The common air, the hills which he so oft 
Had climbed with vigorous steps, which had impressed 
So many incidents upon his mind 
Of hardship, skill or courage, joy or fear, 
Which like a book preserved the memory 
Of the dumb animals whom he had saved (ll. 65-71) 
 
The expressions ‘cheerful spirits’, ‘his mind’, and ‘the memory’, indicate that 
nature is associated not only with Michael’s physical body, but also with his 
inner self. But he does not seem to recognise his close relationship with nature 
in the sense that he ‘errs grossly’ because he ‘should suppose / That the green 
valleys, and the streams and rocks, / Were things indifferent to the shepherd’s 
                                                                                                                                
Jonathan Bate, The Song of the Earth (London: Picador, 2001), p. 205. 
7
 Bate, The Song of the Earth, pp. 64, 75. 
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thoughts’ (ll. 62-4). Although Michael is not aware of such an intimate 
relationship with his surroundings, Wordsworth refers to the effect the habitat 
has on the shepherd to the extent that ‘these fields, these hills, / were his living 
being even more / Than his own blood’ (ll. 74-6). Seamus Heaney holds that 
‘the Westmorland mountains were so much more than a picturesque backdrop 
for his shepherd’s existence’ and they were ‘rather companionable and 
influential’, flowing in ‘to Michael’s psychic life’. These surroundings were thus 
‘not inanimate stone but active nature, humanized and humanizing’.8 This mutual 
relationship between Michael and the natural environment places nature at the 
centre of his way of dwelling. 
 
1.2. Dwelling and the Divinity 
    Emphasising the interdependent relationship of humanity and nature in the 
idea of dwelling, we face a tension between different perspectives on the 
natural world, for instance, between materialist and idealist, or theistic points of 
view. Each of the above-mentioned critics implies spiritual dimensions in the 
notion of nature. Bate mentions that Wordsworth sees ‘types and symbols of 
eternity in the landscape of the Alps’. 9  McKusick shows how Wordsworth 
formulates the idea of dwelling by vacillating between ‘an abyss of idealism’ and 
‘the ineluctable presence of concrete material objects’. 10  For Kroeber, an 
ecological view is not religious but naturalistic, and the Romantics as proto-
ecological poets subscribe to ‘a fundamentally materialistic worldview’ and to ‘a 
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biologically materialistic understanding of the human mind’. 11  He, however, 
suggests that ‘the ecological tendencies of romantic poets were more complex 
than mere substitutes for religious experiences’ and ‘religiosity’ needs not to be 
excluded from ‘ecological conceptions of natural reality’.12 For instance, Home 
at Grasmere, Wordsworth’s major nature poem, reveals the ‘physical’ and 
‘materialistic’ notion of nature, but suggests this ‘need not be driven by 
derogations of spirit’.13 
    None of these critics, however, pay serious attention to the relationship 
between dwelling and the presence of God in Wordsworth. Generally speaking, 
the religious dimension of Wordsworth’s poetry has been often neglected or 
regarded only in terms of ‘the secularization of inherited theological ideas and 
ways of thinking’.14 In addition, a materialistic and naturalistic perspective tends 
to signify a disbelief in the creative power of a Deity or a belief in the power of 
natural process to transform all forms of life, dismissing any possibility of a 
transcendent dimension. But I will suggest that, if we are to grasp the full 
meaning of dwelling in Wordsworth, we cannot ignore the role of the divinity in 
his poetic mind. 
    One of the complexities in Wordsworth’s poetry is that his idea of dwelling 
continues to change due to the painful experiences of death and loss. 
Maintaining that ‘Wordsworth’s entire career was shaped by his need to find a 
dwelling place’, John Kerrigan succinctly divides the development of 
Wordsworth’s search for home into three periods: an early period in which the 
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poet ‘sought security in rural granges and rose-ringed cottages’; a second 
phase, based on the awareness of the ‘insecurity and vulnerability of stone-
built dwellings’, is concerned with the tomb which Wordsworth thought ‘an 
immutable place to dwell’; finally, in a third phase, Wordsworth ‘committed 
himself to thoughts of heavenly dwelling’, and ‘cottages and tombs are replaced 
by chapels and churches’.15 
    Each phase is characterised not only by a relational dynamic between 
humanity and the natural environment, but also by the power of the divinity, 
whose aspects are different in each phase. If Wordsworth focuses upon the 
earthly dwelling with the immanence of God in a peaceful and harmonious 
relationship between humanity and nature in his early years, he gradually looks 
at the heavenly dwelling with the transcendence of God later. At the same time, 
the dynamics of memory and the poetic imagination are associated with this 
relational aspect in formulating the notion of dwelling. Edward Soja conceives 
‘the interpretation of human spatial organization as a social product’ in the 
sense that the land around us is ‘a reflection of our culture and society’.16 I 
would like to add a religious dimension to Soja’s social one. For Wordsworth, 
the meaning of dwelling place is not only a physical geography, but a reflection 
of his understanding of the relationship between humanity, nature, and God, 
which develops through the dynamics of memory, a poetic imagination, and his 
experience of death. 
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1.3. Heidegger’s idea of dwelling 
    Heidegger offers us a notion of dwelling which bears a considerable 
similarity with Wordsworth, an issue explored by several critics. In his essay, 
‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, Heidegger develops and enriches the idea of 
dwelling in a profound way by discussing the relational aspects of ‘earth, sky, 
divinities and mortals’ – nature, humanity, and God. Given that ‘the idea of the 
inseparability of persons from the places they inhabit is an especially important 
theme in the work of Heidegger’, it is understandable that some critics 
introduce Heidegger’s notion of dwelling to the interpretation of Wordsworth’s 
poetry.17 But they have tended not to deal with the issue of transcendence 
seriously, focusing instead upon the close relationship between humanity and 
place. Intending to introduce Heidegger’s notion of dwelling as a useful 
framework for understanding Wordsworth’s idea of dwelling, it can be claimed 
that Heidegger, like Wordsworth, tries to develop the notion of dwelling by 
bringing together humanity, nature and the transcendence with a special 
reference to human mortality. 
    For Heidegger, dwelling is far more than just a building in that ‘to be a 
human being means to be on the earth as a mortal, it means to dwell’.18 At the 
beginning of his essay, he traces the roots of the Old English and High German 
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word ‘Bauen’, which means to dwell. The word ‘bin’ belongs to ‘bauen’, and 
therefore ‘ich bin and du bist’ refers to ‘I dwell and you dwell’. The implication 
is that ‘the way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are 
on the earth, is Buan, dwelling’.19  Heidegger attempts to show an intimate 
association between dwelling and the meaning of human existence. Dwelling 
thus signifies the ontological situation of human existence, the questions of who 
we are, and the way we find ourselves in this world. For Heidegger, ‘dwelling is 
the basic character of Being in keeping with which mortals exists.’20 
    It is through a relational aspect of being that Heidegger shows a strong 
bond between dwelling and the truth of being. As early as Being and Time, 
Heidegger identified the dynamic of interrelation as the central character of 
being human. For him, Being as Being-in-the-world is openness to others and 
things, and a clearer understanding of our being can be acquired by the set of 
meaningful relationships – people, things and issues.21 When we say that we 
dwell, we mean that we build these relationships. In ‘Building Dwelling 
Thinking’, Heidegger introduces four elements in the relational activities of 
being-in-the-world – earth, sky, divinities, and mortals. Human beings discover 
who they are and how they are by dwelling in the relational dynamic of the four 
elements. 
    I would like to focus on three aspects of their relationship. First, Heidegger 
recovers an ethical dimension of dwelling in the fourfold relationship. He argues 
that the old word ‘bauen’ also means ‘to cherish and protect, to preserve and 
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care for, specifically to till the soil, to cultivate the vine’.22 In addition, the Old 
Saxon ‘wuon’, the Gothic ‘wunian’ like the word ‘bauen’, mean to remain, to 
stay in a place, but ‘wunian’ means ‘to be at peace, to be brought to peace, to 
remain in peace: preserved from harm and danger’. 23  Referring to these 
connotations of ‘bauen’ and ‘wunian’, Heidegger asserts that ‘the fundamental 
character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving’, and that ‘mortals dwell in 
the way they preserve the fourfold – earth, sky, divinities and mortals - in its 
essential being’.24  His way of preserving Earth and the Sky alludes to the 
ethical responsibilities of human beings, those which enable Earth and the Sky 
to be what they are. Mortals dwell in that they save the earth, and therefore 
they set it free into its own being, rather than exploiting, mastering, or 
subjugating it. Mortals dwell in that they receive the sky as sky, rather than 
turning night into day, or day into a harassed unrest.25 According to Foltz, this 
aspect of Heidegger’s thinking brings back a broadened notion of ethics, akin to 
the idea of ‘coming into right relation’.26 While the narrowness of the modern 
conception of ethics tends to concentrate only on certain sorts of moral 
obligation, Heidegger’s idea concerns the bearing through which we comport 
ourselves toward entities, how we hold ourselves in relation to the being of 
entities, and how we in turn are held by our being.27 As a result, in his idea of 
dwelling, Heidegger discovers a reciprocal relationship between mortals and the 
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earth and sky through sparing and preserving. 
    Secondly, Heidegger conceives death as an essential part of dwelling. If 
dwelling is the basic feature of Being, it cannot, to some extent, avoid the issue 
of death. Human beings are called mortals because they can die, but Heidegger 
holds that to die means ‘to be capable of death as death’.28 Being ‘capable of 
death as death’ is neither to make death empty or nothing nor to darken 
dwelling by blindly staring toward the end. Rather ‘mortals dwell in that they 
initiate their own nature – their being “capable of death as death” – into the use 
and practice of this capacity, so that there may be a good death.’29 Although 
Heidegger does not articulate further the meaning of a good death in detail, he 
appears to make death a basic part of dwelling in a constructive and positive 
sense without generating a sense of discontinuity and emptiness. 
    Thirdly, Heidegger claims the oneness of the four elements. He proposes 
that ‘mortals dwell in that they await the divinities as divinities [. . .] They wait 
for intimations of their coming and do not mistake the signs of their absence’.30 
In the long run, dwelling is built on saving the earth, receiving the sky, awaiting 
the divinities, and initiating mortals. But the fourfold is achieved in a simple 
unity. Heidegger provides an example of how earth, heaven, divinities, and 
mortals accomplish the simple oneness in dwelling by describing the structure 
of a farmhouse in the Black Forest, which was built some two hundred years 
ago: 
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It placed the farm on the wind-sheltered mountain slope looking south, 
among the meadows close to the spring [. . .] It did not forget the altar 
corner behind the community table; it made room in its chamber for the 
hallowed places of childbed and the ‘tree of the dead’-for that is what 
they call a coffin there [. . .]31 
 
The structure of the house shows how nature, the divinities, and death are 
integrated into dwelling. Interestingly, the ‘tree of the dead’ is part of the house 
through which the dwellers are reminded of human mortality as well as 
remember their ancestors. Further, they appear to deal with this reality of the 
death by awaiting the divinities and being dependent upon the transcendence of 
the divinities, which ‘the altar’ may symbolise. All these elements as a single 
unity contribute to establishing the idea of dwelling. 
    Heidegger thus provides a very important notion of dwelling for discussing 
Wordsworth’s idea of it. He gives an explicit and systematic explanation about 
dwelling which is expressed implicitly throughout the works of Wordsworth. 
Thus it offers us a conceptual framework which helps us to analyse 
Wordsworth’s idea of dwelling. As discussed above, Heidegger expresses a few 
crucial thoughts on dwelling, the relational dynamic, the integration of death 
into dwelling, and the significance of God in the oneness. For him, to dwell 
means not just to inhabit a building, but a way of being human on the earth. 
Likewise, Wordsworth’s idea of dwelling develops through the reality of death 
and the presence of God. 
 
1.4. The Vale of Esthwaite 
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    Before moving to the next section, it will be useful to introduce one of 
Wordsworth’s very earliest poems, The Vale of Esthwaite. Although the poem 
has received little attention, even criticised as being little more than ‘gothic 
claptrap’, some critics see it as a seminal work for his mature poetry, either in 
terms of his ideas of poetic imagination or the dynamic of emotion.32 I suggest 
that The Vale of Esthwaite expresses some crucial elements in the idea of 
dwelling. Most of all, it shows how deeply the poet experienced a sense of loss 
and displacement and how intensely his yearning for dwelling was embedded in 
his mind. The haunted visions of the poet’s underworld journey which occupy 
the first half of the poem are followed by the memory of his father’s death: 
 
With sighs repeated o’er and o’er, 
I mourn because I mourned no more. 
For ah! The storm was soon at rest 
Soon broke the Sun upon my breast 
Nor did my little heart foresee 
-She lost a home in losing thee.  (ll. 288-293) 
 
What is noteworthy is his awareness of the consequence of the death. His 
mother died when he was 8 years old, in 1778, and his father, John Wordsworth, 
followed Wordsworth’s mother a few years later, in 1783. The death of his 
father brought the sense of safety to an end. Certainly these deaths affected 
their children outwardly in the changed situation of their lives as well as 
inwardly in their emotion and psychology. Finally, in his delayed grieving for his 
dead father Wordsworth became fully aware of the consequence of the death, 
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‘losing home’. 
    If we look at a letter from Dorothy Wordsworth to her lifelong friend, Jane 
Pollard, dating from late July 1787, the year when the poem was written, we 
find that she, like her brother, became conscious of the result of her parents’s 
death. Dorothy has been living with her mother’s cousin, Elizabeth Threlkeld, in 
Halifax after her father’s death, but in May 1787 had to move to her Cookson 
grandparents in Penrith.33 The letter which was written after two months in the 
Cookson house shows how Dorothy felt about the way she was being treated: 
 
We have been told thousands of times that we were liars but we treat 
such behaviour with the contempt it deserves. [We] always finish our 
conversations which generally take a melancholy turn, with wishing we 
had a father and a home.34 
 
Like Wordsworth’s poem, this passage reflects a growing understanding of what 
the loss of their father meant. She again told Jane in February 1793 that ‘we in 
the same moment lost a father, a mother, a home’.35 As Moorman rightly notes, 
‘the real loss sustained by the Wordsworth children in the death of their father 
was perhaps less that of a beloved person than of a happy home.’36 In fact, his 
experience of death and loss does not end with the death of his parents, but 
continues to challenge him through his life, as he had yet to face the death of 
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his brother John and his own children later. 
    Obviously Wordsworth’s development of the idea of dwelling is 
fundamentally associated with the experience of death. Even during this 
juvenile period, we find that dwelling is not simply about a place to live, but has 
multiple layers of meaning. The poem consists of three parts. The first part 
describes the scenery of the shepherd, his dog, and a cottage. The second 
reveals the anguished visions of an underworld journey, and the third expresses 
the poet’s intellectual and emotional responses to both happy and painful 
memories. Despite a lack of coherence, each part is closely involved with the 
way the narrator experiences a sense of dwelling that is threatened and 
shattered by death. 
    First, the natural environment, which displays harmony, peace, and joy, 
becomes a crucial part of the experience of dwelling. At the beginning of the 
poem, the narrator provides a detailed description of how the shepherd and his 
dog dwell in harmony, peace, and joy, in a valley: 
 
The shepherd’s restless dog I mark 
Who bounding round with frequent bark 
Now leaps aroun[d] th’uncovered plain 
Now dives into the mist again 
And while the guiding sound he hears 
The [   ] shepherd lad appears 
Who knows his transport while he sees 
His cottage smoking from the trees 
[ ? ] [ ? ] then turns the shepherd boy 
And claps his clinging dog for joy. (ll. 15-24) 
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Further, the narrator deepens the sense of this peaceful and harmonious 
dwelling in nature by imagining that the scene of the shepherd and his dog 
encircled by mist ‘seems an island in the air’ (ll. 13-14). Then the scene turns 
to other obscure worlds with visions where the poet sees images of a battle 
between ‘Gigantic moors’ (ll. 146). Right after this horrifying vision he tries to 
soothe his ‘soul’ by reminding himself of the ‘pleasure’ of ‘lovely Grasmere’s 
heav’nly vale’ (ll. 178, 180). The natural environment of ‘the landskip’s varied 
treasure’ forms this portrayal of dwelling. 
    Secondly, dwelling is also associated with the incorporeal dynamic in that 
the place for living has a psychological and emotional dimension. For the 
narrator, the landscape is not only a place to live, but also a place that carries 
memories of happiness and loss. Surveying ‘the Vale of Esthwaite’, the narrator 
tells that the landscape contains his past: 
 
The time when these sad orbs shall close 
May hold before me Nature’s Page 
Till dim seen by the eyes of age 
Then basking in the noontide blaze 
Here might I fix my feeble gaze 
As on a Book companion dear 
Of childhood’s ever-merry year 
Retrace each scene with fond delight 
While memory aids the orbs of sight. (ll. 339-347) 
 
Then he pronounces, ‘From every rock would hang a tale’ (ll. 353). In particular, 
the landscape is perceived as the ‘vale of woe’. Death, one of the dominating 
images of the poem, has turned the vale into the ‘vale of woe’, and consequently 
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brought about displacement and disconnectedness. The implication is that the 
natural environment is not only a physical place, but also a reflection of the 
dweller’s memories. As mentioned earlier, the narrator realises that losing a 
father means losing a home. The disturbed visions of the underworld journey in 
the second part -- the images of wandering, weariness, suffering, aloneness, 
separation, and displacement -- implies that the poet is struggling with the 
experience of losing home not purely in physical terms of place, but on the 
level of his emotion and psychology. But at the same time, the poet expresses 
his desperate yearning for restoring this broken relationship with the people 
and place in the third part. 
    Lastly, this longing for home is resonant with transcendent aspects. The 
narrator attempts to overcome the experience of loss and displacement by 
looking beyond the earthly dwelling. His painful awareness of death and the loss 
of home is immediately followed by the ‘sweet voice’: 
 
That says we soon again shall meet 
For oft when fades the leaden day 
To joy-consuming pain a prey 
Or from afar the midnight bell 
Flings on mine ear its solemn knell 
A still voice whispers to my breast 
I soon shall be with them that rest. (ll. 297-303) 
 
He then describes his own death as a way of being together with them that rest: 
‘Ah may my weary body may sleep / In peace beneath a green grass heap / In 
church-yard such at death of day’ (ll. 314-316). In addition, at the end of the 
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poem, the poet conceives the relationship between his sister and himself as 
‘heav’n connected chain’, which is ‘for ever’. It appears that dwelling involves 
not only the earthly home but also a transcendent or spiritual space in that the 
narrator deals with the consequence of death, ‘losing home’, by assuring himself 
of being together in an eternal home. This is not to suggest that Wordsworth is 
already referring to the heavenly home explicitly in this period, but we can see 
here the seminal idea of a heavenly dwelling in Wordsworth. As he grows older, 
his idea of heavenly dwelling becomes more conspicuous. 
    The Vale of Esthwaite has often been read in terms of its psychological and 
biographical significance, and Duncan Wu also associates it with Wordsworth’s 
experience of death.37 His biographical backgrounds provide some reasons why 
he was struggling with the issue of dwelling. My aim in introducing this poem, 
however, is not to simply relate it to these biographical contexts. Rather, my 
purpose is to make one aware that in his early work Wordsworth was intensely 
affected by a sense of loss and displacement in ways that profoundly 
conditioned his yearning for home. Although there is a lack of coherence in this 
early poem, it as a seminal work for his mature poetry contains some crucial 
elements for dwelling. Having examined this early statement of the notion of 
dwelling in the poetry, in the next three sections we will explore how it 
develops from the idea of an earthly dwelling towards the community of the 
living and the dead, and finally a heavenly dwelling. It will be suggested that the 
relational dimension of dwelling reveals an ecotheological perspective. 
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2. Dwelling in a cottage in Grasmere 
2.1. Fears and anxieties about city-life, uncertainties, and mortality 
    This section discusses The Ruined Cottage, The Pedlar, Tintern Abbey, and 
Home at Grasmere. I examine Wordsworth’s development of the trope of 
dwelling in a cottage by discovering the relational dynamic between human 
beings, the natural environment, and God. In this phase, Wordsworth appears to 
find an ideal place for home in a cottage in a natural environment, ‘our dear 
vale’ in Grasmere, and it seems that this is a reflection of his inner mind as well 
as of the physical geography. One of the main characteristics in his idea of 
dwelling is that it resonates with the anxieties of mortality and suffering. That 
is, he tries to discover a dwelling place over and against such anxieties and 
experiences. If we look at these poems, we recognise that a sense of 
displacement and yearning for home are the main driving forces for formulating 
the idea of dwelling. And the experience of displacement involves various 
aspects: death, suffering, and the cold realities of life. 
    Although Wordsworth appears to find an ideal place for dwelling in the vale 
of Grasmere, Home at Grasmere is still resonant with his anxieties and fears 
about the inhuman ways of city-life and human mortality. On the one hand, 
Geoffrey Hartman has focused on the joy and optimism of Home at Grasmere in 
a sense that the poem remains ‘the sole sustained example of Wordsworth 
making “A present joy the matter of a song”’.38 Karl Kroeber also views it as 
the expression of a sense of the continuity between humanity and nature within 
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an unequivocal vision of ecological wholeness. 39  On the other hand, some 
critics, including, Kenneth Johnston, Raimonda Modiano, and Bruce Clarke, draw 
our attention to the anxieties, doubts, and tensions that imply his fears ‘being 
“home at Grasmere” might not be the kind of being, the kind of home, or even 
the kind of Grasmere he says it is’ due to the narrative’s sense of ‘an 
imagination of mortal violence’.40 Wordsworth’s optimistic vision of an ideal 
dwelling place in the poem needs to be understood within the context of such 
anxieties and fears. He does not seem to overcome them completely because 
they reappear continuously throughout his later years. They remain a 
significant component of his poetic vision. There is an inner tension between 
these two aspects of his thinking, but it should be noted that his idea of home 
develops through the interaction between them. 
    First of all, his idea of dwelling in the vale has been formulated by his 
critical attitude towards the city. Just before declaring ‘The True community of 
many into one incorporate’, he contrasts the urban metropolis as ‘a deracinated 
space of alienation’41: 
 
[. . .] he truly is alone, 
He of the multitude, whose eyes are doomed 
To hold a vacant commerce day by day 
With that which he can neither know nor love— 
Dead things, to him thrice dead-or worse than this, 
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With swarms of life, and worse than all, of men, 
His fellow men, that are to him no more 
Than to the Forest Hermit are the leaves  
That hang aloft in myriad. (ll. 808-816) 
 
‘A vacant commerce day by day’ implies a sense of dehumanisation caused by 
urbanisation and the Industrial Revolution, in which a person becomes just one 
‘of the multitude’, without establishing a relationship with them in knowledge 
and love. Intriguingly, this passage reminds us of Wordsworth’s representation 
of urban life in Tintern Abbey in which the two phrases ‘in lonely rooms’ and ‘in 
hours of weariness’ ‘mid the din of towns and cities’ (ll. 26-28) convey the 
experience of isolation. ‘Towns and cities’ are full of people, but the poet still 
feels ‘lonely’, and he appears to be disconnected with them in the middle of ‘a 
vacant commerce’. In Book VII of The Prelude: Residence in London, 
Wordsworth provides an account of the alienated nature of city-life: ‘how men 
lived / Even next-door neighbours (as we say) yet still / Strangers, and 
knowing not each other’s names’ (ll. 118-120). 
    In addition to the experience of the isolation of city-life, Wordsworth 
describes his struggle with ‘the Realities of Life’: ‘so cold, / So cowardly, so 
ready to betray, / So stinted in the measure of their grace’ (ll. 54-6). Here he 
expresses a critical voice against the inhuman and corrupted way of city-life. In 
his pastoral poem, Michael, the poet shows how the shepherd’s son, Luke, who 
has been raised to understand the value of the natural environment, ‘gave 
himself to evil courses’ and was lost into depravity and disgrace after moving to 
‘the dissolute city’ (ll. 453-456). Further, in Home at Grasmere, his wrestling 
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with ‘the Realities of Life’ is also partly caused by something which ‘was 
deemed so difficult’ in his ‘blindness’ (ll. 75, 76). In Tintern Abbey, Wordsworth 
describes this sense of difficulty and blindness as ‘the burthen of the mystery’ 
which brings about ‘the heavy and the weary weight of all this unintelligible 
world’, ‘the many shapes of joyless day-light’, and ‘the fever of the world’ (ll. 
39-41, 52-55). Critics have articulated various senses of ‘the burthen of the 
mystery’. Weinfield suggested the poet’s struggle is ‘at once personal (and 
private) and religious (and public)’.42 On a personal level, he may have been 
afflicted with the on-going issues of loss, mortality, and powerlessness in life, 
particularly during the early 1790s, for example, ‘his impotent hostility to his 
own country’s policies, his responsibility to Annette and their child, and the lack 
of direction and of financial independence’.43 In addition, it has been suggested 
that the poet had to face a religious and epistemological crisis in relation to a 
tension between Christianity and the Enlightenment in terms of materialism, 
rationalism, and necessitarianism.44 Thus, that crisis may have caused the poet 
to oscillate between skepticism and affirmation, which creates a sense of 
instability.45 
    Another significant element which seems to cast a shadow over the 
harmony and safety of dwelling is the destructive power of death. Interestingly, 
at the beginning of Home at Grasmere, Wordsworth explains that even when he 
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saw the vale and thought of ‘living here’ as ‘happy fortune’, he imagined that ‘if 
I thought of dying, if a thought / Of mortal separation could come in / With 
paradise before me, here to die’ (ll. 9-12). As a boy, he associated the 
happiness of dwelling with the stern reality of mortality. Home at Grasmere 
offers four episodes about a pair of swans and some couples which are related 
with death. First, the description of ‘Sweet Spring’ in Grasmere is followed by 
absence: 
 
But two are missing – two, a lonely pair 
Of milk-white swans. Ah, why are they not here? 
There above all, ah, why are they not here 
To share in this day’s pleasure? (ll. 322-5) 
 
The poet and his wife, Emma, ‘saw them day by day, / Through those two 
months of unrelenting storm’, and ‘knew them well’ (ll. 329-330, 332). The 
reason he is so concerned about their absence is not only ‘their beauty and 
their still /And placid way of life and faithful love’ but also the resemblance 
between this pair, and the poet and Emma: ‘They also having chosen this 
abode- / They strangers, and we strangers – they a pair / And we a solitary 
pair like them’ (ll. 339-341). He hopes that ‘neither pair be broken’ (ll. 350), but 
‘an imagination of mortal violence breaks into’ this hope that ‘the shepherd may 
have seized the deadly tube’ or ‘haply both are gone’ (ll. 352, 356).46 The 
absence of the swans thus implicitly brings about a sense of anxiety regarding 
the security of his relationship with his wife in the face of the threat of death. 
    Secondly, Wordsworth also expresses anxiety about death in the three 
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stories about local dwellers in the vale of Grasmere. He refers to the attraction 
of ‘all Arcadian dreams, / All golden fancies of the golden age’ (ll. 829-830), but 
he reminds us that the local dwellers of Grasmere cannot avoid the human 
condition of death. The first story is about a local farmer who deceived his wife 
with their maid. Then he lets his farm go to ruin out of remorse, and ‘could not 
bear the weight of his own shame’ and ‘died of his own grief’ (ll. 531-2). The 
second one is about a father whose wife died a long time ago and left him ‘many 
helpless children’ (ll. 538). Although it is a ‘tale / Of sorrow and dejection’, the 
poet discovers that ‘the whole house is filled with [the] gaiety’ of the children 
(ll. 539-540, 606). In the final episode, the ruinous power of mortality is 
contrasted with the blooming of a grove. A dame explains that she and her now 
dead husband had planted this grove, ‘Just six weeks younger than her eldest 
boy’ (ll. 613). While they ‘No longer flourish’: he ‘entirely gone’ and she 
‘withering in her loneliness’, the plant is ‘now flourishing’ (ll. 640-2). 
Immediately after these episodes, he tries to convince himself that: 
 
No, we are not alone: we do not stand, 
My Emma, here misplaced and desolate, 
Loving what no one cares for but ourselves. 
We shall not scatter through the plains and rocks (ll. 646-649) 
 
Whereas the poet expresses his deep yearning for a happy dwelling with Emma 
in Grasmere, this passage portrays his fear of human mortality in the sense that 
the three stories cast the shadow of death on their dwelling. 
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2.2. Dwelling and the inner self in the Ruined Cottage 
    If we look at The Ruined Cottage, we can see how the experience of death 
and loss destroys the sense of dwelling. This poem, written in 1797-98, but 
published as book I of The Excursion in 1814, is an account about the 
disintegration of Margaret’s family and her silent suffering.47 As war destroys 
the rural economy, her husband, Robert, deserts Margaret and enlists in the 
military. Leaving ‘a purse of gold’ for his family, he could not face saying 
farewell. And he never came back home. Her eldest child and little babe also 
died later, and eventually ‘she was left alone’ (ll. 476). The disintegration of her 
family leads to the loss of home in that she herself became a wanderer in her 
own place. Interestingly, losing people brings about a disrupted relationship 
between Margaret and the place where she lives. The deterioration is captured 
by Margaret’s wandering and the pedlar’s account of the decaying of her 
cottage. After Robert left, Margaret ‘was used to ramble far’ (ll. 382). She 
herself mentions that she has ‘wandered much of late and has need of her best 
prayers to bring her back again’ (ll. 399-401). After the disappearance of her 
husband and the death of her eldest child, she hopes that: 
 
[ . . . ] heaven 
Will give me patience to endure the things 
Which I behold at home (ll. 412-414) 
 
The ‘things’ are not specified, but we can assume that they are ‘the things’ 
which may remind her of the fuller sense of dwelling with which they are 
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associated. Her restlessness shows that she has lost a sense of rootedness and 
comfort. 
    The pedlar returns to the cottage several times after Robert’s 
disappearance, and provides an eyewitness account of how it has been ruined. 
On his first return, he describes how Margaret’s face had become ‘thin and pale’ 
(ll. 396) and her cottage was changed: 
 
And knots of worthless stone-crop started out 
Along the window’s edge and grew like weeds 
Against the lower panes. [. . .] 
The unprofitable bindweed spread his bells 
From side to side, and with unwieldy wreaths 
Had dragged the rose from its sustaining wall 
And bowed it down to earth. (ll. 368-370, 372-375) 
 
On his second return, he clearly sees that ‘a sleepy hand of negligence’ (ll. 440) 
has shadowed the place, and finally, that ‘her poor hut / Sunk to decay’ (ll. 512-
513). The process of the cottage’s ruination reflects an estrangement between 
her and the place. 
    Particularly, the decaying cottage demonstrates the crucial relationship 
between the place and her inner self. As Wordsworth lost a home by losing his 
parents, Margaret is displaced by losing her family. If, for Wordsworth, the loss 
of his parents brought about the loss of home, Margaret’s loss of her family 
does not drive her from the place as a locality, but she does lose it as a home in 
terms of dwelling. What has changed is not the place, but her inner situation. 
Furthermore, ‘the things’ in her home deepen her experience of loss, because 
 173 
they evoke absence as well as memory. It is not the place itself, but her inner 
state of the mind that causes her displacement. Accordingly, dwelling involves 
the relationship between a place and her inner self. In this respect, Margaret’s 
dwelling place remained a home for her physical body, but not for her inner self. 
    The pedlar’s closing comment on Margaret and her cottage conveys the 
complex meaning of dwelling: 
 
She loved this wretched spot, nor would for worlds 
Have parted hence; and still that length of road 
And this rude bench one torturing hope endeared, 
Fast rooted at her heart (ll. 523-526) 
 
‘This wretched spot’ used to be her home, but the absence of her family 
deprived her of the proper sense of dwelling. The image of wretchedness 
represents her broken relationship with the place and the sense of 
uprootedness on a psychological and spiritual level. But the fact that she still 
‘loved this wretched spot’ and cherished hope of Robert’s returning ‘at her 
heart’ reflects her yearning for a restoration of home. In the Ruined Cottage, 
her yearning for home is not concerned so much with the place itself as with 
her husband and children. In the long run, the meaning of dwelling requires a 
place not only for a physical body but also for the dynamic of an inner self in 
relation to psychology and spirituality. 
 
2.3. The experience of the one life 
    Having looked at Wordsworth’s struggles, fears, and anxieties about death 
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and the alienation of urban life, I will discuss his attempts to discover an ideal 
place for dwelling in the vale of Grasmere. We have seen how the loss of family, 
the experience of alienated city-life, and the burden of the mystery, ruin the 
harmony and joy of dwelling, but his poetry continues to point towards a 
relationship between humanity, nature, and God as the foundation for a home 
over and against them. Both the natural environment and the notion of 
transcendence constitute an indispensable part in dwelling. Particularly, in this 
phase, for Wordsworth, the concept of the one life is crucial to the formulation 
of a dwelling place in relation to the three elements. 
    For Wordsworth, the idea of the one life becomes one of the primary 
themes of his writing in the 1790s, especially after Wordsworth developed a 
close relationship with Coleridge in 1797-1798.48 During these years, the two 
poets met frequently and exchanged their ideas on various subjects. There is 
no doubt that this relationship contributed to Wordsworth’s intellectual 
development in a profound way. Later Wordsworth mentioned that Coleridge 
was ‘one of the two beings to whom my intellect is most indebted’.49 Although 
Wordsworth owes the idea of the one life to Coleridge, he develops it in a 
different way. H. W. Piper made an interesting comment on the difference 
between them in this regard. Whereas Coleridge was ‘preoccupied with the 
creative nature of the soul and with his loss of poetic power, and became more 
concerned with the Imagination as an activity of the mind’, Wordsworth 
‘continued to see it [the one life] as a natural phenomenon occurring in the life 
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of a chosen being’.50 This contrast reflects their different ways of pursuing the 
idea of the one life. Coleridge gradually turned from poetry to prose, in which 
he continued to try to formulate a grand theory for the unity of the universe. By 
contrast, what matters for Wordsworth is his own personal experience, often 
associated with feeling rather than any larger theory. As Jonathan Wordsworth 
put it, he must experience his ideas ‘on his pulses’.51  If Coleridge tried to 
articulate the oneness of the universe through his voluminous readings and hard 
thinking, Wordsworth had to contemplate and to feel it in his personal 
experience. Presupposing that there is the one life, Coleridge tried to find it 
through recent scientific discoveries, philosophy, and theology. Rather than 
being interested in the grand idea of the one life, Wordsworth was more 
preoccupied by various issues about human life, for example, the experiences 
of grief, loss, and suffering. 
    The Pedlar, composed in February – March 1798, was originally planned to 
be part of The Ruined Cottage, which was written the previous summer, but 
they were never published as one single poem.52 In The Ruined Cottage the 
pedlar tells the tragic story of Margaret, but in The Pedlar the narrator provides 
the story of the pedlar in Part I. Like Margaret, the pedlar underwent a painful 
experience of loss and poverty. When he was a boy, his father died and left the 
family destitute. Whereas Margaret becomes disconnected from her dwelling 
place, the pedlar moves beyond suffering. His enlightenment does not take 
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place suddenly, but is related with the formation of his mind. Various elements 
contribute to the development of the pedlar’s mind. He was taught to fear God 
and to respect ‘God’s word’ (ll. 112-113). He also read books ‘greedily’ (ll. 
164-174). Interestingly, he could not find ‘love’ or ‘the pure joy of love’ in 
books (ll. 175-180). It was through the power of nature that he was able to feel 
‘the lesson deep of love’ (ll. 180-185). In other words, he learned through his 
relationship with nature what he could not gain in the more traditional way via 
religious education, or knowledge of books. 
    Furthermore, the Pedlar was able to experience the presence of God in 
nature. When he was a boy, he ‘had perceiv’d the presence and the power / Of 
greatness’ in the wood on his way back home. While tending herds on the tops 
of the high mountains, he beheld the sun: 
 
Rise up, and bathe the world in light. He look’d; 
The ocean and the earth beneath him lay 
In gladness and deep joy. The clouds were touch’d, 
And in their silent faces did he read 
Unutterable love. Sound needed none, 
Nor any voice of joy: his spirit drank 
The spectacle. Sensation, soul, and form 
All melted into him: they swallow’d up 
His animal being: in them did he live 
And by them did he live. They were his life, (ll. 192-201) 
 
Intriguingly, he describes this mystical experience as a ‘visitation from the 
living God’ (ll. 203). This much-quoted passage represents clearly the idea of 
the one life in terms of the relationship between humanity and nature and God 
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to the extent that nature and the pedlar are united by living in each other’s life 
through the presence of God in nature. In the one life, he can experience 
‘unutterable love’ and ‘joy’, but it should be noted that the experience is based 
on the immanence of God in nature. A parallel passage in Tintern Abbey also 
communicates a similar experience of the one life. The poet, like the pedlar, felt 
‘a presence’ in nature: 
 
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns, 
And the round ocean, and the living air, 
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man – (ll. 98-100) 
 
When he becomes aware of ‘a presence’ in nature, he, at the same time, 
perceives ‘a motion and a spirit that impels / All thinking things, all objects of 
all thought, / And rolls through all things’ (ll. 102-103). Therefore, for him, 
nature was ‘all in all’ (ll. 76). The immanence of God in nature enables the poet 
to recognise the unity of all things and to feel ‘the joy of elevated thoughts’ (ll. 
95-6). 
    In fact, these two passages are often regarded as pantheistic. But it is 
important to pay attention to the sense of immanence and transcendence in 
them. Integration seems to be offered between the Presence in nature and the 
Absolute Otherness. ‘The sun’s bathing the world in light’ conjures up a striking 
image of how God is present in the whole universe, but the idea of ‘visitation 
from the living God’ implies that the universe and its Creator are distinct. 
Although the pedlar experiences the one life through the visitation, he 
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confesses that ‘He did not feel the God, he felt his works’.53  A distinction 
between God and His creature is thus drawn. In a similar vein, Tintern Abbey 
communicates such a distinction in terms of the poem’s portrayal of dwelling. 
The notion that nature is the dwelling place of God seems to evoke a 
pantheistic mood, but does not identify nature with the transcendence of God in 
the poem. In fact, the idea of the accommodation of God as a traditional 
Christian concept implies how God can dwell in nature. In his Essay, 
Supplementary to the Preface of 1815, Wordsworth himself explains the 
traditional accomodatio: 
 
The commerce between Man and his Maker cannot be carried on but by a 
process where much is represented in little, and the infinite Being 
accommodates himself to a finite capacity.54 
 
As the concept of accomodatio reflects a distinction as well as integration 
between the infinite Being and the finite creature, God’s dwelling in nature 
maintains both immanence and transcendence. He is immanent in nature in that 
He accommodates himself to it, and at the same time He is transcendent as long 
as a distinction between the dweller and the place remains. Accordingly, the 
presence of God in the two comparable passages ought to be conceived as the 
vitality of immanence and transcendence, rather than as pantheism. The 
implication is that, in this stage, Wordsworth appears to put emphasis on the 
immanence of God as he tries to build up an ideal place for home in the natural 
environment. 
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    Having argued that the idea of the one life is deeply religious in terms of 
his experience of divine immanence in nature, the outcome of the pedlar’s 
visionary experience remains to be explored. It is noteworthy that the pedlar is 
able to corroborate his religious faith through his mystical experience. After 
having encountered the one life in relation to nature and God, he finally 
authenticates his religious faith: 
 
Oh! Then, how beautiful, how bright appear’d 
The written promise! He had early learn’d 
To reverence the Volume which displays 
The mystery, the life which cannot die: 
But in the mountains did he feel his faith: (ll. 212-216) 
 
The passage implies a tension between the teaching of historical Christianity 
and personal experience in nature. Although he has learned the teachings of the 
faith, it appears that he is able to convince himself of them through his personal 
and mystical experience in nature. It is through the ‘unutterable love’ in the 
unity of nature that he can embrace ‘the written promise’ and ‘the life which 
cannot die’, which empowers him to overcome the pain of mortality. 
    The wisdom of nature expands the perceptive power of his mind in a sense 
that he came to see what others could not see. The pedlar tells the narrator 
that: 
 
I see around me here 
Things which you cannot see: we die, my Friend, 
Nor we alone, but that which each Man lov’d 
And priz’d in his peculiar nook of earth 
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Dies with him, or is chang’d; (ll. 405-409) 
 
Reminding us of the inevitable reality of death and the transience of our life, he 
implies that he found a way of going beyond that reality. After finishing the 
tragic story, the pedlar acknowledges that he has created a sense of sorrow. He, 
however, argues that: 
 
What we feel of sorrow and despair 
From ruin and from change, and all the grief 
The passing shews of being leave behind, 
Appear’d an idle dream that could not live 
Where meditation was: (ll. 865-869) 
 
Through meditation he seems to be able to conceive the sorrow of despair, 
death, and mutability as ‘an idle dream’. In spite of the sadness of the tragic 
story, he could thus find ‘tranquility’ and ‘walked along his road in happiness’ (ll. 
862, 870). His visionary experience of the one life reveals that his way of 
overcoming this reality is not to compensate for it with the joy of the 
experience, but to be aware of the promise of immortality, which was ‘felt’ by 
the experience. At the end, he consoles the narrator by saying that ‘she sleeps 
in the calm earth, and peace is here’ (ll. 856). The faith of immortality based 
upon the infinite Being allows him to feel the interrelatedness of life even in the 
face of death and mutability. 
    Likewise, in Home at Grasmere, Wordsworth explores the consolation of 
immortality as a way to overcome suffering. Despite the anxieties of death felt 
in the poem, the poet, like the pedlar, is willing to challenge the shadow of our 
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life: 
 
The Vision of humanity and of God 
The Mourner, God the Sufferer, when the heart 
Of his poor Creatures suffers wrongfully- 
Both in the sadness and the joy we found 
A promise and an earnest that we twain (ll. 244-248) 
 
Interestingly, this passage refers to the two natures of Christ who was both God 
and human. He was divine, but at the same time human, ‘the Sufferer’. He died 
as a human but revealed the idea of immortality in the divine. ‘A promise’ 
assures the poet that, ‘in the midst of these unhappy times, all the Vales of 
earth and all mankind will be given love and knowledge by a portion of the 
blessedness’ (ll. 253-256), through which they will overcome human mortality. 
At the end of the poem, the poet offers a condensed form of summary for hope 
against suffering which reminds us of the Sermon on the Mount in Matthew 5. 
The poet would sing the songs for ‘Hope for this earth and hope beyond the 
grave--: 
 
Of blessed consolations in distress, 
Of joy in widest commonalty spread, 
Of the individual mind that keeps its own 
Inviolate retirement, and consists 
With being limitless the one great Life- (ll. 965-971) 
 
Although human life is overshadowed by the experience of suffering and loss, 
the poet attempts to write a song for hope, which reassures us of the 
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consolation of immortality in the context of ‘the one great Life’. 
 
2.4. ‘The one great Life’ and ‘one Household under God’ 
    If the idea of the one great life enables the poet to reconcile himself to 
mortality, the question arises what kind of relationship the idea develops with 
the notion of dwelling. Offering us an idealized picture of dwelling in Home at 
Grasmere, Wordsworth declares, ‘dear Vale, / One of thy lowly dwellings is my 
home’ (ll. 52-3). First of all, he stresses the significance of this place as a 
locality and a physical geography within the context of a natural environment. 
For Wordsworth, this dwelling-place is neither a ‘mere place in respite from the 
fragmented restlessness of modern life’, nor ‘a symbol of a utopian existence’, 
but is ‘a choice of the whole heart’: not ‘a weak indulgence’ but ‘an act of 
reason that exultingly aspires’ (ll. 78-82).55 One of the elements which explains 
this firm determination to choose this particular spot as a home can be found in 
his memory of childhood. The poem opens on a scene in his memory which 
refers to the first time the poet as ‘a School-boy’ overlooked the vale of 
Grasmere, and he remembers his passionate yearning for this place as a home: 
‘What happy fortune were it here to live!’ (ll. 9); ‘For rest of body ‘twas a 
perfect place’ (ll. 22); ‘here / Should be my home, this Valley be my World’ (ll. 
42-3). Further, in a letter to Lady Beaumont in November 1805, Dorothy 
recollects John’s visit to the new house in Grasmere in 1800, during which he 
‘paced over this floor in pride before we had been six weeks in the house, 
exulting within his noble heart that his Father’s Children had once again a home 
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together’.56 In the poem Wordsworth also mentions briefly that John, ‘a never-
resting Pilgrim of the Sea’, ‘finds at last an hour to his content / Beneath our 
roof’, and he describes the union of his siblings as ‘a happy band!’ in a ‘Vale of 
Peace’ (ll. 866-8, 873-4). In this sense, this particular spot, as an element of 
physical geography, enables the poet to maintain the continuity of the self 
between the past and the present. 
    This place for a home needs to be understood in terms of a physical 
geography and a natural environment. As ‘From that time forward was the place 
to me / As beautiful in thought as it had been / When present to my bodily eyes’ 
(ll. 44-6), the natural beauty of the place is important to the poet. His 
experience and perception of life in an urban space shattered the peace and joy 
in dwelling, but the natural environment in Grasmere enabled him to create an 
ideal place for dwelling. He discovered a sense of ‘peace’ and ‘gladness’ in the 
‘soft and gay and beautiful’ vale of Grasmere (ll. 134). This dwelling place 
provided a sense of safety to the extent that ‘What once was deemed so 
difficult is now / Smooth, easy, without obstacle’ (ll. 75-6). Likewise, in Tintern 
Abbey, Wordsworth confesses that he has ‘owed to the forms of beauty’ in 
nature the overcoming of the sense of ‘loneliness’ and ‘weariness’ in ‘towns and 
cities’ and the experiencing of ‘tranquil restoration’ (ll. 31). The process by 
which nature lightens ‘the heavy and the weary weight of all this unintelligible 
world’ (ll. 40-41) implies that nature is associated with the mind as a corporeal 
landscape. That is, the outward forms of nature stimulate the senses and create 
‘sensations sweet’ which are ‘felt in the blood and ‘along the heart’ and finally 
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reach into the mind (ll. 28-30). Accordingly, the sense of locality and the 
physical geography of this particular spot need to be underlined. 
    The reason for underlining the physicality of the dwelling place in 
Grasmere is that, for Wordsworth, the relational aspect between the place and 
the dweller is of great significance, but the physical dimension is often regarded 
as a mere projection of the mind by critics. I want to stress that the physical 
geography of a particular spot matters in the formulation of a dwelling place. In 
developing the idea of dwelling, the poet reveals the significance of the intimate 
relationship between dwellers and their natural environment. As he defines the 
theme of the poem as ‘on Man, on Nature, and on human Life’ (ll. 959), he 
shows us that he is attempting to build the notion of dwelling by integrating 
diverse elements into one single unity. Moreover, in Home at Grasmere, he 
describes a kind of interpersonal relationship between humanity and nature, 
which live together not in a hierarchical sense, but in a reciprocal way. If we 
look at the process of his settling in this place, we see him as the beneficiary in 
this natural environment as he is given a safe place over and against the cold 
‘Realities of Life’. He tries to build an ‘I-Thou’ relationship with the place, 
rather than ‘I-It’, by personifying the vale and asking it to ‘Embrace me then, ye 
Hill, and close me in’ (ll. 129). Instead of occupying the place by simple choice, 
the poet is willing to let the place accept him as a dweller: 
 
[. . .] Grasmere, our dear Vale, 
Received us. Bright and solemn was the sky 
That faced us with a passionate welcoming 
And led us to our threshold, to a home 
Within a home [. . .] (ll. 258-262) 
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‘A home Within a home’ implies that Grasmere itself becomes a home, and the 
vale as home offers a sense of safety by ‘concealing us from the storm’ (ll. 456). 
Therefore he feels ‘enclosed / To breathe in peace’ ‘under Nature’s care’ and 
‘guardianship’ (ll. 854-5, 753, 131). Further, their relationship deepens through 
love: ‘It loves us now, this Vale so beautiful / Begins to love us!’ (ll. 268-9). 
    In return for the loving care the vale shows to the poet, he acknowledges 
the intrinsic value of the place. He endorses the sacredness of the vale in that 
the dwellers are already ‘blessed’ owing to ‘this holy place’ (ll. 366-369). We 
should not despise ‘this lowly dwelling’ (ll. 53) because: 
 
Each Being has his office, lowly some 
And common, yet all worthy if fulfilled 
With zeal, acknowledgement that with the gift 
Keeps pace a harvest answering to the seed. (ll. 880-883) 
 
The poet urges us to ‘love all gentle things’ (ll. 943). Further, his knowledge of 
this place grows as he becomes familiar with the inner life of the natural 
environment as well as its appearances. Although he is a ‘Newcomer’, he notes 
that ‘the inward frame opens every day’; ‘Though slowly opening’ (ll. 693-5). 
‘As it unfolds itself, now here, now there’, the poet enriches his understanding 
of ‘this fair Valley’s self’ (ll. 697, 700). In this respect, the poet and the vale 
develop an interpersonal relationship by interpenetrating each other in that he 
opens himself to the fullness and care of the vale, and at the same time it also 
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opens its inward frame to him every day.57 
    The growth of the mind plays a key role in appreciating the intrinsic value 
of such a natural environment. If we look at the Pedlar and Tintern Abbey, too, 
we see that the transformative experience of coming to understand the one life 
is not limited to the unity of a static understanding, but has to do with feeling 
and perception. What changes is not the person or nature, but the way of 
feeling and seeing in the visionary experiences. In The Pedlar, the pedlar 
perceives ‘the moral properties and scope of things’ (ll. 162-163) and gives ‘a 
moral life’ to ‘every natural form, rock, fruit, and flower, even the loose stones 
that cover the highway’ (ll. 80-82, The Ruined Cottage). There is nothing 
unimportant in nature because even ‘the least of things seem’d infinite’ (ll. 220-
221). In a similar vein, the poet, in Tintern Abbey, confesses: 
 
[. . . ] I have learned 
To look on nature, not as in the hour 
Of thoughtless youth, but hearing oftentimes 
The still, sad music of humanity, (ll. 89-92) 
 
The visionary experience enabled him to see nature in a different perspective, 
and therefore he came to recognise the intrinsic value of nature in relation to 
the ethical or spiritual aspect of nature and the preciousness of little things. In 
other words, it opened the eye of the mind in terms of an epistemological 
dimension through which he could ‘see into the life of thing’ (ll. 50). The pedlar 
and the poet re-establish their relationship with nature through mystical 
experience by discovering the intrinsic value of the natural environment. 
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    In the long run, the poet is able to discover an alternative ‘Society’, ‘The 
True community, the noblest Frame / Of many into one incorporate’ (ll. 818-
820) in the vale of Grasmere, and describes this community as ‘one Household 
under God for high and low, one family and one mansion’ (ll. 822-823). The 
thought of ‘one Household under God’ epitomizes Wordsworth’s idea of dwelling. 
For him, to dwell means to foster a reciprocal relationship between a dweller 
and a natural environment in the one life. The interrelatedness between the 
dweller and a dwelling place deepens their bond to the extent that the poet can 
locate the sense of self-completeness in the beautiful natural surroundings. For 
him, ‘this small abiding-place of many men’ in the valley of Grasmere is: 
 
A Centre, come from wheresoe’er you will, 
A Whole without dependence or defect, 
Made for itself and happy in itself, 
Perfect Contentment, Unity entire. (ll. 167-170). 
 
Nothing is wanting in the valley because everything is there, and ‘it is 
indivisibly self-unified.’58 The poet thus perceives the unity of the dwellers and 
‘the topographical actuality of the valley’ in Grasmere, which represents ‘one 
Household’.59 
    In his Wordsworth and the Poetry of What we are, Paul Fry declares that 
the works of Wordsworth do not reflect a radical subjectivity or egotism but are 
concerned with the ‘ontological’ unity of the human and the nonhuman, or of us 
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and the rest of the world. 60  Discussing the relationship between human 
consciousness and all nonhuman things in the ‘Preface’, Fry claims that the 
ontic unity is not ‘the reinforcement of human self-importance by nonhuman 
analogs’, but ‘the disclosure to human reflection of the nonhuman unity, perhaps 
also the spiritual unity, of all somatic existence’.61 It is noteworthy that the 
poetry of Wordsworth, rather than creating, ‘discloses the unity constituted by 
and as the being, apart from meaning and apart even from difference, of all 
human and nonhuman things’.62 What Wordsworth discovers is ‘the revelation of 
being itself in the nonhumanity that “we” share with the nonhuman universe.’63 
Accordingly, the unity between the dwellers and ‘the topographical actuality of 
the valley’ in Grasmere is based not on a sheer subjective experience, but on 
the poet’s awareness of the reciprocal relationship between them. 
    What I would particularly add to Fry’s account is the religious aspect of 
dwelling. We have seen that Home at Grasmere is resonant with fears and 
anxieties about death and the inhuman nature of city-life, but the poet tries to 
deal with them through the experience of the one life. The notion of the one life 
shows his awareness of how he is interrelated with nature and with God. In 
particular, the sense of the one life convinces him of faith in immortality 
‘beyond the grave’, which is based upon the immanence of God in nature. 
Because of this faith, the poet can finally build up a dwelling place in the vale of 
Grasmere with a sense of safety and peace and joy over and against any 
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anxieties. As he proclaims ‘Great God’ as ‘breath and being, way and guide, 
power and understanding’ (ll. 1042-1044), the thought of ‘one Household’ is 
revealed to be dependent upon the immanence of God. In this respect, for 
Wordsworth, the notion of the one life is associated with a psychological and 
spiritual space as well as a physical space in dwelling. 
 
3. Dwelling in the community of the living and the dead 
3.1. A fresh challenge from human mortality 
    In the previous section we have seen that Home At Grasmere is a kind of 
eulogy or manifesto for an ideal of dwelling, in which humanity, nature, and God 
are interrelated with one another. In this poem, Wordsworth appears to 
reconcile himself with the reality of loss and death to the extent that he can find 
peace and harmony in his new dwelling, Grasmere, trusting in the hope of 
eternal life. But in his works after the eulogy he still return to an anxiety about 
home in the sense that Wordsworth keeps conjuring up images of loss and 
wandering. In particular, he is seen struggling with the experience of death in a 
very profound way, even during his adult life. Although the death of his parents 
left the boy a painful memory, he later had to face a fresh challenge from the 
bitter reality of death due to the death of his brother John and two children. 
    In the middle and late 1800s, Wordsworth was exhaustively tested in terms 
of ‘the faith that looks through death’.64 His brother, John, a ship’s captain, was 
drowned at sea in 1805, and his daughter Catherine died of convulsions at the 
age of three in June in 1812, while his son Thomas, six and a half years old, 
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died of pneumonia in December of the same year. Wordsworth wrote some 
letters and poems about these deaths that express his intense feelings of 
unbearable sorrow and pain. They not only express a collection of 
heartbreaking emotions, but allow us to catch a glimpse of his changing 
perspectives on the relationship between humanity, nature, and God within the 
context of dwelling. First of all, in his letters, Wordsworth conveys the sense 
that his stable family in a loved place seems to be broken apart: ‘the set is now 
broken’; ‘God keep the rest of us together’.65 It reminds one of Wordsworth’s 
childhood experience of separation after the death of his parents. With the 
death of Catherine, Wordsworth recognises that he is struggling not only with 
sorrow but with uncertainty: ‘I write with a full heart; with some sorrow, but 
most oppressed by an awful sense of the uncertainty and instability of all human 
things’.66 The awareness of ‘an awful sense of the uncertainty and instability of 
all human things’ alludes to his overall spiritual crisis in his understanding of 
life.67 Although he had had the experience of losing his parents in his childhood, 
the death of John and his children appears to represent a new challenge to 
Wordsworth, as a husband, father, and brother. When the death of John and the 
two children shattered the peace and harmony of his dwelling, he became 
conscious of the mutability or fragility of his own human efforts. He was aware 
of how vulnerable to death and loss his happy dwelling was. If he was yearning 
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for just another home after the death of his parents in his childhood, the death 
of John and his two children made him perceive the unreliability and 
unpredictability of the earthly home itself. Accordingly, for the poet, ‘all human 
things’ seemed to be unstable and uncertain. Yet, if we look at Essays Upon 
Epitaphs and Books V, VI and VII of The Excursion, we discover that 
Wordsworth tries to overcome this spiritual crisis by reaffirming the idea of 
immortality. 
 
3.2. Paul de Man and Essays Upon Epitaphs 
    In recent decades, critics have tended to see Wordsworth’s epitaphic 
writings from a deconstructive perspective, focusing on ‘the gap between the 
sheer materiality of the inscribed epitaph, figuring the textuality of writing, and 
the absence of the author, associated with the absent dead’. 68  For them, 
epitaphs open up a gap between signifier and signified, text and the human 
presence. In his ‘Autobiography as De-Facement’, Paul de Man investigates the 
relationship between language and mortality in Essays Upon Epitaphs and points 
to the unbridgeable gap between them. Presupposing that the essays are forms 
of autobiography, de Man argues that ‘Wordsworth’s claim for restoration in the 
face of death, in the Essays Upon Epitaphs, is grounded in a consistent system’: 
‘a system of mediations that converts the radical distance of an either / or 
opposition in a process allowing movement from one extreme to the other by a 
series of transformations that leave the negativity of the (or lack of 
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relationship) intact. One moves, without compromise, from death or life to life 
and death’. 69  Yet, for de Man, language as ‘trope’ and ‘figure’ is ‘always 
private’, and it is ‘not the thing itself but the representation, the picture of the 
thing’. Just as the pictures are ‘mute’, so this language is ‘mute’. Accordingly, 
our dependence upon this language in writing implies ‘the possible 
manifestation of sound at our own will’.70 Although the essays try to construct 
‘a sequence of mediations between incompatibles: body and grave’, any 
correlation between them is invalidated by the fact that ‘the shape and the 
sense of a world’ is ‘accessible only in the private way of understanding’. De 
Man thus claims that ‘death is a displaced name for a linguistic predicament, and 
the restoration of mortality by autobiography deprives and disfigures to the 
precise extent that it restores’. 71  In a nutshell, for de Man, Essays Upon 
Epitaphs are a sheer self-restoration which cannot go beyond the poetic self. 
    But for Wordsworth, epitaphs are not mere rhetoric without human 
presence, but a core element which ‘restores a sense of broken community’ by 
linking the living with the dead.72 In other words, they enable the poet to re-
locate his dwelling place in terms of the relationship between the living 
community, the dead, nature, and immortality. In the process, we should 
consider the continuing importance of ideas of the one life to his writing in this 
period, even if critics have tended to overlook this when discussing the later 
poetry and prose. Admittedly, his way of dealing with mortality in Essays Upon 
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Epitaphs is different, for instance, from that in The Pedlar. On the one hand, in 
the latter, he seeks consolation over and against the reality of mortality through 
the experience of the one life, but the dead are not considered as being 
included in the dwelling. On the other hand, in the former, he tries to re-
establish the idea of the dwelling by making the dead part of his dwelling, rather 
than being separated from the living, through a relational dynamic. Accordingly, 
it can be claimed that the vanishing of the idea of the one life does not mean 
that Wordsworth rejected it; rather he continued to search for an ideal place for 
dwelling by investigating how the world is interrelated. 
 
3.3. Immortality, language, and the permanence of the epitaph 
    During the period of The Pedlar and Home At Grasmere, Wordsworth refers 
to the idea of immortality, but it is in Essays Upon Epitaphs (1810) and The 
Excursion (1814) that he provides us with a comprehensive account of 
immortality in relation to death.73 In the first essay of his Essays Upon Epitaphs, 
he suggests that ‘the desire to live in the remembrance of his fellows’ and to 
remember others is due to ‘the consciousness of a principle of immortality in 
the human soul’. 74  He regards immortality as a built-in idea in human 
consciousness in the sense that it is ‘implanted in all men naturally’.75 Then he 
associates the idea of immortality with the act of writing, which produces 
epitaphs. He argues that ‘as soon as nations had learned the use of letter, the 
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epitaphs were inscribed upon these monuments’ for immortality.76 Accordingly, 
epitaphs manifest the human compulsion to perpetuate life even after death 
through inscriptions. 
    The language of immortality in these inscriptions is the reincarnation of the 
human beings, who are to be remembered in epitaphs. For Wordsworth, 
language plays a key role in connecting the source with its final destination. In 
his trope of a ‘running stream’ in a permanent state of ‘influx’, language is 
conceived as the very ‘receptacle’ of ‘the mighty influx’ ‘without bounds or 
dimensions’, aspiring towards ‘infinity’.77  If we compare the journey of the 
immortal soul to the mighty influx of a running stream, human language can be 
understood as the vehicle of the journey. As language becomes an intermediary 
of the stream between the beginning and the end, it becomes boundlessly or 
limitlessly a mediator of the soul’s journey before and after death. 
    In this respect, for Wordsworth, language and death are deeply interrelated 
with each other. Even after death, the soul will return through language in the 
form of epitaph. In the third essay, the poet argues that language is the 
incarnation of the thought: 
 
They [words] hold above all other external powers a dominion over 
thoughts. If words be not (recurring to a metaphor before used) an 
incarnation of the thought but only a clothing for it, then they surely will 
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prove an ill gift [. . .] Language, if it do not uphold, and feed, and leave in 
quiet, like the power of gravitation or the air we breathe, is a counter-
spirit, unremittingly and noiselessly at work to derange, to subvert, to lay 
waste, to vitiate, and to dissolve.78 
 
The metaphor of language as clothing for thought was common in neo-classical 
poetics, but Wordsworth rejects it, choosing to see ‘words’ as ‘incarnation’ 
rather than ‘clothing’. 79  In his fourth essay on Style (1841), De Quincey, 
referring to Wordsworth’s metaphor of incarnation for thought, maintains that ‘if 
language were merely a dress, then you could separate the two’. But the union 
of language and thought is ‘too subtle, the intertexture too ineffable, - each co-
existing not merely with the other, but each in and through the other’. Thus ‘the 
two elements are not united as a body with a separable dress, but as a 
mysterious incarnation.’80 If a word can enter into a thought as a constituent 
part, ‘the incarnation of thought made into a word about decaying flesh directs 
attention to the reincarnation of human beings to be memorialized in the form of 
the epitaph’.81 As a result, the dead can be immortalized by the inscription of 
the epitaph, which is a very particular kind of incarnation of thought. 
    Given that a desire for remembering the dead is implanted naturally in 
human beings and the inscription of the epitaph is the incarnation, rather than 
clothing, of this desire, Wordsworth holds that the epitaph reveals the sense of 
permanence and immortality in conjunction with the mortality of human beings. 
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He emphasises the ‘permanence’ of the inscription itself by contrasting it with 
the ephemeral ‘funeral oration or elegiac poem’ which produce transitory 
‘weakness and anguish of sorrow’. 82  Here what matters is the relationship 
between the permanence of the epitaph and the idea of dwelling. For 
Wordsworth, the permanence of the epitaph serves not only the dead, but also 
the living in that he appears to re-formulate the idea of dwelling through the 
location of the epitaph for those who still live there. 
    First of all, the permanence of the epitaph reassures people of immortality 
over and against the darkness and fear of death, which threatens the stability of 
dwelling. As the writings about the death of John and his two children imply, 
Wordsworth is struggling with uncertainty as well as the sorrow of loss. When 
the poet emphasises the immortality of the human soul through the permanence 
of the epitaph, he attains two objects. The epitaph enables him to recognise that 
the dead do not disappear completely but continue to dwell in their final home, 
and at the same time it releases him from the uncertainty of human mortality. 
‘The departed Mortal is telling the people that his pains are gone; that a state of 
rest is come; and he conjures them to weep for him no longer.’ 83  In The 
Excursion, death is described as a ‘vivid promise, bright as spring’, as well as 
being ‘cold, sullen and blank’ (V. ll. 556). The Pastor claims that: 
 
Life, I repeat, is energy of Love 
Divine or human; exercised in pain, 
In strife, and tribulation; and ordained, 
If so approved and sanctified, to pass, 
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Through shades and silent rest, to endless joy. (Book V, ll. 1018 – 1022) 
 
Although human life goes through the darkness of death, it is ‘the channel’ to 
‘endless joy’. Wordsworth describes how ‘the contemplative Soul’, as if ‘sailing 
upon the orb of this planet’ from west to east, ‘travels in the direction of 
mortality and advances to the country of everlasting life’.84 In the long run, 
death with ‘twofold aspect’ points to faith in immortality as well as to the pain 
of mortality, through which the living can attain the stability of dwelling, 
threatened by the darkness of death. 
 
3.4. Religion and the idea of immortality 
    For Wordsworth, the idea of immortality is not just poetic imagination or 
philosophical reasoning, but a religious faith. The poet pronounces the epitaph 
‘a humble expression of Christian confidence in immortality’, and the faith in 
immortality described by the pastor in the Excursion is also explicitly 
Christian. 85  But it is debatable whether he accepted Christian faith whole-
heartedly during this period. If we look at the poems and letters concerning the 
death of his brother and his children, we find that they display a rich mixture of 
suffering and surrendering. The death of his brother John is reflected in the 
‘Elegiac Stanzas Suggested by a Picture of Peele Castle’ (Poems in Two 
Volumes, 1807): 
 
I have submitted to a new controul: 
A power is gone, which nothing can restore; 
                                            
84
 Ibid., p. 53. 
85
 Ibid., p. 56. 
 198 
A deep distress hath humaniz’d my Soul.  (ll. 34-36) 
 
Yet, he declares that ‘the feeling of my loss will ne’er be old’, and he closes the 
poem with the juxtaposition of hope and pain: ‘Not without hope we suffer and 
we mourn’ (ll. 39, 60). After the death of Thomas in 1812, Wordsworth wrote to 
Southey that ‘For myself dear Southey I dare not say in what state of mind I am 
[. . .] yet in the agony of my spirit in surrendering such a treasure I feel a 
thousand times richer than if I had never possessed it’.86 He seems to suffer 
from the loss, paradoxically, as much as he surrenders presumably to ‘a new 
controul’ with hope. 
    With regard to the juxtaposition of suffering and surrendering, critics have 
pointed rightly to the ambivalence of his religious faith during the period of the 
death of his brother and two children. According to Ryan, the poet’s decision to 
rejoin the Church of England was more like a pledge of allegiance than a 
confession of faith on the grounds that Christian doctrine gave him comfort 
after the death of John, but he seems to have been struggling toward a 
confident assurance of an afterlife as late as 1805. 87  Intriguingly, The 
Excursion conveys a tension between faith and doubt through multiple points of 
view. Although the didactic narrative of the Pastor dominates Book V, VI and 
VII of the poem, the unresolved pessimistic view of the Solitary ‘unsettles the 
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absolute claim of any one speaker’.88 Sharp suggests that ‘The Excursion has 
no universally authorized poet or reader’.89 Referring to this unsettled ending of 
the poem, Gill also sees The Excursion ‘not as a confessio fidei, but as an 
exploration of faith’.90 
    Although it seems that Wordsworth examines, rather than believes 
sincerely, his exploration indicates something of the way he begins to see 
another aspect of God. In The Pedlar and Home At Grasmere the poet focuses 
on the immanence of God, present within the world, but now he begins to look 
at the transcendence of God by which He may exist beyond the world. It will be 
seen that Wordsworth eventually in his later years committed himself to the 
idea of heavenly dwelling. Yet, one of the key points in dealing with religion in 
Wordsworth is how to understand the relationship between the pantheistic 
tendency in the early years and the more doctrine-oriented attitude in later 
years. There is a danger of claiming that Wordsworth had two different sets of 
notions about God. But it should be stressed that his growing interest in the 
transcendence of God does not exclude a belief in the immanence of God. 
Likewise, his searching for the immortality of the soul during this period does 
not mean that he neglected the idea of the earthly dwelling, but rather enabled 
him to re-formulate the idea within the context of death. 
 
3.5. The community of the living and the dead 
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    With his presupposition of the immortality of the soul, Wordsworth re-
creates the ideal of dwelling by associating the dead with both the living and 
nature. For him, the dead do not disappear completely from the community after 
their death, but they become part of the community in terms of locality, emotion, 
and morality. Wordsworth even alludes to ‘communion between living and dead’ 
in the sense that they share a common dwelling place.91 In ‘We are seven’, an 
eight-year-old girl understands that both the living and the dead are part of a 
community. A man encounters a little cottage girl and asks her how many family 
members she has. She replies: 
 
‘Seven are we, 
And two of us at Conway dwell, 
And two are gone to sea. 
Two of us in the church-yard lie, 
My sister and my brother, 
And in the church-yard cottage, I 
Dwell near them with my mother.’ (ll. 18-24) 
 
Then the adult tries to correct her by reminding her that two are dead. 
However, she explains how she still regards her two dead siblings as part of 
her dwelling. For her, they are not separated from those living on the grounds 
that ‘Their graves are green’; ‘Twelve steps or more from my mother’s door’; 
‘My stockings there I often knit’; ‘I sit and sing to them’; ‘And eat my supper 
there’ (ll. 37, 39, 41, 44, 48). Whereas the man demarcates a clear boundary 
between the living and the dead, this little girl continues to develop an intimate 
relationship with the dead in terms of locality, emotion and sharing. 
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    In the Excursion, the graves are often described not as a cold and dark 
lifeless place, but as home or ‘habitation’ (Book VI, ll. 116, 219) in peace and 
holiness. Referring to a vivid Jacobite and a sullen Hanoverian, the Pastor also 
perceives the Church-yard: 
 
The visible quiet of this holy ground 
And breathed its soothing air; -the Spirit of hope 
And saintly magnanimity (Book VI, ll. 498-500) 
 
As the deaf man was carried ‘from his home / (Yon Cottage shaded by the 
woody crags) / To the profound stillness of the grave’ (Book VII, ll. 483-485), 
the act of dying, to some extent, is the act of moving from one home to another 
home.92 The graves, as other homes, are ‘around the dwelling place for the 
living’ (Book V, ll. 649), and thus the dwelling places for living and dead are 
brought together. In addition, Wordsworth mentions that the bones of the people 
who died away from home are transferred to their community in order to ‘rest 
by the side of their forefathers’.93 The implication is that the dead one, rather 
than being separated completely from the living, remains part of the community 
in terms of dwelling place. 
    The bond between living and dead is developed further through the channel 
of emotion. For Wordsworth, ‘the general sympathy’, created by the epitaphs, is 
based upon ‘love-the joint offspring of the worth of the dead and the affections 
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of the living!’.94 The emotions of the living play a key role in forming their 
relationship with the dead. At the same time, this emotional response brings 
people together: ‘they suffer and they weep with the same heart; they love and 
are anxious for one another in one spirit’.95 Critics, including Sally Bushel, Kurt 
Fosso, Michele Turner Sharp, and Lorna Clymer, have recently discussed how 
the culture of mourning contributes to the establishment of the relationship 
between the dead and the living, and between the people in a community.96 
    In this respect, we ascribe the despondency and seclusion of the Solitary in 
The Excursion to his troubled mourning. The history he narrates about the 
death of his two children and wife discloses how he has displaced mourning. 
Referring to the death of his wife, he mentions that he ‘suffers now, not seldom, 
from the thought / That I remember, and can weep no more-‘ (Book III, ll. 494-
495). Then he proclaims: 
 
[. . .] my business is, 
Roaming at large, to observe, and not to feel; 
And, therefore, not to act-convinced that all 
Which bears the name of action, howsoe’er 
Beginning, ends in servitude-still painful, 
And mostly profitless.  (Book III, ll. 899-904) 
 
His refusal to feel reveals his way of escaping from loss, grief and ‘Mutability, 
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which is Nature’s bane’ (Book III, ll. 465). Interestingly, this displacing of 
mourning reminds us of the delayed mourning in The Vale of Esthwaite, where 
the narrator, as we discussed earlier, was able to relieve his soul from grief by 
‘paying the mighty debt of Grief’ (ll. 287). The Solitary’s ‘yearning for reclusion 
from attachment’, as Fosso holds, is ‘owed not just to these painful feelings of 
mortal loss’ but ‘to grief over his mourning’s premature cessation, to his 
mourning of mourning’.97 For Wordsworth, emotion becomes one of the key 
channels through which the dead and the living can develop their relationship. 
    In addition to the ideas of immortality and mourning, graves also have a 
moral influence upon the living. In the eighteenth century the social 
consciousness of remembering the dead was recognised in terms of morality. In 
his Reflections on the Revolution in France, Edmund Burke had suggested that 
social affection is dependent upon the connection between the dead and the 
living in that the monuments ‘keep a durable record of all our acts’.98 Examining 
the association of Wordsworth’s poetry of epitaph and English burial reform, 
Karen Sánchez-Eppler shows that the reformers’ stance on the relocation and 
renovation of England’s cemeteries was variously reinforced by ‘a newly voiced 
need to protect the repose of the dead, and the notion that the graveyard should 
be a place of moral edification’.99 She also mentions William Godwin’s comment 
that the mere act of ‘Erecting Some Memorial of the Illustrious Dead [. . .] on 
the Spot where their Remains have been Interred’ would have ‘moral uses [. . .] 
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of no common magnitude’.100 Likewise, Wordsworth evokes the moral influence 
of the graves on the living. In a footnote to his first Essay, Wordsworth 
criticises Dr. Johnson’s thought that ‘to define an Epitaph is useless; everyone 
knows that it is an inscription on a Tomb. An Epitaph, therefore, implies no 
particular character of writing’.101 Wordsworth, however, reveals the historical 
role of graves and epitaphs within the moral constitution of the community in 
that ‘epitaphs personate the deceased and represent him as speaking from his 
own tomb-stone’: 
 
He admonishes with the voice of one experienced in the vanity of those 
affections which are confined to earthly objects, and gives a verdict like a 
superior Being, performing the office of a judge.102 
 
Wordsworth thus recognises ‘a parish-church’ as ‘a visible centre of a 
community of the living and the dead’ where ‘the sensations of pious 
cheerfulness, which attend the celebration of the Sabbath-day, are profitably 
chastised by the sight of the graves of kindred and friend’.103 
    In Books VI and VII of The Excursion, the stories of the unmarked dead in 
the vale also inspire a moral message. Most of all, the Pastor’s act of 
recounting the stories is ‘a positive and communicative act, creating new links 
between the living’ and the dead.104  His oratory has an effective power to 
evoke a living narrative in the memories of others. In his ‘admiring description 
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of the Pastor as narrator’, Charles Lamb pointed out how, in particular, the 
environmental context of his oratory generates a sense of the connection 
between life and death: 
 
Nothing can be conceived finer than the manner of introducing these tales. 
With heaven above his head, and the mouldering turf at his feet – standing 
betwixt life and death – he seems to maintain that spiritual relation which 
he bore to his living flock, in its undiminished strength, even with their 
ashes.105 
 
By bringing back various memories of the dead through his narrative, the Pastor 
attempts to re-connect the living with the dead in terms of moral implications. 
He provides a number of stories about the dead who were poor and rich, 
powerful and marginalized, virtuous and wicked, friends and opponents, and 
draws the same conclusion from them all: that human beings share their 
mortality in common. After hearing the tales, the grey-haired Wanderer 
exclaims: 
 
So fails, so languishes, grows dim, and dies, 
All that this Word is proud of. From their spheres 
The stars of human glory are cast down; 
Perish the roses and the flowers of Kings, 
Princes and Emperors, and the crowns and palms 
Of all the Mighty, withered and consumed! 
Nor is power given to lowliest Innocence 
Long to protect her won. The Man himself 
Departs; (Book VII, ll. 998-1007) 
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This response is resonant with the sense of the transitoriness of human life, 
and therefore the graves become ‘a warning for a thoughtless Man’ (Book VI, ll. 
824). For instance, the Pastor recounts a story about a woman who was often 
sent abroad and lost her child, and reminds us that 
 
[. . .] for not only she bewailed 
A Mother’s loss, but mourned in bitterness 
Her own transgression; Penitent sincere 
As ever raised to Heaven a streaming eye. (Book VI, ll. 1009 – 1012) 
 
In this respect, the dead become part of dwelling with the living ‘in memory and 
for warning’ (Book VI, ll. 1103). 
 
3.6. The relationship between nature and the graveyard 
    We have seen how nature is a crucial part of dwelling in The Pedlar and 
Home At Grasmere in terms of the immanence of God, its beauty, and its 
reciprocal relationship with the dwellers. It continues to play a key role in 
Wordsworth’s reformulation of the idea of dwelling in association with the dead. 
As an idealized community stands in a close relationship to nature within the 
context of the natural environment, Wordsworth recognises the significance of 
nature in the location of the graveyard. Allocating several pages in the first 
‘Essays’ to an examination of burial practices from ancient times to the present, 
Wordsworth presents a striking contrast between a large town and the 
countryside with regard to the place of epitaphs: 
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Let a man only compare in imagination the unsightly manner in which our 
monuments are crowded together in the busy, noisy, unclean, and almost 
grassless church-yard of a large town, with the still seclusion of a 
Turkish cemetery, in some remote place; and yet further sanctified by the 
grove of cypress in which it is embosomed.106 
 
He prefers above all else the location of ‘a village church-yard, lying as it does 
in the lap of nature’, and most favourably contrasted with ‘that of a town of 
crowded population.’107 One of the reasons why Wordsworth wants to locate 
the monuments in nature is that ‘the language of the senseless stone’ can be 
given ‘a voice enforced and endeared by the benignity of that nature’.108 And 
this ‘voice’ of the monuments offers a ‘Traveller’, passing by, some soothing 
‘visible appearances or immediate impressions, lively and affecting analogies of 
life as a journey-death as a sleep overcoming the tired wayfarer [. . .] of virtue 
that standeth firm as a rock against the beating waves [. . .] of admonitions and 
heart-stirring remembrances, like a refreshing breeze that comes without 
warning, or the taste of the waters of an unexpected fountain’.109 
    Just as in The Excursion the stories of those dead in the vale coalesce 
together with those of the living, so the site of the graves, like the dwelling 
place of the living, is hardly differentiated from the landscape.110 As the act of 
dying is an act of moving from one home to another home, the dead, like the 
living, inhabit the vale. The natural environment appears to create a soothing 
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effect on the burial site as well as on the dwelling place of the living. After 
reading the tranquilizing inscription in the ‘Church-yard’: ‘Discerning Mortal! 
Do thou serve the will / Of Time’s eternal Master, and that peace, / Which the 
World wants, shall be for Thee confirmed’ (Book VI, ll. 535-537), the Sceptic 
agrees that ‘Smooth verse, inspired by no unlettered Muse’, and ‘the strain of 
thought / Accords with Nature’s language’ (Book VI, ll. 538-540). In other 
words, he identifies the effect of the verse with the effect of the natural 
surroundings: ‘the soft voice / Of yon white torrent falling down the rocks / 
Speaks, less distinctly, to the same effect’ (Book VI, ll. 540-542). For example, 
in Book VII, the Pastor explains how a ‘Tall-pine tree’, standing next to the 
tomb of the deaf Dalesman: 
 
At the touch of every wandering breeze, 
Murmurs, not idly, o’er his peaceful grave. 
Soul-cheering Light, most bountiful of Things! 
Guide of our way, mysterious Comforter! 
Whose sacred influence, spread through earth and heaven. (ll. 497-501) 
 
Therefore, Wordsworth affirms that ‘when death is in our thoughts, nothing can 
make amends for the want of the soothing influences of nature’.111  In this 
respect, he finds a close connection between nature and the tombs in that the 
latter owe their soothing beauty to the former: even to the extent that the 
language of the monuments is ‘in unison with that nature’.112 
    Another aspect of the close link between nature and graves can be found in 
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Wordsworth’s egalitarian idea of dwelling. He invokes the sense of commonness 
everywhere from Lyrical Ballads to The Excursion, and we have seen that, in 
Home at Grasmere, he emphasises a reciprocal relationship between the 
dwellers and the natural environment, and integrates the lives of the locals into 
his idea of dwelling. 113  Likewise, the graves, as part of Wordsworth’s re-
established notion of dwelling, are associated with the sense of commonness 
within the context of nature. In The Excursion, we hear about various deaths, 
but all of them will ‘find an equal resting-place’ in ‘this place’: 
 
[. . .] open to the good 
And evil, to the just and the unjust; 
In which they find an equal resting-place: 
Even as the multitude of kindred brooks 
And streams, whose murmur fills this hollow vale, 
Whether their course be turbulent or smooth, 
Their waters clear or sullied, all are lost 
Within the bosom of yon chrystal Lake, 
And end their journey in the same repose! (Book V, ll 920-928) 
 
For Wordsworth, in ‘nature’ ‘all men resemble each other, as in the temple 
where the universal Father is worshipped, or by the side of the grave which 
gathers all human Beings to itself, and equalises the lofty and the low’.114 In 
addition, an epitaph is ‘not a proud writing shut up for the studious: it is 
exposed to all – to the wise and the most ignorant’: ‘in the church-yard it is 
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open to the day; the sun looks down upon the stone, and the rains of heaven 
beat against it’. 115  The beauty of nature also contributes to the epitaph’s 
openness to all in that it ‘must have borrowed the beauty from the surrounding 
images of nature – from the trees, the wild flowers, from a stream running 
perhaps within sight or hearing’.116 Thus, nature is involved in the egalitarian 
and common aspects of the graves. 
    Interestingly, nature itself also plays an epitaphic function in association 
with memory. In his ‘Wordsworth, Inscriptions, and Romantic Nature Poetry’, 
Hartman holds that, for Wordsworth, landscape and graveyard merge together 
through the dynamic of the mind. In eighteenth-century poetry, ‘not only is the 
graveyard a major locus for the expression of nature sentiment, but is herself a 
larger graveyard inscribed deeply with evidences of past life’, for example, 
‘Gray’s Elegy (1751)’.117 In a similar vein, Kneale also recognises ‘the voice of 
nature’ as ‘an epitaphic voice’ in which ‘nature itself is like one giant epitaph, 
one complex memorial text to be conned by human beings’. 118  This 
convergence of graveyard and nature is found in Wordsworth’s poetry where he 
‘commemorates a strange spot in nature rather than a grave’ and ‘sees the pile 
of stones as a funeral pile’ in his imagination.119 For example, in his earlier 
experimental poems such as ‘The Thorns’, ‘The Two April Mornings’, and ‘To 
Joanna’, we discover that ‘the spot of mourning’ ‘lies in close association to the 
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natural objects of a thorn bush, a bridge, a native rock’.120 In ‘Lines Left upon a 
Seat in a Yew-tree’, Wordsworth gives an account of a man who died in a vale, 
whose memory is evoked by ‘this lonely yew-tree,’ ‘piled-stones’, ‘barren 
rocks’ (ll. 1, 9, 25). And the poet pronounces ‘this seat his only monument’ ‘in 
this deep vale’ (ll. 42-43). ‘The poet reads landscape as if it were a monument 
or grave’, and therefore ‘the lapidary inscription, replaced by the meditative 
mind’, is ‘freed from its dependence’ upon a specific tomb.121 Landscape itself, 
rather than a specific tomb, becomes epitaphic by associating itself with 
memory. Accordingly, in The Vale of Esthwaite, the poet, ‘wandering round the 
vale’, states that ‘[From] every rock would hang a tale’ (ll. 352-3). 
    Furthermore, nature’s epitaphic function requires that landscape is closely 
associated with the consciousness of the characters in The Excursion. Given 
that landscape as epitaph inspires the meditative mind particularly in relation to 
memory, it can be shown that, in Book V of the Excursion, ‘the poet transforms 
the physical journey through nature into a mental excursion which concerns the 
metaphysics of existence’.122 Being approached by the Pastor, the Wanderer 
provides a brief summary about his discussion on despondency with the 
Solitary: 
 
[. . .] A living power 
Is virtue, or not better than a name, 
Fleeting as health or beauty, and unsound? 
So that the only substance which remains, 
(For thus the tenor of complaint hath run,) 
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Among so many shadows, are the pains 
And penalties of miserable life, 
Doomed to decay, and then expire in dust! 
Our cogitations, this way have been drawn, 
These are the points,” the Wanderer said, “on which 
Our inquest turns. – Accord, good Sir! the light 
Of your experience to dispel this gloom” (Book V, ll. 466-477) 
 
This comment implies that the despondency of the Solitary is caused by his way 
of interpreting death as ‘the pains and penalties of miserable life’. The 
Solitary’s gloom regarding the plight of existence, caused by his way of 
understanding, shows how ‘elegies lamenting the dead turn into self-morbid 
solipsism’.123 As the Wanderer ‘turns our inquest’ on such inner aspects of 
human experience, his excursion ‘turns inward as an incursion through the inner 
depths of consciousness played out in the voices of the Wanderer, the Solitary, 
the Pastor, and the poet himself’. 124  As a result, the description of the 
landscape can be associated with that of the consciousness. 
 
4. Heavenly Dwelling 
4.1. Ecclesiastical Sonnets 
    In the previous section, we saw how Wordsworth re-establishes the idea of 
dwelling by associating the peace and harmony of a cottage in nature with the 
influence and presence of death. If Wordsworth’s early notion of dwelling is 
concerned with an earthly home and the immanence of God, in Essays Upon 
Epitaphs and The Excursion he considers immortality and the transcendent 
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aspect of God. Further, one of the interesting changes in his later period is that 
he becomes more aware of the vulnerability of earthly cottages and attempts to 
seek a more secure home in a heavenly dwelling. Most critics regard his later 
poetry as showing a decline in his poetic powers or a falling off in his 
achievement, but my purpose in this section is not to examine whether his 
poetic imagination gradually diminished, but to show how his perspective shifts 
from a view of the dwelling in this world to a view of the dwelling in the next 
world.125 Focusing on Part III of the Ecclesiastical Sonnets, I shall explore how 
Wordsworth contemplates the heavenly dwelling through church architecture, in 
which nature still constitutes one of the key elements. 
    The Ecclesiastical Sonnets consist of 132 sonnets that, while beginning 
with the establishment of Christianity in England to the situation of religion in 
Wordsworth’s day and dramatizing its ebb and flow, describe a journey or 
pilgrimage to an eternal city, along with a struggle over the uncertainty of faith 
in a fallen world, as well as a yearning for political stability and a spiritual goal 
over and against mutability, decay, change and paradox.126 The sonnets used to 
be not only part of Wordsworth’s long neglected later work, but also along with 
the poet’s doubtful achievements in his later works, received some harsh 
criticism.127 But some critics have not failed to recognise their significance 
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within the context of Wordsworth’s whole work. For example, attention should 
be paid to the interconnectedness of religious ideas in the Ecclesiastical 
Sonnets and in The Excursion concerning the nature of religion, the origins of 
worship, immanence and transcendence in nature. While the uncertainty of faith 
was not resolved yet in The Excursion, the composition of Ecclesiastical 
Sonnets ‘marked a very important moment in Wordsworth’s intellectual life’ in 
which he claimed ‘the necessity of defending’ faith as ‘the safeguard against 
anarchy’, ‘social retrogression’, mutability and mortality.128 In particular, it is 
clear that the poet is still preoccupied with the fear of death and the 
vulnerability of any earthly home in the sonnets. In Essays Upon Epitaphs and 
The Excursion, death is discussed in a positive sense as the poet attempts to be 
reconciled with it by uncovering the meaning and influence of death for the 
living. In the Ecclesiastical Sonnets, however, the poet focuses upon the 
destructive power of death, which is in marked contrast with the immortality 
and eternity of the heavenly dwelling. 
 
4.2. The experience of death in the journey of our life 
    If the sonnets outline the whole of British Church history, Wordsworth, 
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interestingly, draws a picture of a person’s whole life-journey from birth to 
death in part III from Sonnet XX to Sonnet XXXIV. His understanding of the 
journey of life is now entirely conditioned by the link between the mortality of 
human life and the promise of faith. Each stage of life, overshadowed by the 
fear of human mortality, is marked by a sacrament, such as Baptism (XX), The 
Marriage Ceremony (XXVI), and Funeral Service (XXXI). 129  Although the 
sacrament of Baptism is meant to celebrate the sense of a new beginning for a 
new born baby under ‘parental Love’ and ‘Grace from above’, Wordsworth 
juxtaposes life and death in Sonnet XX (Baptism). In the first half the sacrament 
of baptism is described as a transformation into ‘a christian Flower / A Growth 
from sinful Nature’s bed of weeds!’, which reminds us of St. Paul’s idea that 
‘Therefore as by the offence of one judgement came upon all men to 
condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all 
men unto justification of life’.130 The new born baby thus changes from death to 
life through baptism. Yet, a tension between life and death dominates the 
second half of the sonnet in the sense that ‘The tombs – which hear and answer 
that brief cry, / The Infant’s notice of his second birth - / Recall the wandering 
Soul to sympathy / With what man hopes from Heaven, yet fears from Earth’. In 
spite of the grace of life ‘from above’, the awareness of ‘fears from Earth’ 
recalls the unavoidable reality of death. 
    In Sonnet XXII (Catechising), Wordsworth continues to evoke a painful 
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experience of mortality, being reminded of the loss of his mother at an early 
age. This Sonnet uses the narrator’s recollection of the occasion on which the 
children were tested to decide whether they were ready to be confirmed into 
the church. The first seven lines describe well the anxious little children who 
were gathering around ‘the Pastor’, wearing ‘new-wrought vest’ and holding ‘a 
vernal posy’: some were murmuring ‘like a distant bee’, but some made ‘a bold 
unerring answer’. The next few lines recall an affectionate relationship between 
the narrator and his mother as her ‘anxious heart for me’ [narrator] may have 
been ‘fluttered’ by ‘a bold unerring answer’ and her son wore ‘the flowers’ 
‘bound’ by the ‘happy hand’ of ‘Beloved Mother’. And yet, this loving 
relationship is juxtaposed with a bitter remembrance of her death. A picture of 
her face is conjured up by the ‘inaudible command’ of ‘Sweet flowers’, but the 
last two lines disclose that the narrator was too young to understand the idea of 
death and to mourn his loss, and that his present ‘heartfelt sigh’ does not seem 
to compensate properly for the loss: ‘O lost too early for the frequent tear, / 
And ill requited by this heartfelt sigh!’ In a similar vein, Sonnet XXIV 
(Confirmation Continued) expresses a mother’s painful experience of her older 
daughter’s death, creating a tension between a vision of Heaven and human 
mortality. Although the sonnet imagines that the ‘Sister-child’ may dwell in 
Heaven, the questions the poet asks – ‘Did gleams appear? / Opened a vision of 
that blissful place / Where dwells a Sister-child?’ - underline the hard fact of 
the girl’s death reserved for the last lines of the sonnet: ‘And was power given 
/ Part of her lost One’s glory back to trace / Even to this Rite? For thus She 
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knelt, and, ere, / The summer-leaf had faded, passed to Heaven.’131 Just as the 
poet reveals ‘ill requited’ loss in the final line of Sonnet XXII, so he finds an 
insecure balance between an eternal life in Heaven and human mortality on 
earth in Sonnet XXIV. 
    Wordsworth then carries on the journey of life from birth to death on earth 
through other sacraments, and ends finally with Sonnet XXXIV (Mutability), 
acknowledged as the greatest poem in the entire series and the final sonnet in 
the series on liturgy. Although by juxtaposing a loving relationship and a painful 
experience of loss the poet creates a tension over the teachings of the 
sacraments in the previous sonnets, he appears to want to transcend the reality 
of mortality by the authority of the voice in the sonnet ‘Mutability’, the 
impersonality of mutability itself. 132  In this poem, the impersonal voice of 
‘Mutability’ communicates Wordsworth’s realisation of both the ubiquity of 
mutability and our inability to control it. The ‘outward forms’ of ‘Truth’ are 
compared to ‘frosty rime, / That in the morning whitened hill and plain / And is 
no more’, but this sense of mutability is ubiquitous: 
 
From low to high doth dissolution climb, 
And sink from high to low, along a scale 
Of awful notes, whose concord shall not fail 
 
Further, ‘the unimaginable touch of Time’ suggests our inability to control death 
and dissolution. The poet thus manages to keep a distance from the painful 
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personal emotional aspect of human mortality and he is able to recognise death 
as it is through his ‘overarching awareness of death and dissolution as the 
quintessential common experience’.133 What is implied in ‘Mutability’ is that, in 
spite of being overshadowed by mortality, the sacraments of the church, to 
which ‘the Soul must be tied by chain’ (XXV. Sacrament), can outshine the fear 
and ‘gloomiest shade’ (XXV. Sacrament) of death by bringing out ‘hopes from 
Heaven’ (XX. Baptism) and ‘a path of light’ (XXV. Sacrament). It should be noted 
that the sonnets about a life’s journey from birth to death are immediately 
followed by the sonnets on the subject of church architecture (XXXVIII – XLVII), 
which symbolises the heavenly dwelling as well as the house of God for 
common worship. Just as human life is subject to mutability and mortality, so 
human dwelling itself on earth is vulnerable to ruin. Although the poet 
conceives human life as ‘grass that springeth up at morn, / grows green, and is 
cut down and withereth / Ere nightfall’ (XXXI. Funeral Service), he attempts to 
move beyond this view by looking at the eternity of the heavenly dwelling 
through church architecture. 
 
4.3. Church architecture as a symbol of heavenly dwelling 
    In the previous parts of this chapter, it was shown that cottages and tombs 
are key elements to formulate the idea of dwelling, but as Kerrigan points out, 
in Wordsworth’s later works they are ‘replaced by chapels and churches’, 
which are ‘increasingly treated as types of heaven, images of the Father’s 
house with many mansions which Christ promised his followers’.134 Yet, in fact, 
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Wordsworth already associated his understanding of human life with the idea of 
church architecture, even during those periods when his poetry was full of 
cottages and tombs. In his ‘Preface’ to The Excursion, for instance, Wordsworth 
famously described The Recluse as ‘a gothic Church’ in a holistic sense in 
which The Prelude is ‘the Anti-chapel’ and his minor Pieces are ‘the little Cells, 
Oratories, and sepulchral Recesses’. 135  Considering The Recluse as ‘a 
philosophical Poem’, ‘of Man, Nature, and Soceity’, we suppose that for 
Wordsworth church architecture must be an essential model revealing the 
whole picture of human life. The conclusion is that the image of the church 
building already played a crucial role in his perception of the unity of the 
universe in his early period. Moreover, in Essays Upon Epitaphs, he presents ‘a 
parish-church’ as ‘a visible centre of a community of the living and the dead’. 
Finally, in the Ecclesiastical Sonnets, the Church ‘suddenly imposes itself upon 
the reader’s consciousness much like a mountain that has long dominated a 
familiar landscape’.136 Whereas the poet was able to find solace and vision in 
landscape in the past, he now turns to church architecture in which he uncovers 
an imperishable eternal home. In other words, he tries to locate a safe and 
eternal home over and against mutability in the church building which 
symbolises a heavenly dwelling. 
    Most of all, the poet establishes the Church as a place of shelter for Faith, 
for the exiled and the distressed. In Sonnet XXXIX, the church which would be 
built from ‘Those forest oaks of Druid memory, / Shall long survive, to shelter 
                                            
135
 ‘Preface’ to The Excursion (1814). ‘[. . . ] and the two Works have the same kind of relation 
to each other, if he may so express himself, as the Anti-chapel has to the body of a gothic 
Church.’ 
136
 Rylestone, Prophetic Memory, p. 1. 
 220 
the Abode / Of genuine Faith’. The Church of England is also described as ‘a 
fearless resting-place’ for ‘self-exiled / From altars threatened, levelled, or 
defiled’ during the French Revolution in Sonnet XXXVI (Emigrant French 
Clergy). Roaming through the aisles of Westminster Abbey, the poet holds that, 
‘in hours of fear / Or grovelling thought’, the believers can ‘seek a refuge’ here 
(Sonnet XLV). 
    Further, church buildings as a shelter present a sense of eternity and 
immortality. Just before introducing Sonnet XXXVIII (New Churches), 
Wordsworth offers two sonnets on ‘Old Abbeys’ (XXXV) and ‘Emigrant French 
Clergy’ (XXXVI) which deal with the destruction of churches. The former traces 
back to the Dissolution of the Monasteries in 1539, and the latter originates 
with the French Revolution in 1789. For Wordsworth, one of the decisive 
common features between them is that churches were reduced to ruins or dust 
during those periods: ‘MONASTIC Domes! Following my downward way, / 
Untouched by due regret I marked your fall! / Now, ruin’ (XXXV); ‘EVEN while I 
speak, the sacred roofs of France / Are shattered into dust’ (XXXVI). Although 
they were wrecked in ruin and dust, a sense of continuity flows through them: 
‘Once ye were holy, ye are holy still’ (XXXV), and the ‘self-exiled’ find ‘a 
fearless resting-place’ for ‘their Faith’ in England (XXXVI). Finally, in Sonnet 
XXXVIII (New Churches), he declares ‘the wished-for Temples rise!’ again 
‘through England bounds’. Just as a phoenix burns itself on a funeral pyre every 
five centuries and rises from the ashes with renewed youth, the poet imagines 
that new churches rise from ruins and dust. The notion of re-rising thus, like a 
phoenix, embodies the ideas of eternity and immortality, which resonate 
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through the sonnets on church architecture: ‘ye everlasting Piles!’ (XLII), ‘born 
for immortality’ (XLIII), ‘dreamt not of a perishable home’ (XLV), ‘Infinity’s 
embrace’ (XLV), ‘the eternal City’ (XLVII). 
    In Sonnet XLIII (Inside of King’s College Chapel, Cambridge), the poet is 
able to refer explicitly to the notion of immortality in the interaction between 
the ‘immense’ / And glorious’ interior architecture of the chapel and music, light, 
and shade which ‘directs the human spirit to reveries of paradise’137: 
 
These lofty pillars, spread that branching roof 
Self-poised, and scooped into ten thousand cells, 
Where light and shade repose, where music dwells 
Lingering-and wandering on as loth to die; 
Like thoughts whose very sweetness yieldeth proof 
That they were born for immortality. (ll. 9-14) 
 
In fact, the church building itself is not the heavenly Jerusalem, but the symbol 
and prototype of the eternal home, ‘a microcosm of the celestial world on earth’, 
which links the earthly with the heavenly home and enables the believers to 
overcome the fear of mortality in an earthly home.138 Wordsworth thus, at the 
beginning of the next Sonnet XLV, writes that ‘They dreamt not of a perishable 
home / Who thus could build’. In addition, he asserts, ‘The house that cannot 
pass away be ours’, in a sonnet, published in 1842, which implies his yearning 
for heavenly dwelling, in contrast with the mutability and mortality of any 
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earthly dwelling.139 
 
4.4. Nature in the heavenly dwelling 
    Unlike the earthly dwelling, a heavenly dwelling seems to involve 
transcendence and ‘the world above’ (XLII), rather than the material world of a 
landscape in nature. Intriguingly, however, in the sonnets on church buildings 
nature as corporeal reality continues to play a key role in the church building 
with reference to the spatial and emotional and mental contexts. First of all, 
nature as material reality is incorporated into church buildings in terms of 
beauty, purity and caring. In the prefatory letter to Ecclesiastical Sketches 
(1822), Wordsworth informs us that the composition of the sonnets was inspired 
by his and his friend Sir George Beaumont’s search for a site for a new church 
in his Esate in 1820.140 What is striking is how the beauty of nature stimulated 
him to look at human life from the perspective of the power of faith: ‘It was one 
of the most beautiful mornings of a mild season, -- our feelings were in 
harmony with the cherishing influences of the scene; and such being our 
purpose, we were naturally led to look back upon past events with wonder and 
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gratitude, and on the future with hope.’ This beautiful landscape thus 
encouraged the poet to embrace the past and the future in the light of God’s 
love for the world during his search for a site for a new church. Looking at ‘Old 
Abbeys’, the poet detects ‘beauty’ and ‘ancient stillness’ as well as ‘ruin’ in 
Sonnet XXXV, which vividly reminds us of Tintern Abbey, in which the beauty 
of nature near Tintern Abbey is praised. 
    The purity of nature also contributes to building a new church in that the 
chosen site for a new church is not an arbitrary one, but a place which 
maintains its innocence in nature. At the very beginning of Sonnet XXXIX 
(Church To Be Erected), he proclaims: 
 
Be this the chosen site; the virgin sod, 
Moistened from age to age by dewy eve, 
Shall disappear, and grateful earth receive 
The corner-stone from hands that build to God. (ll. 1-4) 
 
Interestingly, the phrase, ‘Moistened from age to age’, implies additionally the 
awareness of a sacredness which points to primitive gods. In the next lines, it is 
mentioned that ‘Those forest of oaks of Druid memory’ will ‘shelter the Abode 
Of genuine Faith’. This primitive sacredness then is consecrated as God’s 
dwelling place by His holiness:141 
 
[. . .] there let the holy altar stand 
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For kneeling adoration; - while – above, 
Broods, visibly portrayed, the mystic Dove, 
That shall protect from blasphemy the Land. (ll. 11-4) 
 
‘The mystic Dove’ implies that the purity and ancient holiness of nature will turn 
into the sacredness of God. Wordsworth uses a similar image about the 
relationship between nature and a new church-yard in Sonnet XLI (New 
Church-Yard). Just as ‘the virgin sod’ shall be offered to the site for the new 
church, so ‘The encircling ground, in native turf arrayed’ is now ‘given to social 
interests, and to favouring Heaven’ ‘by solemn consecration’ even to the extent 
that ‘the lonely Sexton’s spade shall wound the tender sod’. Yet, this pure place 
will become a place for encounter between the people and God: ‘The prayers, 
the contrite struggle, and the trust / That to the Almighty Father looks through 
all.’ 
    Further, the caring aspect of nature appears to replace the power of 
incense in the new churches. In Sonnet XL, Wordsworth describes the moment 
of burning incense inside the church: ‘clouds of incense mounting and veiled the 
rood’. But he sees it as ‘appalling rite’, which ‘Our Church prepares not, trusting 
to the might / Of simple truth with grace divine imbued’. Rather than ‘concealing 
the precious Cross, like men ashamed’, with clouds of incense, he imagines that 
caring nature will venerate it: 
 
[. . .] the Sun with his first smile 
Shall greet that symbol crowning the low Pile: 
And the fresh air of incense-breathing morn 
Shall wooingly embrace it; and green moss 
Creep round its arms through centuries unborn. (ll. 10-4) 
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Just as the Grasmere vale receives a new dweller with tenderness, so the smile 
of the Sun, morning fresh air and green moss, will pay homage to the cross. 
Soothing nature’s veneration of the cross brings to mind the pedlar’s mystic 
experience in nature through which he was able to feel ‘the lesson deep of love’ 
(ll. 180-185), rather than by the traditional way of religious education. The 
landscape is thus integrated spatially and spiritually into the church, which 
suggests that a soothing experience in nature can point to the idea of a 
heavenly dwelling.142 
    The coalescence of nature and the church is also found when Wordsworth 
articulates the emotional, psychological and spiritual solace in church 
architecture, which bears a close parallel to the images of nature creating 
consolation and hope. When the poet contemplates the interior architecture of 
the church, the account of his experience is very close to the account of his 
experience in nature. In fact, there is nature’s literal assimilation into the 
church in Sonnet XXXIII (Regrets) in which ‘the church building, filled with 
greens at Christmas’, serves as a ‘counter Spirit to nature in winter’143: 
 
Go, seek, when Christmas snows discomfort bring, 
The counter Spirit found in some gay church 
Green with fresh holly, every pew a perch (ll. 9-11) 
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Here the solace and ‘Hope’ (XXXIII) created by the church’s Christmas rituals 
seems tantamount to an experience of nature.144 Further, for Wordsworth, the 
sensual aspects of nature, such as light, dark and sound, are of great 
significance in that they themselves bring about consolation and at the same 
time enable the poet to perceive the depth of life in his poetic imagination. 
Intriguingly, we can find such images inside the church, ‘where light and shade 
repose, / where music dwells’ (XLIII), even to the extent that darkness and light 
or solitude and joy in nature are held together in one vision.145 In Sonnet XLIV, 
he expresses how the fusion of the darkness of Night and the music leads to a 
mystical experience in King’s College Chapel: 
 
Shine on, until ye fade with coming Night!- 
But, from the arms of silence-list! O list! 
The music bursteth into second life; 
The notes luxuriate, every stone is kissed 
By sound, or ghost of sound, in mazy strife; 
Heart-thrilling strains, that cast, before the eye 
Of the devout, a veil of ecstasy! (ll. 8-14). 
 
The interplay between music and darkness can create a sense of ecstasy, but in 
fact it is the power of darkness that enables the music to maximise the 
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experience of bliss in the church. In a similar vein, in On the Power of Sound, 
the mortality of Arion, whose music ‘could humanise the creatures of the sea’, 
becomes immortalized by ‘one chant’ in ‘silent night’: ‘And he, with his 
preserver, shine starbright / In memory, through silent night’ (IX).146 The image 
of darkness, which is often associated with the darkness inside the tomb, calls 
to mind human mortality, which may be transformed into immortality through 
music. 
    There is also a metaphorical interplay between nature and the church. To 
reveal the historical continuity and connectedness between the world and God, 
the poet uses the metaphor of a river or a stream of water. In the introductory 
sonnet in Part I the aim of the sonnets is announced: 
 
I, who essayed the nobler Stream to trace 
Of Liberty, and smote the plausive string 
Till the checked torrent, proudly triumphing, 
Won for herself a lasting resting-place; 
Now seek upon the heights of Time the source 
Of a Holy River [ . . . ] (I. Introduction) 
 
And in the very last sonnet in Part III ‘That Stream upon whose bosom we have 
passed’ finally ‘has reached the eternal City-built / For the perfected Spirit of 
the just!’ (XLVII). The journey motif of a nation or an individual in the 
Ecclesiastical Sonnets is developed and exemplified by the image of a river. As 
a river is born and flows, a human being or a society is born and grows. In the 
final sonnet of The River Duddon, whose name is mentioned in Sonnet I in Part I 
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of Ecclesiastical Sonnets, the ever-gliding stream is described as ‘a type of the 
ever-vanishing yet ever developing race of man’.147 Whereas human beings ‘go 
toward the silent tomb’, the river does not pass away. But the poet’s advance to 
‘the source / Of a Holy River’ suggests ‘the mingling of the soul with 
eternity’. 148  In this respect, the river as an image of growth and eternity 
constitutes a crucial element in exploring the journey into the permanent 
dwelling place through the metaphorical interplay between nature and the 
church. 
    Dividing his career into three phases, we have seen how Wordsworth 
attempts to shape the idea of dwelling over and against fears and anxieties 
about human mortality: 1. dwelling in a cottage in Grasmere; 2. dwelling in the 
community of the living and the dead; 3. a heavenly dwelling. For him, dwelling 
does not mean simply a place for living, but, as with Heidegger’s idea of 
dwelling, it is fundamentally based upon a close relationship between humanity, 
nature, and God, which develops at the level of emotion and psychology and 
also as an environmental locality. Evidently each phase has two principal 
ecotheological aspects, the independent sacred value of nature, and its inter-
relatedness. In the first phase, the experience of the one great life, which 
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refers to ‘one Household under God’ in Grasmere, is founded upon a mutual and 
caring relationship between the dwellers and the natural environment within the 
context of God’s presence, and at the same time upon the sacredness of nature 
articulated by the presence of God in nature. Secondly, dwelling in the 
community of the living and the dead, who are bonded together by locality, 
emotion, and morality, is dependent upon the religious notion of immortality, 
and the soothing, beautiful, egalitarian and epitaphic aspects of nature. Lastly, 
the heavenly dwelling, represented by church buildings, is also integrated into a 
crucial relationship with God and nature on the ground that it is based upon the 
sense of immortality in God and upon nature’s various characteristics: beauty, 
purity, sacredness, care, consolation, hope, and metaphor for on-going journey. 
Overall, it can be affirmed that Wordsworth’s idea of dwelling combines two 
significant ecotheological aspects. 
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Chapter 4 
Eschatology in Coleridge and Wordsworth 
 
 
    In this Chapter, I explore the ecotheological implications of the 
eschatological aspects of the works of Wordsworth and Coleridge. Chapter 1 
underlined the significance of eschatology to ecotheology, which tries to locate 
the non-human natural world in its context of final salvation. If nature is not 
thought about with regard to the end of the time, nature may be thought of 
simply as existing for the wellbeing of human beings. In order to appreciate the 
intrinsic value of nature, ecotheology considers it essential to formulate an 
eschatological theory that understands nature as one of the key elements of the 
Apocalypse. It will be shown that nature is involved in Apocalypse through its 
symbols, images, and effects upon the psychology and emotion of human beings. 
Chapters 2 and 3 argued that Coleridge’s on-going search for the unity of the 
universe and Wordsworth’s notion of dwelling reveal clearly some key 
ecotheological aspects of their thinking. Now it is necessary to investigate 
whether the two poets develop an eschatological vision that provides a 
distinctive role for nature. 
    Wordsworth and Coleridge were both deeply committed to eschatological 
thinking, although over their careers it differed in its complexity. First, both of 
them perceived the French Revolution as an apocalyptic event which could 
provoke the transformation of the world in a literal sense. Secondly, even after 
their disillusionment with the Revolution, they did not give up their yearning to 
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transform and develop an internalized means for attaining it. If Coleridge turns 
to the revolution of the mind, Wordsworth looks to the power of imagination. 
Although these are internalized means to an apocalypse, it will be shown that in 
a fundamental sense they are associated with an external reality. Lastly, both 
Coleridge and Wordsworth offer a final vision of the universe beyond our life on 
earth. What remains to be shown is to show how the non-human natural world 
is integrated into their eschatological vision at each stage of their development. 
    Before proceeding, however, we will discuss briefly the definition of 
eschatology. As shown in Chapter 1, traditionally the two ideas of ‘apocalypse’ 
and ‘millennium’ have been dealt with together in relation to eschatology. The 
transformative power of an apocalypse brings to an abrupt end the present 
world and gives birth to a new world, which is often described as the 
‘millennium’. Hartman explains some meanings of the term ‘apocalypse’: i) ‘the 
Apocalypse of St. John (the Book of Revelation)’; ii) being concerned with ‘the 
Last Things’; iii) a desire for ‘the inauguration of a new epoch’; iv) ‘any strong 
desire to cast out nature and to achieve an unmediated contact with the 
principle of things’. 1  Both Coleridge and Wordsworth use the terms 
‘apocalypse’ and ‘millennium’ for their eschatological vision in relation to the 
transformation of the world, sometimes referring to the Apocalypse of St. John 
either explicitly or implicitly. 
 
1. Coleridge 
1.1. The French Revolution 
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1.1.1. Enlightenment, aesthetics and politics, and religion 
    It is obvious that apocalypse and millennium are principal themes in 
Coleridge’s poems of the early and middle 1790s in relation to the French 
Revolution.2 The idea that the French Revolution shaped thinking in the period 
scarcely needs restating. Indeed it was widely seen as a sign of the coming of 
the Apocalypse and of the Millennium. It is worth pointing out the principal 
elements in apocalyptic thought about the Revolution, which influenced the 
responses of Coleridge and Wordsworth: Enlightenment, aesthetics and politics, 
and religion. First, the Revolution was ascribed partly to the power of reason 
and science in the Enlightenment. In his lectures on The Philosophy of History 
(1822), Hegel describes the Revolution as a triumph over faith: in the French 
Revolution ‘man had advanced to the recognition of the principle that Thought 
ought to govern spiritual reality. This was accordingly a glorious mental dawn.’3 
The French Revolution is ‘the happy consciousness of satisfied Enlightenment’ 
in that the inner epistemological revolution of the Enlightenment becomes 
actualized in the real world.4 Both Wordsworth and Coleridge associated the 
French Revolution with the power of Reason. For Wordsworth, it was the time 
‘When Reason seem’d the most to assert her rights / When most intent on 
making of herself / A prime Enchanter to assist the work / Which then was 
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going forwards in her name’.5  In Stanza V of ‘Destruction of the Bastille’, 
Coleridge claims that the enlightened mind of a peasant will no longer be 
‘fettered’ by irrational ‘fear’ and superstition, for ‘Liberty the soul of Life shall 
reign’ (ll. 27-30).6 
    Milton was also an important influence on literary and political responses in 
this regard, especially for Coleridge and Wordsworth. As Peter Kitson put it, 
during the middle of the eighteenth century Milton became ‘the paramount poet 
of the sublime, and Paradise Lost, became along with the Bible’, a presence that 
was ‘a political as well as a literary one’.7 Thomas De Quincey, for example, 
notes that ‘in Milton only, first and last, is the power of the sublime revealed’.8 
Probably it was Edmund Burke who, in his A Philosophical Enquiry into the 
Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful (1757), established him as 
the sublime poet for the Romantic Age. Attempting to define the aesthetic 
notion of the sublime, Burke described Milton as ‘the great poet’, who 
understood better than anyone ‘the secret of heightening, or of setting terrible 
things’ and was able to create the effect of the sublime through the dynamic of 
light and darkness, instancing ‘a light which by its very excess is converted into 
a species of darkness’.9 What mattered for Burke was the idea of the sublime, 
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but for others Milton’s blend of politics and aesthetics was of significance.10 In 
his radical pamphlet The Plot Discovered (1795), Coleridge pleaded for ‘wisdom 
and inspiring zeal’ with ‘Sages and patriots that being dead do yet speak to us, 
spirits of Milton, Locke, Sidney, Harrington!’. 11  Wordsworth also began his 
sonnet ‘London’ (1802) with the invocation, ‘Milton! thou should’st be living at 
this hour’ and asked him to give ‘manners, virtue, freedom, power’ to us, who 
are ‘selfish men’.12 For them, Milton was a republican hero, an example of a 
prophetic voice, which stood out against the sinfulness of the times in which he 
lived. In other words, Milton’s mixed message of politics and aesthetics was 
applied to comprehending the Revolution. 
    Although the Revolution was praised as a triumph of Reason over faith to 
bring about the transformation of the world, the transformation itself was 
understood as a religious event by some people, such as Richard Price and 
Joseph Priestley.13 Among the most famous of the millenarian responses to the 
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Revolution was that of Richard Price in his sermon to the London Revolution 
Society in 1789.14 Price described the Revolution as bearing on the idea of the 
millennium: 
 
Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace, for mine eyes have 
seen thy salvation [. . .] Behold kingdom, admonished by you, starting 
from sleep, breaking their fetters, and claiming justice from their 
oppressors! Behold, the light you have struck out, after setting America 
free, reflected to France, and there kindled into a blaze that lays 
despotism in ashes, and warms and illuminates Europe!15 
 
Here Price associates the political events of the American and French 
Revolution with the coming of a millennial Kingdom. Priestley, the leading 
Unitarian thinker, also followed this apocalyptic and millenarian view of politics 
in the Revolution. In his Sermon, Preached at the Gravel Pit Meeting in Hackney 
in 1794, given before he left Britain for the United States, Priestley explicitly 
adopted a blend of apocalypse and millennialism in hailing the Revolution as the 
opening-up of the expected time, ‘the kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ’. He 
insists that the establishment of the Kingdom would be preceded by ‘great 
calamities, such as the world has never yet experienced’, and he explains the 
political events of the Revolution in France as the predicted signs of the times 
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by interpreting them as the accomplishment of Revelation, chap. xi.3: ‘And the 
same hour there was a great earthquake, and the tenth part of the city fell, and 
in the earthquake were slain of men (or literally, names of men) seven thousand, 
and the remnant were affrighted, and gave glory to God’.16 The violent events 
of the French Revolution are the beginning of those very calamitous times, and 
the millennium is imminent.17 
 
1.1.2. The French Revolution as apocalypse and millennium 
    Likewise, Coleridge had also showed an initial enthusiasm about the 
Revolution. Looking back on the decade in The Friend, he mentioned that ‘My 
feelings, however, and imagination did not remain unkindled in this general 
conflagration; and I confess I should be more inclined to be ashamed than proud 
of myself, if they had: I was a sharer in the general vortex.’18 Further, his way 
of perceiving the Revolution was always deeply influenced by the language of 
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the Bible, often mediated through Milton. 19  Accordingly, secular events are 
described as sacred events in his poetry. If we look at ‘Destruction of the 
Bastile’, written while the poet was still at school, we catch a glimpse of how 
the school boy understood the Revolution religiously as well as politically. He 
celebrates the dawn of a new era for humanity in that personified ‘Freedom’ 
and ‘Liberty’ as ‘the soul of Life’ ‘shall reign, Shall throb in every pulse’, and 
‘shall flow thro’ every vein!’, over and against ‘Tyranny’ and its ‘terrors’. At 
the same time, his description of the Revolution is deeply coloured with 
apocalyptic imagery. In Stanza VI, the poet addresses the question, ‘Shall 
France alone a Despot spurn?’, but he asserts that ‘every land from pole to pole 
/ Shall boast one independent soul!’. Yet, ‘favour’d Britain be /first ever of the 
first and freest of the free!’ Rather than limiting the Revolution only to France, 
the patriotic schoolboy turns his eyes to the whole world, particularly wishing 
that a similar transformation would happen in England. 20  In addition, it is 
important to note that he introduces apocalyptic imagery in describing the 
emergence of Freedom: ‘Freedom rous’d by fierce Disdain’, ‘broke thy triple 
chain’, ‘the storm which Earth’s deep entrails hide’, ‘Power’s blood-stain’d 
streamers.’ In his later descriptions of the Revolution, these images will re-
appear in a more sophisticated way linked to thoughts of apocalypse and 
millennium. 
    However, Coleridge’s interpretation of the Revolution as apocalypse and 
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millennium is not always straightforward because the hope and promise was 
followed by the Terror and the Wars. As the Revolution turned in an 
undesirable direction, Coleridge had to change his understanding of the 
Revolution. The fervent Romantic response to the Revolution lasted from 1789 
to 1794, from the fall of the Bastille to the establishment of the Directorate 
after the Terror, and Coleridge’s three major poems on the Revolution were 
written after that period, The Destiny of Nations (1796), Religious Musings 
(1796), and France: An Ode (1798).21 Although the Revolution began with pure 
intentions, it had been subverted by the use of violence. Coleridge saw the 
situation as a paradox of ‘a nation wading to their Rights through Blood, and 
marking the track of Freedom by Devastation!’. 22  Yet Coleridge did not 
immediately give up his hope and continued to identify the Revolution with 
personified Freedom by interpreting the violence as part of the whole process. 
In The Destiny of Nations, Joan of Arc sees a vision that ‘The Sun that rose on 
Freedom, rose in Blood!’ but ‘Soon shall the Morning struggle into Day, / The 
stormy Morning into cloudless Noon’. Coleridge confesses that ‘In my calmer 
moments I have the firmest faith that all things work together for good. But 
alas! It seems a long and dark process’.23 During this period his treatment of 
the Revolution is thus characterised by a mixture of criticism and hope. It will 
be helpful to look more closely at Religious Musings to find out how Coleridge 
comprehended the French Revolution as a mixture of hope and violence. This 
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may show how his eschatological understanding of the Revolution can provide 
an ecotheological perspective. 
    Religious Musings describes the political events during the Revolution as 
apocalyptic by adapting the religious beliefs of apocalypse to current political 
circumstances. Coleridge has a pessimistic view of human nature and of the 
moral failing of the established order, which explains his enthusiasm for the 
Revolution.24 Shortly after the description of creation (ll. 105-116), Coleridge 
gives an account of the dark side of humanity. A young Angel looks down on 
Human Nature and beholds: 
 
A sea of blood bestrewed with wrecks, where mad 
Embattling Interests on each other rush 
With unhelmed rage! 
‘Tis the sublime of man (ll. 124-127) 
 
This ‘sublime of man’ alludes ironically to Pitt’s Government, the slave trade 
(‘loud-laughing Trade / More hideous packs his bales of living anguish’), the 
war and the defences of it in Parliament which turn God into an ‘Accomplice 
Deity’. The Church of England is described as ‘mitred Atheism’.25 But Coleridge 
suggests that the depravity of humanity is a problem not only for contemporary 
society, but for the whole history of human beings. He sketches a brief history 
of such depravity: during ‘the primeval age’ ‘the vacant Shepherd’, wandering 
with his flock, gives way to ‘A host of new desires’ and ‘Property began’. Then 
‘Warriors, and Lords, and Priests’ created ‘all the sore ills / That vex and 
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desolate our mortal life’. Thereafter he talks about the Enlightenment during 
which ‘heavenly Science’ emerged and granted ‘Freedom’, and Philosophers 
and Bards / Spread in concentric circles o’er waken’d realms’. Nevertheless, 
these great thinkers are impotent to resist the coming judgement which is 
portrayed with images of lions and hyaenas with ‘bloody jaws’, and ‘a poor 
widow’ weeping over ‘her husband’s mangled corse’.26 They could only bewail, 
‘Why there was misery in a world so fair.’ 
    Having provided a historical overview of the perversion of human nature, 
Coleridge projects a prophetic voice, pronouncing an apocalyptic judgement in 
the near future against contemporary society. The poet does not hide his 
agitation in predicting the imminent ‘day of Retribution’, and tells the ‘Children 
of Wretchedness’ that ‘More groans must rise, / More blood must stream, or ere 
your wrongs be full’ (ll. 301-302). Finally, he foresees that: 
 
The Lamb of God hath opened the fifth seal: 
And upward rush on swiftest wing of fire 
The innumerable multitude of wrongs 
By man on man inflicted! 
[. . .] 
And lo! the Great, the Rich, the Mighty Men, 
The Kings and the Chief Captains of the World 
With all that fixed on high like stars of Heaven 
Shot baleful influence, shall be cast to earth, 
Vile and down-trodden, as the untimely fruit 
Shook from the fig-tree by a sudden storm. 
Even now the storm begins: [. . .]   (ll. 304-315) 
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Just as Coleridge opens the poem with the sound of ‘a Cherub’s trump’ and ‘the 
vision of the heavenly multitude’, this passage conveys explicitly the thought of 
an apocalypse borrowing some direct quotations from St. John’s visions on 
Patmos. He provides a passage from the sixth chapter of the Revelation of St. 
John in his Note.27 What is noteworthy in the Revelation is that, before the fifth 
seal is opened, ‘Death and Hell’ were given ‘power’ ‘to kill with sword, and with 
hunger, and with pestilence, and with the beasts of the Earth’. As the event of 
an apocalypse is an act of judgement, it eventually brings violence and turmoil. 
Coleridge applies this judgement from the Bible to contemporary political 
events. He explains that the above-quoted passage alludes to the French 
Revolution.28 Abandoning ‘a vantage point beyond history’, Coleridge ‘plunges 
his poem into the impermanence of history’ in order to show how ‘the 
prophecies of Revelation’ will be fulfilled by ‘the ambitions of the French 
Revolution’.29 Although he has witnessed the violence of the Revolution, he still 
has faith in the promise and hope of the Revolution in that he regards the 
violence as a turbulent act of judgement, describing it as the beginning of ‘the 
storm’. In this sense, for Coleridge, the downfall of ‘the Great, the Rich, the 
Kings’ is part of an apocalyptic judgement. 
    Apocalyptic destruction is not the whole picture as it will be followed by a 
millennium and finally the opening of the gates to Paradise through the return of 
Christ. In particular, the opening of Religious Musings, written on Christmas Eve 
of 1794, describes the scene of the Nativity. The poet uses the story of Christ 
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not only as ‘a point of reference’ for salvation but also a paradigm for the 
relationship between apocalypse and millennium.30 The scene of the Nativity 
moves immediately to that of suffering and death, but Coleridge emphasises the 
necessity, rather than the unavoidable tragedy, of death within the whole 
history of God’s redemption, declaring that his death was in truth ‘Lovely’. He 
holds that before ‘the Messiah’s destined victory!’ ‘first offences needs must 
come!’. Suffering and death was thus required as part of the salvation history. 
    This paradigm of Christ permeates the poem and consolidates the crucial 
relationship between apocalypse and millennium. Just as death preceded the 
resurrection of Jesus, apocalyptic violence will be followed by a millennium. 
There can be no millennium without apocalypse just as there could be no 
resurrection without death. Morton Paley shows that Coleridge’s thought about 
that relationship is based on his study of John of Patmos, Milton and Thomas 
Burnet’s Sacred Theory of the Earth.31 In the third and fourth books, Burnet 
articulates the inter-related bond between apocalypse and millennium in a way 
that there will be ‘New Heavens and Earth; and yet these shall be annihilated’; 
these first will be ‘redu’d to nothing, and then others created, spick and span 
New, out of nothing’.32 In the new Heavens and new Earth, ‘the Prince of Peace 
shall rule’.33 Likewise, after his account of the apocalyptic storm, Coleridge 
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expresses his yearning for a new world: ‘O return! / Pure Faith! Meek Piety!’ 
Then, ‘The massy gates of Paradise are thrown / Wide open’, and ‘The Saviour 
comes!’ who will the Prince in ‘the Thousand Years.’ The experience of the 
apocalyptic violence does not amount to nothingness, but becomes part of the 
process of ‘New Heavens and a New Earth’. As Jon Mee maintains that 
‘Religious Musings produces images of apocalyptic violence to control and 
contain them’, Coleridge intends to control or to justify such violence by 
understanding it as a necessity for a new world.34 Accordingly, the Revolution 
will ultimately be ‘the vehicle’ of a new world.35 
 
1.1.3. Nature in apocalypse and millennium 
    The question is, whether the non-human natural world would participate in 
this process of transformation. Whereas human societies need to be renewed 
due to the corruption of human nature, Coleridge does not posit any specific 
need for nature’s redemption at this stage of his eschatological vision. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that nature continues to be a crucial element in 
this new Heaven and new Earth as well as in the process of apocalypse and 
millennium. 
    We have seen that the poem makes use of nature’s symbols and images for 
the apocalypse and the millennium. In particular, the potential for nature to 
wield destructive power appears in the violence of the apocalypse. In Religious 
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Musings, Coleridge notes that the universe consists of three parts, ‘earth, 
heaven, and deepest hell’ (ll. 401). Religious Musings propounds a Unitarian 
idea of God who ‘Diffused through all’, ‘does make all one whole’ (ll. 131), and 
is ‘Nature’s vast ever-acting Energy! / In will, in deed, Impulse of All to All!’ 
(The Destiny of Nations, ll. 461-2). The poet bases the whole frame of the 
poem on the omnipotence of God by opening and closing with hymns to God, 
and by examining the possibility of salvation only through ‘the Creator love’. 
What is implied here is that God ‘loves’ and ‘blesses’ ‘all creation’, which is 
called ‘very good’ (ll. 112-3). The earth is thus described as a blessed place: 
 
But lo! the bursting Sun! 
Touched by the enchantment of that sudden beam 
Straight the black vapour melteth, and in globes 
Of dewy glitter gems each plant and tree; 
On every leaf, on every blade it hangs! 
Dance glad the new-born intermingling rays, 
And wide around the landscape streams with glory! (ll. 98-104) 
 
Right after referring to the blessedness of ‘all creation’, Coleridge ascribes the 
corruption of the world to ‘human nature’. Although nature is not blamed for sin, 
its destructive power is used as a vehicle for an apocalyptic judgment. The poet 
makes the interesting comment in Religious Musings that ‘Earth should league 
with Hell’ (ll. 67), which reveals its potential destructive power. In both 
‘Destruction of The Bastile’ and Religious Musings, ‘the storm’ as an 
apocalyptic power is described as hiding in the earth. When Coleridge refers to 
Freedom’s power to break the ‘triple chain’ of ‘Tyranny’ in ‘Destruction of The 
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Bastile’, he writes ‘the storm which Earth’s deep entrails hide, / At length has 
burst its way and spread the ruins wide’. In Religious Musings, ‘the storm’ 
‘burst hideous from the cell / Where the old Hag, unconquerable, huge, / 
Creation’s eyeless drudge, black Ruin, sits / Nursing the impatient earthquake’ 
(ll. 319-322). Accordingly, the non-human natural world plays a crucial role by 
carrying a disastrous storm, which strikes the world in the event of an 
apocalypse. 
    At the same time, nature is fully integrated into Coleridge’s imaginative 
picture of ‘the renovated Earth’. It contributes to the experience of joy and love 
in a significant way in the new Heaven and new Earth. When ‘the massy gates 
of Paradise are thrown wide open’, ‘Sweet echoes of unearthly melodies’ come 
forth and ‘odours’ ‘from the crystal river of life spring up on freshened wing, 
ambrosial gales’ (ll. 346-351). At the end of the poem, meditating on the 
‘mystic choir’ of ‘Contemplant Spirits’ above, Coleridge’s experience of God’s 
love is expressed in terms of the pleasures to be found in nature: 
 
I breathe the empyreal air 
Of Love, omnific, omnipresent Love, 
Whose day-spring rises glorious in my soul 
As the great Sun, when he his influence 
Sheds on the frost-bound waters-The glad stream 
Flows to the ray and warbles as it flows. (ll. 414-419) 
 
The implication is that, for Coleridge, the experience of joy and love in nature 
continues to matter even in a new Heaven and a new Earth. Thus, Coleridge’s 
eschatological vision of the Revolution includes an ecotheological perspective, 
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perceiving nature as a crucial part in the vision, rather than excluding or 
transcending it. 
 
1.1.4. Coleridge’s disillusionment with the Revolution 
    Coleridge’s lingering faith in the promise of the Revolution, despite his 
anxieties about violence, finally disappeared around 1798 when the French 
invaded the peaceful cantons of Switzerland.36 In a letter to his brother George, 
10 March 1798, Coleridge shows a heightening of his fears about violence, 
quoting a passage from the First Book of The Kings: ‘Of the French Revolution I 
can give my thoughts the most adequately in the words of Scripture – ‘A great 
& strong wind rent the mountains & brake in pieces the rocks before the Lord; 
but the Lord was not in the wind.’37 Then he continues that there is no Lord in 
either an earthquake or the fire. Just as in the same letter he mentions that ‘no 
calamities are permitted but as the means of Good’, the apocalyptic storm of the 
Revolution was conceived, in Religious Musings, as a providential means of ‘the 
redeeming God’. However, the Revolution now becomes a sheer natural disaster 
without any Good. 
    If we look at the poems written after Religious Musings, ‘Fire, Famine, and 
Slaughter’, ‘The Devil’s Thoughts’, and ‘The Two Round Spaces on the 
Tombstone’, published in the Morning Post from 1798 to 1800, we find that 
Coleridge excludes any vision from the apocalyptic violence and sees it as 
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sheer catastrophe. He still ‘envisages apocalyptic subjects’ and yet ‘without its 
millennial counterpart’.38 The poems share some similar patterns in describing 
an apocalyptic disaster, with personified calamities and the biblical allusions 
from the Revelation. In ‘Fire, Famine, and Slaughter’, the three personified 
catastrophes, Fire, Famine and Slaughter, which may allude to the four riders of 
the Revelation quoted in Religious Musings, cast  apocalyptic violence upon the 
world: ‘I’ll gnaw, I’ll gnaw the multitude, / Till the cup of rage o’erbrim.’ The 
fifth stanza of ‘The Devil’s Thoughts’ conjures up the image of the apocalypse 
through ‘an Apothecary on a white horse / Ride by on his vocations, / And the 
Devil thought of his old Friend / Death in the Revelations’, and Coleridge clearly 
indicates that this passage refers to Revelation 6:8 in the footnote.39 Finally, 
the last stanza mentions, ‘It was general conflagration.’ What matters in these 
poems is that Coleridge did not leave any trace of millennial hope. The 
aesthetic value of the apocalyptic can be ‘sublime’ when it is represented in 
relation to the millennium; but ‘the sublime merges into the grotesque’ ‘with the 
disappearance of any accompanying millennial element’.40 
    As Octavio Paz put it, ‘like the early Christians expecting the Apocalypse, 
modern society has been waiting since the late-eighteenth century for the 
coming of the Revolution. And revolution comes; not the expected one but 
another, always another.’41 In other words, the Revolution came, but failed to 
achieve its aim. On the one hand, some critics point out that by the end of the 
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1790s the themes of apocalypse and millennium had finally disappeared with 
Coleridge’s abandonment of his enthusiasm for the improvement of humankind 
through political powers. On the other hand, it has been argued that his longing 
for the transformation of the world took a different mode or direction after his 
disillusionment. In fact, the generally accepted view of Coleridge’s change from 
‘radical to conservative’ after the failure of the French Revolution involves 
several key issues. Politically, he gave up a radical and revolutionary position; 
personally, he turned from a public life to domestic and private concerns; 
religiously, he gradually moved from Unitarianism to Orthodoxy. And yet I 
would argue that Coleridge continued to search for the revolutionary 
transformation of the world even after the failure of the Revolution. As I have 
already pointed out in Chapter 2, there is a continuity in Coleridge in terms of 
his quest for the unity of the universe, even after he discarded the idea of the 
one life. His longing for a new world continued to captivate his mind, and his 
thought about an apocalyptic transformation took a different direction after his 
disillusionment. 
    While agreeing, to some extent, with Abrams and Paley in their argument 
about the apocalypse after the French Revolution, I look at Coleridge’s later 
ideas on apocalypse from a different point of view. Although Abrams focuses 
more upon Wordsworth, his key term, ‘the internalization of apocalypse’, is 
relevant to Coleridge in that he obviously turned inward after his 
disillusionment. 42  For Abrams, ‘the hopes invested in the Revolution were 
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themselves part of the Romantic secularization of inherited theological ideas 
and ways of thinking and with its failure these hopes themselves became 
internalized’, but it can be argued that the change is still religious.43 Paley also 
gives a remarkable insight as to how Coleridge came to apply a different notion 
of the relationship of Revelation to history after 1817: his later apocalyptic 
language is ‘figurative’, ‘leavening a secular exposition with yeasty 
eschatological tropes’.44 It is evident that Coleridge stopped applying a literal 
meaning of apocalypse to history, but it seems possible to argue that his later 
apocalyptic vision is more than ‘figurative’ in the sense that it provided the 
basis of a pattern of thought which enabled him to interpret and to perceive the 
world morally and religiously. Shifting from a literal expectation of an 
apocalypse to an eschatological pattern of thought, Coleridge moved from the 
dramatic historical events of the Revolution to moments of ordinary daily life in 
which an individual can experience a sense of transformation by perceiving and 
responding to the world according to such patterns of thought. In discussing 
these issues in my next section, we shall focus on both the revolution of the 
mind as the process of the internalization of an apocalypse, and the 
understanding of Revelation as a symbolic drama and a paradigm. Eventually it 
will become clear that this eschatological pattern of thought implies an 
ecotheological perspective, because nature constitutes an essential part of it. 
 
1.2. The revolution of the mind 
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1.2.1. Hope in a private, domestic and natural sphere 
    After renouncing his revolutionary hopes, Coleridge turned to a private, 
domestic, and natural sphere. The focus of his poetry changes from being 
political and public to private, domestic, and natural. As ‘critics of Coleridge’s 
early work routinely distinguish between a sublime and a conversation style’, 
we need to be aware how the poems of revolutionary enthusiasm differ from 
the so-called ‘conversation poems’ in terms of style and theme.45 Whereas the 
former, most notably Religious Musings and The Destiny of Nations, seek the 
transformation of the world in the spheres of politics and history, the latter put 
a ‘new emphasis on personal experience and local environments’ in a domestic 
setting.46 Without the hyperbolic rhetoric of the sublime style, the ‘conversation 
poems’ talk about ordinary temporal experiences in a natural landscape. His 
yearning for a transformation is still there, however. 
    Looking back on the turbulent revolutionary past and regretting his 
‘youthful years’, both ‘France: An Ode’ and ‘Fears in Solitude’ are ‘sermoni 
propriora’, where the poet appears to seek an ideal society in a natural, private, 
and domestic setting.47 Coleridge opens ‘France: An Ode’ by invoking the purity 
of nature in the sense that it ‘Yield[s] homage only to eternal laws!’, and he 
affirms that he ‘still adored / The spirit of divinest Liberty’. From stanza II, he 
explains briefly the hope and despair of the French Revolution. He believed that 
France would liberate the nations, ‘Till Love and Joy look round, and call the 
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Earth their own’, but he casts a prophet judgement against France’s invasion of 
Switzerland by applying ‘to France the figure of sexual transgression that 
Jeremiah does to Jerusalem’: ‘O France! That mockest Heaven, adulterous, 
blind.’48 Then he expresses a sense of guilt about ‘those dreams!’ which he 
cherished once during the Revolution: ‘Forgive me, Freedom! O forgive those 
dreams!’ And yet the transgression of the Revolution does not destroy 
completely Coleridge’s yearning for a world liberated with love, in that he ‘shot 
my being through earth, sea, and air, / Possessing all things with intensest love, 
/ O Liberty! my spirit felt thee there’. Although the hope of the Revolution is 
lost for Coleridge, his enthusiasm for the transformation of the world was too 
great to disappear immediately. The Revolution failed his dreams, but he does 
not give them up. He turns instead to nature. 
    ‘Fears in Solitude’ has a similar structure. At the beginning of the poem, 
Coleridge describes a peaceful landscape where he found ‘Religious meanings 
in the forms of Nature! / And so, his senses gradually wrapt / In a half sleep, he 
dreams of better worlds’. As he sensed the purity of nature in ‘France: An Ode’, 
he is now able to dream of the transformation of the world in nature. Then the 
poem moves from this private natural landscape to the next part, in which he 
raises a critical voice against the violence, caused by war. ‘Fears in Solitude’ 
was written in April 1798, under the alarm of a French invasion, and in this 
second part Coleridge couples the violence of this possible invasion with the 
image of the savagery that happened over the last decade during the Revolution. 
The poet, however, in the last part, turns from this stormy public world to his 
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private domestic sphere in nature, which Tim Fulford terms ‘Coleridge’s 
spiritual high ground’.49 Beholding ‘beloved Stowey!’ and his ‘own lowly cottage, 
where my babe / And my babe’s mother dwell in peace!’, Coleridge appears to 
dream of a better world: 
 
[. . .] O green and silent dell! 
And grateful, that by nature’s quietness 
And solitary musings, all my heart 
Is softened, and made worthy to indulge 
Love, and the thoughts that yearn for human kind. (ll. 221, 226, 228-232) 
 
In her The Emigrants (1793), C. T. Smith also, after witnessing the ‘mournful 
truth’ (I.94) of the French Revolution, tries, like Coleridge, to find in nature a 
place ‘unspoil’d by Man’ (I.56): ‘And sigh for some lone Cottage, deep 
embower’d / In the green woods, that these steep chalky Hills [. . .] There do I 
wish to hide me; well content’ (I. 43-4, 48). Coleridge as a family man tries to 
find peace and the improvement of humankind in his private domestic setting in 
nature, rather than in public politics. Further, in ‘Dejection: An Ode’ (1802), 
Coleridge declares: 
 
Joy, Lady! is the spirit and the power, 
Which wedding Nature to us gives in dower 
A new Earth and new Heaven, (ll. 67-9) 
 
This passage suggests that the poet can uncover a new world through his 
interior powers. 
                                            
49
 Tim Fulford, Landscape, Liberty, and Authority, p. 236. 
 253 
 
1.2.2 The revolution of the mind: a moral reformation 
    Although his vision of a new world in a domestic setting would not last for 
long and may have been a form of self-deception, there is obviously a shift of 
his apocalyptic idea from the public and political in history to the private and 
interior in nature.50 Yet, this leads eventually to a revolution of the mind in 
terms of morality and cognitive power. In his letter to John Thelwall, December 
1796, Coleridge announced, ‘I am not fit for public Life’, but he added, ‘yet the 
Light shall stream to a far distance from the taper in my cottage window.’51 The 
implication is that he intends to retreat from public politics to private 
domesticity but is willing to continue to search for the improvement of 
humankind. And what Coleridge eventually proposes for the transformation of 
the world is, as Gregory Leadbetter put it, the revolution of the mind. 52 
Coleridge endorses the aims of the Revolution, Liberty and Freedom, but he 
deplores the means of achieving it, its violence.53 He suggests that we need to 
enlighten the mind of each individual in order to achieve the aims of a 
revolution. 
    In the ‘Introductory Address’ of Conciones ad Populum, Coleridge explicitly 
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argues:  ‘that general Illumination should precede Revolution, is a truth as 
obvious, as that the Vessel should be cleansed before we fill it with a pure 
Liquor’.54 Immediately before this passage, he introduces a poem, entitled ‘To 
The Exiled Patriots’, in which he praises ‘MARTYRS OF FREEDOM’, who 
‘against Corruption nobly stood / For Justice, Liberty, and equal Laws’, and at 
the end of the poem he expresses a desperate wish, ‘shall your great examples 
fire each soul.’55 In addition, Coleridge uses a biblical allusion in describing 
‘Pure Ones and uncorrupt’ as shining like ‘Lights in Darkness’, which appears in 
John 1:5 and Romans 2:19.56 For him, human nature is associated with the idea 
of corruption, and therefore the ‘general Illumination’ of ‘Pure Ones and 
uncorrupt’ may ‘reconcile us to our own nature’ by shining like Lights in 
Darkness and firing our soul.57 Intriguingly, nearly forty years later, in a letter 
to Gioacchino de Prati from 1833, Coleridge reiterates the same argument: 
 
[. . .] from the very outset I hoped in no advancement of humanity but 
from individual mind & morals working onward from individual to 
individual – in short, from the Gospel -. This in my first work, the 
Conciones ad Populum, I declared, in my 23rd year: and to this I adhere in 
my present 63rd.58  
 
In this letter he continues to claim that ‘Liberty without Law can exist no 
where’. The aim of the revolution, Liberty, was correct, but the nature of each 
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individual, Law and Morality, was not good enough to achieve it. As a result, a 
revolution should be preceded by a revolution of each individual’s nature. 
    The question is, what does the illumination of human nature, as a 
precondition for a revolution, mean? For Coleridge, it is a moral reformation.59 
If we look at The Friend, Coleridge’s intention in this journal appears to be 
consonant with his concern about the best way to develop our inner powers 
with reference to our actions and reactions. In his ‘Prospectus’ to The Friend (a 
letter to a correspondent), outlining a brief summary of his life-long quest 
through unrealised schemes, and the mass of his miscellaneous fragments, 
reflections and observations, he maintains that all these have ‘one common End 
([. . . ] what we are and what we are born to become)’.60 In fact, eleven years 
earlier in a letter to Godwin in 1803, he mentioned that he would: 
 
set seriously to work – in arranging what I have already written, and in 
pushing forward my Studies & my Investigations relative to the omne 
scibile of human Nature – what we are, & how we become what we are; 
so as to solve the two grand Problems, how, being acted upon, we shall 
act; how, acting, we shall be acted upon.61 
 
Reflecting upon the great promise and the terrible violence of the Revolution 
stemming from the same people, Coleridge is eager to find out how the former 
turned into the latter. Then he becomes aware of the importance of ‘an act of 
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the Will’ in that ‘in the moral being lies the source of the intellectual’.62 In order 
to ‘determine what we are in ourselves positively’, we need to investigate ‘the 
moral worth and intellectual power of the age in which we live’.63 Accordingly, 
the realization of truth is based upon the improvement of morality. 
    With respect to a moral reformation, Coleridge looks closely at the 
consciousness or inner mind of each individual. In a letter to his brother, 
George Coleridge, in 1798, Coleridge mentioned that he has withdrawn himself 
‘almost totally from the consideration of immediate causes, which are infinitely 
complex & uncertain, to muse on fundamental & general causes – the “causae 
causarum”’, and tried to find out ‘what our faculties are & what they are 
capable of becoming’. He loves ‘fields & woods & mountains with almost a 
visionary fondness’, and he has found ‘benevolence & quietness growing’ within 
himself ‘as that fondness [has] increased’, through which he may ‘destroy bad 
passions’. Further ‘he wishes to be the means of implanting it in others.’ Here 
we should note the two contrasting attitudes, ‘benevolence’ and ‘bad passions’. 
Depending on the state of our human faculties, we are liable to produce 
‘benevolence’ or ‘bad passions’. Coleridge was able to become gradually 
‘benevolent’ through his love of nature with a ‘visionary fondness’. In other 
words, human faculties need to be nurtured or developed so that their 
potentialities can be realised in terms of moral improvement and intellectual 
power. 
    Coleridge also stresses the inner powers of one’s own consciousness. He 
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holds that ‘any new truth’, which ‘relates to the properties of the mind’, cannot 
be ‘made our own without examination and self-questioning’.64  In a similar 
vein, in his reply to Mathetes in The Friend, Wordsworth asks his reader to be 
dependent ‘upon voluntary and self-originating effort, and upon practice of 
self-examination, sincerely aimed at and rigorously enforced’, in order that his 
‘pure and high-mindedness’ can be protected ‘from any fatal effect of 
seductions and hindrances which opinion may throw’ in his way. 65  In his 
Lectures 1818-1819 on the History of Philosophy, Coleridge regards Plato as 
‘the Prophet & Preparer for the New World’, whose writings intend to ‘actuate 
the minds of men’ and to ‘lead them to seek further’.66 In this way, Coleridge 
underlines the significance of the inner powers of one’s own consciousness in 
that ‘the very first step to knowledge, or rather the previous condition of all 
insight into truth, is to dare commune with our very and permanent self.’67  
 
1.2.3. Apocalypse as a symbolic drama 
    Clearly the revolution of the mind is associated with the Apocalypse as a 
paradigm and symbolic drama. Coleridge applied literally faith in the Revelation 
to the historical event of the French Revolution. Yet, in spite of the failure of 
the Revolution, the language of apocalypse remained in his pursuit of a vision. 
As critics such as E. S. Shaffer, Morton Paley, and Christopher Burdon have 
pointed out, Coleridge continued to defend ‘the authenticity of Revelation’ up to 
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his death in 1834.68  In a letter to Edward Coleridge, 8 February 1826, he 
argued that without the Apocalypse ‘the New Testament would not be what it is, 
the compleat Quadrature and Antitype of the Old’.69 His way of interpreting it, 
however, changed along with his disillusionment. In a footnote to A Lay Sermon, 
he mentions that the idea of an apocalypse ‘has been most strangely abused and 
perverted from the Millenarians of the primitive Church to the religious 
Politicians of our own times’.70 He develops his new approach to the meaning of 
apocalypse in relation to history by interacting with, particularly, Johann 
Gottfried Eichhorn and Edward Irving. 
    Coleridge was introduced in 1824 to the Scottish minister Edward Irving, 
whom he described as ‘the present Idol of the World of Fashion, the Revd. Mr. 
Irving, the super-Ciceronian, ultra-Demosthenic Pulpiteer of the Scotch 
Chapel’. 71  Irving became a regular visitor to Highgate. Their friendship, 
however, was challenged by Irving’s growing interest in, and literal 
interpretation of, the Book of Revelation, which Coleridge disputed on numerous 
occassions. Irving dedicated his book For Missionaries after the Apostolical 
School in 1825 to Coleridge, but the poet made a note on the book’s end-paper 
that ‘I cannot help, believing, that his [Irving] imagination that the XXth Chapter 
of the Revelations favors the doctrine of a future Millennium prevents him from 
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seeing, that it is a mere imagination’.72 In a letter in February 1826, Coleridge 
expresses his puzzlement that ‘I do not at all understand our Friend’s [Irving] 
late excursions into the prophecies of a sealed Book, of which no satisfactory 
proof has yet been given whether they have already been or still remain to be 
fulfilled’.73 In a note on Sermons, Lectures, and Occasional Discourses, a copy 
of which was given to him, Coleridge describes messianic interpretation of Old 
Testament prophecy as founded on ‘ruinous and fleshly fancies [. . .] a carnal 
Superstition’.74 Then he claims that the Apocalypse is ‘a Symbolic Drama [. . .] 
I know indeed no Poem ancient or modern, unless it be the Paradise Lost, that 
can be compared with it either in the felicity of its Structure, or the sublimity of 
the parts’.75 In the long run, for Coleridge, the Apocalyse should not be read 
literally, but symbolically, in that it is ‘a Symbolic Drama’ or ‘Poem’. In fact, 
there are clear echoes of Eichhorn in Coleridge’s arguments against Irving’s 
literal interpretation of the Apocalypse. 
    When Coleridge was staying in Göttingen in 1799, he had come to know J. G. 
Eichhorn, one of the leading figures of Higher Criticism in Germany. It was to 
Eichhorn’s commentaries that he turned many times and himself annotated 
when studying Revelation in greater detail. 76  The German higher critics 
attempted to get at the historical truth underlying biblical narratives by de-
supernatualizing the Bible, but they encountered difficulties with the Apocalyse, 
a book full of supernatural phenomena, yet associated with historical events in 
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the life of the early Church. Being aware of the impossibility of a scientific or 
historic proof of supernatural events, Eichhorn conceives the Book of 
Revelation as ‘a grand symbolic drama in three acts, with prologue (1:4-3:22), 
prelude (4:1-8:5), and epilogue (22:6-11), written by the apostle as a poetic 
interpretation of the fall of Jerusalem a generation after the event’. 77  For 
instance, in his commentary on Revelation 11:1-3, Eichhorn interprets ‘the 42 
months and the 1260 days’ as being ‘fictitious and symbolical’ and ‘standard 
expressions for the long duration of a public calamity’.78 Finally, he describes 
the Apocalypse as ‘a poetic work’ full of ‘materials of the liveliest imaginative 
power’.79 Coleridge generally accepted such arguments in his use of Eichhorn’s 
commentary over a period of thirty years, but he challenged ‘the commentary’s 
aesthetic reponse to Revelation’. For Coleridge, it was ‘a Vision, not a Poem.-
Whether divine and bona fide prophetic’.80 It seems contradictory that Coleridge 
could regard the Apocalypse as ‘a Symbolic Poem’ and also describe it as ‘a 
Vision, not a Poem’. Yet, special attention needs to be paid to the word 
‘symbolic’. For Eichhorn, it seemed that the Apocalypse was a mere poetic 
fiction without vision. He considered ‘all the raptures and visions’ of Ezekiel as 
‘mere drapery, mere poetic fiction’, but Coleridge disputed strongly this 
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comment in the margin: 
 
It perplexes me to understand, how a Man of Eichhorn’s Sense, Learning, 
and Acquaintance with Psychology could form, or attach belief to, so 
cold-blooded an hypothesis. That in Ezechiel’s Visions Ideas or Spiritual 
Entities are presented in visual Symbols, I never doubted.81 
 
Although the Apocalypse needs to be interpreted symbolically, the symbols are 
not merely poetic fiction but are essentially associated with the vision of the 
Apocalpse. Here we need to be reminded of Coleridge’s concept of a symbol, 
which, for him, is not a metaphor or allegory, but an actual and essential part of 
the whole it represents; ‘it always partakes of the Reality which it renders 
intelligible.’ 82  Thus symbols must not be interpreted literally, yet they 
represent a vision because, for Coleridge, they participate in it. Now the 
question is, in what sense can this symbolic poem be involved with history? 
    In his extensive notes on Irving’s Sermons, Lectures, and Occasional 
Discourses, Coleridge shows that the Apocalypse as a symbolic drama is part of 
the whole redemptive history. Referring to ‘the Brahmin Theology’s 
manifestation of the Godhead in Nature in the trinity of Production, Destruction 
and Reproduction’, Coleridge explains that the Christian human history is the 
process of ‘Creation’, ‘Destruction’, and ‘Reproduction (Re-creation, Re-
generation, New Birth)’.83 For Coleridge, it seems that the process of creation, 
destruction and reproduction shows a dialectical dynamic. One stage of the 
process presupposes the next stage in the sense that ‘every great Epoch of 
                                            
81
 A note to Eichhorn’s Einleitung ins Alte Testament, in CM II, pp. 373-414 (p. 410). 
82
 SM, p. 30. 
83
 A note to Sermons, Lectures, and Occasional Discourses, in CM III, p. 60. 
 262 
Reproduction is preceded by a Destruction’.84 As a result, he holds that ‘the 
Creation of the material universe appears as the first Act of the Redemption by 
the Spirit & the Word’ and the ‘Fall’ was ‘the necessary Result’.85 Although he 
defends ‘the authenticity of Revelation’, he is not sure, in terms of the final 
redemption, whether the prophecies of a sealed Book have already been, or still 
remain to be, fulfilled. Nevertheless, what he discovered after his 
disillusionment with the French Revolution was that this symbolic drama of the 
redemption becomes a paradigm for history, in that this drama continues to take 
place throughout the grand narrative of redemption.86 In other words, he applies 
the process of the redemption symbolically to some great epochs in history. For 
instance, he interprets ‘the two great Revolutions’ – ‘the dread destructive 
Moments of the existing Epoch, the one recorded, the other predictively 
denounced, in Holy Writings [the Flood and the lake of fire’ (the second death 
foretold in Rev. 20:14-15)] – as ‘the two forms of Death’, ‘the two modes of 
destructive disorganization’.87 Accordingly, the Apocalypse as a symbolic poem 
becomes a pattern of thought through which people can understand the world 
and their life. 
    Intriguingly, if we look at 1 Thessalonians 5:1-11, we find that St. Paul also 
shifts from the literal approach to eschatology to a symbolic understanding. The 
early Christians believed that they would see the second coming of Jesus, the 
so-called ‘parousia’, but the problem was that it continued to be delayed. St. 
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Paul begins Chapter 5 of I Thessalonians by saying ‘Now concerning the times 
and the seasons’, but, instead of answering, he refers to the ‘unexpectedness’ 
of the parousia with the metaphor of ‘a thief in the night’: ‘the day of the Lord 
will come like a thief in the night’ (v.2).88 Implying an inability to know the 
times, he speaks of the mode of existence in ordinary daily life, encouraging 
people to ‘keep awake and be sober’, and to ‘put on the breastplate of faith and 
love, and for a helmet the hope of salvation’, for ‘you are all children of light’ (v. 
5, 6, 8). Rather than wait for the day of the Lord, they are expected as the 
children of light to maintain and to improve their morality within the context of 
the day of the Lord. In other words, ‘parousia’ is now understood as a paradigm 
which influences the mode of existence in ordinary daily life. 
 
1.2.4. Apocalypse: morality, symbolic drama, an external reality 
    Likewise, for Coleridge, the symbolic drama of the Apocalypse is a 
paradigm which is associated with morality. With regard to Coleridge’s two 
ideas, the revolution of the mind and the symbolic drama of the Apocalypse, I 
maintain that they are fundamentally interrelated. When Coleridge changed from 
a literal to a symbolic understadning of the Apocalypse, this symbolic drama 
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became a paradigm which defined ordinary daily life in history on the grounds 
that people are expected to formulate their mode of existence according to it. 
Therefore, given the paradigm of a symbolic drama, the transformation is not a 
final dramatic event, but an experience of moral improvement in ordinary daily 
life, which reminds us of St. Paul’s mode of existence in the context of the 
parousia. 
    The images Coleridge uses to describe the transformation of the mind have 
religious connotations. He associates it with images of ‘general Illumination’, 
‘Light in darkness’ and ‘firing our soul’, which enlighten the mind so that it can 
improve its moral capacity. When he speaks of the Apocalypse as a symbolic 
drama of creation, destruction, and reproduction, he also presents ‘the Word (or 
Logos)’ as ‘Light’.89 ‘Life’ can become ‘the Correlative’ only where the Light, 
as ‘a consuming Fire to all Iniquity, is in actu’ (actual, in action).90 Just as St. 
Paul calls his people the ‘children of light’, so Coleridge requires ‘general 
Illumination’ and ‘Light’ to fire and to guide the soul for transformation. In this 
sense, the transformation of the mind is not just concerned with the growth of 
consciousness, in terms of morality and cognitive power, but also has a 
religious aspect. The revolution of the mind thus needs to be understood as a 
crucial part of the symbolic drama of the Apocalypse. For Coleridge, the 
symbolic drama of the Apocalypse as a paradigm is fundamentally associated 
with the revolution of the mind, which each individual needs to experience in 
order to taste ‘a new Earth and new Heaven’. 
    Yet it should be noted that this internalized interpretation of apocalypse is 
                                            
89
 A note to Sermons, Lectures, and Occasional Discourse, in CM III, pp. 59-60. 
90
 Ibid., p. 60. 
 265 
involved in an external reality. The internalization of the transformation does 
not limit itself merely to the inner and private sphere of a person, but extends 
to outward social and natural aspects in terms of morality. In other words, for 
Coleridge the transformation of the mind becomes a paradigm through which 
social injustices are criticised. In the Lay Sermon of 1817, Coleridge blames 
‘the OVERBALANCE OF THE COMMERCIAL SPIRIT’ for causing the ‘trouble’ 
and ‘perplexity’ of the present state.91 In 1819 in a letter to Thomas Allsop he 
praises Cobbett for his criticism against ‘the hollowness of commercial 
wealth’.92  In 1815, Coleridge made a public speech at Calne, attacking the 
‘Injustice and Cruelty’ of ‘the Corn Bill’. He said ‘it is a Poll Tax [. . .] the 
poorest pay the most’.93  In 1818, Coleridge campaigned vigorously for ‘the 
passage of Peel’s Bill to regulate the working hours of children in cotton 
factories’, writing three pamphlets in its support (SWF I 714-751), which turned 
on one question: ‘Whether some half score of rich Capitalists are to be 
prevented from suborning Suicide and perpetrating Infanticide and Soul-
murder.’ 94  Although Coleridge rejected the violence of the Revolution, he 
continued to seek the transformation of the external world through the 
revolution of the mind, which was not the transformation itself, but an 
internalized means for the transformation.95 
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1.2.5. Nature and the Apocalypse as a symbolic drama 
    The symbolic drama of the Apocalypse relate to an ecotheology in so far as 
the natural world forms an essential part of it. In fact, nature itself reveals the 
symbolic drama. Chapter 2 already mentioned that nature becomes the eternal 
language of God in ‘Frost at Midnight’; nature is often presented as a book of 
revelation by Coleridge. In his Lectures on Politics and Religion (1795), he 
describes ‘the Volume of the World’ as ‘the Transcript of himself’, and 
maintains that ‘its [nature’s] every Feature is the Symbol and all its Parts the 
written Language of infinite Goodness and all powerful Intelligence’.96 In The 
Statesman’s Manual, he also calls nature ‘another book’, ‘a revelation of God-
the great book of his servant Nature’.97  For Coleridge, there are thus two 
Books in terms of God’s revelation: the book of nature and the book of the Bible. 
He continued to see nature as the book of God’s language, but the image of God 
in nature eventually developed into ‘an orthodox trinitarianism, and Christ, or 
the Word’.98 If we look at the notebooks written in Malta, we find that when 
Coleridge observed the sun reflected in the sea, he began to be aware of the 
‘Logos ab Ente’, or the Word from the beginning, in nature, rather than the 
image of God.99 In his letter to Joseph Cottle, April 1814, Coleridge, having 
been asked about ‘the Trinity’, mentions that he ‘accepts the doctrine’ and has 
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‘in my head some floating ideas on the Logos, which I hope, hereafter, to mould 
into a consistent form’.100 Interestingly, in the very last paragraph of the last 
Chapter in Biographia Literaria, Coleridge provides a vivid account of how the 
Trinitarian God can be descried in the starry heaven: 
 
It is Night, sacred Night! The upraised Eye views only the starry Heaven 
which manifests itself alone: and the outward Beholding is fixed on the 
sparks twinkling in the aweful depth, though Suns of other Worlds, only to 
preserve the Soul steady and collected in its pure Act of inward Adoration 
to the great I AM, and to the filial WORD that re-affirmeth it from Eternity 
to Eternity, whose choral Echo is the Universe.101 
 
If he saw images of God in the book of nature before, now he can read from the 
same book the dynamic relationship between the Father and the Son. In other 
words, the natural world reveals it through its symbols and parts. 
    Nature’s revelation of the Son comes from the fact that the Logos is 
concerned with redemptive history through creativity and Incarnation. While 
‘the sun, moon, stars, and the very plants and herbs of the field speak of God’, 
now Coleridge indicates specifically that he can read the redemptive power of 
God in them.102 In his ‘Sermons, Lectures, and Occasional Discourse’, he argues 
that ‘the Truth of Christ’ as ‘Logos’ who ‘lighteth every Man’ expresses ‘a 
continuous, ever unfolding Revelation in the Natural World symbolically’.103 It 
should be noted that Coleridge here integrates the Logos as the Christ into the 
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act of redemption in that He ‘lighteth every Man’. Therefore the book of nature, 
like the book of the Bible, reveals the history of redemption in the sense that 
the symbolic drama of creation, destruction, and reproduction ‘express 
declarations in Scripture, and facts equally express and declarative in 
Nature’.104 In this sense, the natural world itself communicates the symbolic 
drama of the Apocalypse, creation, destruction and reproduction. 
    In addition, the natural world enables the poet to experience the power of 
transformation and also helps him to carry through the revolution of the mind. 
As was already noted, after abandoning the hope of the Revolution Coleridge in 
‘France: An Ode’ could find in nature a liberated new world. He can experience 
a transforming power, which he was looking for in the Revolution, by 
participating ‘in the uncontrollable vitality manifested in clouds, waves, and 
wind-swung forest branches whose energy fulfills “eternal laws”’105 (ll. 4): 
 
O ye loud Waves! And O ye Forests high! 
And O ye Clouds that far above me soared! 
Thou rising Sun! thou blue rejoicing Sky! 
Yea, every thing that is and will be free! (ll. 15-18) 
 
His conscious engagement with this dynamic natural world is also found in the 
process of the revolution of the mind. Coleridge was able to ‘destroy bad 
passions’ through his love of ‘fields & woods & mountains with almost a 
visionary fondness’ so that human faculties can be nurtured and developed in 
terms of moral improvement. The power of nature thus helps him to transform 
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the mind. In consequence, Coleridge’s eschatological vision after his 
disillusionment expresses an ecotheological perspective in that the natural 
world itself represents a symbolic drama and at the same time is involved in the 
transformation of the mind. 
 
1.3. The final vision of the universe 
    So far, it has been suggested that the natural world constitutes a key part in 
two phases of Coleridge’s eschatological vision, the literal understanding of the 
French Revolution as the Apocalypse and the Millennium, and the symbolic 
drama of the Apocalypse and the revolution of the mind after his disillusionment. 
Lastly, we should note that Coleridge offers a final vision of the universe into 
which nature will be integrated. Although he abandoned any literal 
understanding of the Apocalypse after his disillusionment and turned to its 
symbolic drama, he still defended the authenticity of the Revelation and 
eventually drew a picture of the day of the Lord, including the natural world. In 
his Lecture Introductory, Irving gives a speculative analysis of Nature: ‘God 
hath ordained nature in its present form’ and ‘from man down to the lowest 
creature [. . .] everything containeth the presentiment of its own future 
perfection’.106 Interestingly, Coleridge made a note here, implying that Irving’s 
idea is based on his own work, Aids to Reflection. In Chapter 2, I discussed 
Coleridge’s understanding of the natural history of the cosmos, ‘the great 
redemptive process, which began in the separation of light from Chaos’; this 
includes the non-human natural world as well as human beings.107 Creation is 
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not static but ‘contains the presentiment of its own future perfection’, on the 
grounds that nature ‘is about to be born’ and is ‘always becoming’.108 In fact, 
Coleridge referred not to the imperfection of nature, but to the corruption of 
human nature, when he applied the idea of the Apocalypse to the French 
Revolution. Yet, in his final vision of the universe, he expects the future 
perfection of all creation on the last day. In other words, ‘all things strive to 
ascend, and ascend in their striving’, and, finally, this process ‘has its end in the 
union of life with God’ in the day of the Lord.109 This eschatological vision thus 
signifies explicitly an ecotheological perspective by formulating a final vision 
for the non-human natural world as well as for human beings. 
 
2. Wordsworth 
2.1. The French Revolution 
2.1.1. The French Revolution as apocalypse and millennium 
    The term ‘apocalypse’ appears only once in Wordsworth’s writing and that 
is in the passage in The Prelude where Wordsworth refers to ‘Characters of the 
great apocalypse’ during his walking tour in the Alps in Book VI. The term, 
however, has provided one of the key debating points in Wordsworth criticism 
over the last century.110 Though the term is used just once in Wordsworth, 
there are various passages which express an apocalyptic pattern of imagination. 
The last stanza of the Salisbury Plain, (1793), for instance, speaking of ‘another 
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world to which the artist as prophet must point, includes the whole world in its 
apocalyptic vision’.111 Book IX of The Excursion (1814) evokes an apocalyptic 
vision: ‘That Paradise, the lost abode of man, / Was raised again’. And the 
conclusion of the series of Ecclesiastical Sonnets (1820) also asserts an 
apocalyptic vision, saying that all will reach ‘the eternal City’. There is no doubt 
that the works of Wordsworth are charged with apocalyptic. 
    To explore Wordsworth’s way of understanding this, reference must be 
made to Descriptive Sketches (1793), A Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff, Book 
VI of The Prelude, and Books II and III of The Excursion, which allow us to 
glimpse something of the development of his apocalyptic thinking. Wordsworth 
left England for France in the late autumn of 1791, and returned to England in 
late December 1792. Announcements of the execution of Luis XVI appeared in 
the London papers on 24 January 1793, and a few days later two poems were 
published in London, An Evening Walk and Descriptive Sketches, by 
Wordsworth.112 If Descriptive Sketches provides an account of his first-hand 
experience of the Revolution that developed in less than two years, Book VI of 
The Prelude is a recollection of that experience no less than fourteen years 
after it developed. On the one hand, it is obvious that there is a considerable 
distance between The Prelude and Descriptive Sketches in terms of style and 
thought.113 On the other hand, there is ‘in part a continuity between an attitude 
of mind present in 1790 that was to become dominant by the time the 1805 
Prelude was complete, and work going forward on the Excursion’ in terms of 
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his understanding of the French Revolution.114 Both poems reveal clearly his 
enthusiasm for the transformation of the world through the Revolution in an 
apocalyptic sense, but Descriptive Sketches communicates it more explicitly, 
dramatically and urgently, than the Prelude and the Excursion. 
    Unlike Coleridge, Wordsworth does not apply clear biblical references to 
his understanding of the Revolution, but his transformative experience can be 
interpreted as apocalyptic. When he wrote Descriptive Sketches, the violence of 
the Revolution caused fear and anxiety. Yet, his Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff 
obviously shows that he had not given up hope in the Revolution as he tries to 
provide a justification for revolutionary violence. Having heard that on 21 
January 1793 Louis XVI was guillotined in Paris, the Bishop ‘hurriedly 
composed an indignant protest’: ‘I fly with terror and abhorrence even from the 
altar of liberty when I see it stained with the blood of the aged, of the innocent, 
of the defenceless sex’.115 Wordsworth condemns this comment and defends 
the necessity of violence: 
 
What! have you so little knowledge of the nature of man as to be ignorant, 
that a time of revolution is not the season of true Liberty. Alas! the 
obstinacy & perversion of men is such  that she is too often obliged to 
borrow the very arms of despotism to overthrow him, and in order to 
reign in peace must establish herself by violence.116 
 
As violence in revolution seems to be inevitable, Wordsworth sees the world of 
‘true Liberty’ coming out of it. He attempts to understand the Revolution as a 
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mixture of violence and hope associated with the dynamic of apocalypse and 
millennium. 
    Above all, Wordsworth’s enthusiasm for the Revolution is based not just on 
the transformation of the system in politics, from monarchy to republicanism, 
but on something fundamental in the creation of the world.  One of the main 
themes which Wordsworth tries to express in Descriptive Sketches recounting 
his walk through the French and Swiss Alps is the sense of being granted a 
vision of a primitive innocence. In particular, he imagines the uncorrupted 
original state of ‘Man’, which reminds us of Rousseau: 
 
Once Man entirely free, alone and wild, 
Was bless’d as free – for he was Nature’s child. 
He, all superior but his God disdain’d, 
[. . .] 
As Man in his primaeval dower array’d 
The image of his glorious sire display’d, 
Ev’n so, by vestal Nature guarded, here 
The traces of primaeval Man appear. (ll. 520-529) 
 
According to Mary Moorman, this section suggests that Wordsworth’s ‘whole 
outlook on man had undergone a change’.117 Over and against ‘human vices’ (ll. 
486), he seems to encounter a kind of original condition of human nature. In 
Book VI of the Prelude, he also mentions that ‘twas a time when Europe was 
rejoiced, / France standing on the top of golden hours, / And human nature 
seeming born again’ (ll. 352-4). In the Excursion, the Solitary perceives the 
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Revolution as ‘The glorious opening, the unlooked-for dawn’ of ‘a new world of 
hope’ (II, ll. 224, 233), and this new world is compared to ‘A golden Palace’ 
which ‘rose from the wreck’ (III, ll. 722-723). In addition, he extends the 
meaning of this particular historical event to the whole universe by making the 
joy of the Revolution that of the whole world: ‘By joyful all ye Nations, in all 
Lands’ (III, ll. 737). Wordsworth considers the Revolution to be the 
transformation of the whole universe by associating the revolutionary power 
with the primitive state of human nature. 
    This idea of rebirth is not just the sense of renewal, but is deeply involved 
in the dynamic of apocalypse and millennium. One of the key points in the 
description of nature in Descriptive Sketches is that it brings out two 
contrasting faces of nature: its destructive power, and the sense of joy, hope, 
beauty and the sublime. In the early part of Descriptive Sketches, the poet is 
absorbed in the beauty of nature: ‘How bless’d, delicious Scene! the eye that 
greets / Thy open beauties’ (ll. 120-121), but soon he is overtaken by fear of 
the destructive power of an Alpine avalanche. Throughout his walk, he has to 
face such fear in that he sees ‘their fiery clouds, their rocks, and snows’ 
‘hiding’ on the high summits’ (ll. 205-206) and ‘In the deep snow the mighty 
ruin drown’d, / Mocks the dull ear of Time with deaf abortive sound’ (ll. 378-
379). Eventually ‘the avalanche of Death destroy[s] / The little cottage of 
domestic Joy’ (ll. 600-601). And yet, in the middle of such terror, the poet is 
able to listen to ‘the vernal breeze’, whispering ‘hope’ (ll. 443), and he exclaims, 
‘Gay lark of hope thy silent song resume!’ (ll. 632). What he experiences during 
his walk is a complex feeling about nature because ‘Abortive Joy, and Hope 
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works in fear’ (ll. 651). Although he is frightened by its destructive power, he 
comes across ‘One flower of hope’ ‘For ye have reach’d at last the happy shore, 
/ Where the charm’d worm of pain shall gnaw no more’ (ll. 661, 668-669). In 
this sense, nature’s violent force is not completely negative, but can be 
regarded as part of the process for reaching ‘the happy shore’. 
    Intriguingly, his yearning for ‘Liberty’ also involves a destructive power, 
which penetrates, or is penetrated by, his experience of the dual faces of nature. 
The poet is thoroughly aware of the conflict between freedom and slavery in 
that his initial joy in beautiful nature is tainted by his consciousness that there 
is ‘Slavery’ (ll. 158). Wordsworth, as shown above, is able to envisage the 
freedom of ‘primaeval Man’, and yet, this ‘Freedom’ is often accompanied by 
‘Victory and Death’ (ll. 537). At the end of Descriptive Sketches, the poet 
announces the coming of ‘Liberty’ (ll. 774), but it brings about the 
transformation of the world in a stormy and catastrophic way, which is resonant 
with the language of the Revelation. When Liberty shall raise ‘his beacon’s 
comet blaze’, ‘Pride’s perverted ire / [shall] Rouse Hell’s own aid, and wrap thy 
hills in fire’ (ll. 774-5, 780-781). The poet then supplicates: 
 
Oh give, great God, to Freedom’s waves to ride 
Sublime o’er Conquest, Avarice, and Pride, 
To break, the vales where Death with Famine scow’rs, 
And dark Oppression builds her thick-ribb’d tow’rs; 
[. . .] 
Where Discord stalks dilating, every hour, 
And crouching fearful at the feet of pow’r, 
Like Lightnings eager for th’ almighty word, 
Look up for sign of havoc, Fire and Sword (ll. 792-803) 
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It is evident that images of ‘Death’, ‘Famine’, ‘Fire’, and ‘Sword’, remind us of 
the apocalyptic judgement in the Revelation (19:11-21). Just as the apocalyptic 
judgement is followed by the millennium (Rev., 20:4), so Wordsworth tells 
people to ‘rejoice’ because ‘from the’ innocuous flames, a lovely birth! / With 
it’s own Virtues springs another earth: / Nature, as in her prime, her virgin 
reign / Begins, and Love and Truth compose her train’ (ll. 780, 782-785). Here 
it may be worth noting Westbrook’s comment that ‘Wordsworthian apocalyptics 
are deeply marked by biblical intertextuality and what may be called a form of 
biblical iconography’.118 The biblical images in Wordsworthian apocalyptic are 
often unobtrusive, but nevertheless ‘adjust the texts to accommodate their 
force and presence’. 119  On the one hand, in Book III of The Excursion, 
Wordsworth still in a mood of apocalypse expresses retrospectively a sudden 
and tumultuous expectation of a new world, but such a mood seems to be much 
more weak than in Descriptive Sketches: 
 
[. . .] The potent shock 
I felt; the transformation I perceived, 
As marvelously seized as in that moment 
When, from the blind mist issuing, I beheld 
Glory – beyond all glory ever seen, 
Confusion infinite of heaven and earth, 
Dazzling the soul!  (III. ll. 725-731) 
 
On the other hand, the vision of earth’s renovation in Descriptive Sketches 
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vividly carries an apocalyptic sense of transformation through the dynamic of 
its images, which resonate with the apocalyptic judgement of the Revelation. 
Thus, Wordsworth understood the violence of the Revolution as an apocalyptic 
violence which would deliver a judgement against ‘human vices and eventually 
bring about the ‘Freedom’ of ‘primaeval Man’. 
 
2.1.2. A lesson of nature and ‘power of strong controul’ in nature 
    Nature contributes crucially to his apocalyptic understanding of the 
Revolution in Descriptive Sketches. There is a striking parallel between the two 
faces of nature and the hope and violence of the Revolution in that the poet 
identifies a destructive power as well as a sense of rebirth in both nature and 
the Revolution. Eventually, in Book VI of The Prelude, he equates various 
beautiful aspects of nature with ‘Characters of the great apocalypse, / The 
types and symbols of eternity’ (ll. 570-1). It is hard to say whether his 
experience of nature is simply a projection of his ideas; or whether his way of 
understanding the hope and violence of the Revolution is completely subject to 
his experience of the two faces of nature. Most of all, nature itself mattered to 
the poet. Just before mentioning his landing at Calais on the very eve of that 
great federal day (VI, ll. 356-7), he explains his motivation for this walking tour. 
Although ‘an open slight / Of college cares and study was the scheme’, he 
confesses that ‘nature then was sovereign in my heart’ (VI, ll. 342-3, 346). In 
Descriptive Sketches, he shows how he was impressed by nature’s beauty and 
sublime. And yet, he was also struggling with the problem of the violence in the 
Revolution because the imminent flood, which would cleanse the blemished 
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world through its violence, could not be imagined without ‘a fainter pang of 
moral grief’ (Descriptive Sketches, ll. 769). Interestingly, in Book VI, beholding 
the summit of Mont Blanc and the wondrous Vale of Chamouny, he remembers 
that ‘With such a book / Before our eyes we could not choose but read / A 
frequent lesson of sound tenderness, / The universal reason of mankind’ (ll. 
473-6). As Hartman suggests, Descriptive Sketches is neither ‘a portrait of 
nature’ nor ‘the projection on nature of an idea’; but ‘the portrayal of the action 
of a mind in search (primarily through the eye) of a nature adequate to its 
idea’.120 In other words, both the descriptions of nature and the thoughts of the 
Revolution can be integrated into each other in the sense that the lessons 
taught by nature are applied to dealing with the problem.121 
    The idea of divine power connects nature with Wordsworth’s apocalyptic 
way of thinking in a significant way. In Descriptive Sketches, the poet is 
continuously reminded of the presence of divine power in nature. He begins the 
poem by referring to ‘a spot of holy ground’ which ‘Nature’s God had giv’n to 
man’ (ll. 1, 2), and he feels ‘a secret Power that reigns / Here, where no trace 
of man the spot profanes’ (ll. 424-425). When we look at his Keswilll letter of 
September 6, 1790, to his sister Dorothy, it can be seen that his experience of 
divine power is deeply religious, rather than sheer rhetoric: ‘Among the more 
awful scenes of the Alps, I had not a thought of man, or a single created being; 
my whole soul was turned to Him who produced the terrible majesty before 
me’. 122  Further, this power is not only present, but active in nature. He 
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envisages a world beyond the earth: ‘For images of other worlds are there, / 
Awful the light, and holy is the air’ (ll. 544-5), and, at the same time, ‘An 
unknown power connects him with the dead’ (ll. 543). Eventually, this ‘power of 
strong controul’, which the poet encounters in nature, is invoked to bring 
‘Liberty’ (ll. 774) to the persecuted and oppressed. In this way, nature is a 
crucial element in Wordsworth’s apocalyptic way of comprehending the 
Revolution. 
 
2.1.3. Wordsworth’s disillusionment with the Revolution 
    The turbulent expectations for a new world turned into terror and despair, 
and Wordsworth became disillusioned with the Revolution, as he recounts in 
Books IX and X of The Prelude. At the time of hope, the French are compared 
to ‘bees’ who ‘swarmed’ (VI, ll. 398), but at the time of terror they are 
described as ‘ant-like swarms’ (IX, ll. 58). At the beginning of Book X, in which 
Wordsworth moves from ‘the scenes of vineyard, orchard and calm waters’ 
towards ‘the fierce metropolis’ of the past two month’s massacres, he describes 
how ‘the swarm’ ‘came elate and jocund’ but ‘had shrunk from sight of their 
own task, and fled in terror’ (X, ll. 4-6, 13-20). As Morton Paley pointed out, 
the image of the swarm reminds one of ‘the image of Satan’s fallen angels 
entering their hall’: ‘As bees / In spring-time, when the Sun with Taurus rides 
[. . .] so thick the aery crowd / Swarmed and were straitened’.123 In addition, 
Wordsworth appears to equate the terror of the Revolution with the disaster of 
the plagues in ancient Egypt: ‘The land all swarmed with passion, like a plain / 
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Devoured by locusts’ (IX, ll. 178-9). 
    As the poet walks ‘through the wide city’ (X, ll. 41) and across ‘The Square 
of the Carrousel’ where the dead had been ‘heaped up’ (X, ll. 47-8), his 
experience of despair deepens. Whereas he was able to read the book of nature 
as ‘Characters of the great apocalypse’ while crossing the Alps with the hope of 
the Revolution (VI, ll. 570), the current volume of the terror became unreadable 
in that it was ‘locked up from him’, ‘being written in a tongue he cannot read’ (X, 
ll. 51-3). In Book III of The Excursion, the Solitary, who ‘reconverted to the 
world’ of the Revolution, also reveals feelings of ‘scorn’ and ‘contempt’ for its 
‘Shade’ (ll. 742, 776, 785). Wordsworth clearly experienced a growth in a 
prophetic voice which ‘enabled him to denounce apocalyptic wrath upon the 
world’124: 
 
But as the ancient prophets were inflamed, 
[. . .] 
Before them in some desolated place 
The consummation of the wrath of Heaven; 
So did some portions of that spirit fall 
On me, to uphold me through those evil times (X, ll. 401-410) 
 
He wishes that the Holy Spirit may descend upon France like the Pentecost in 
Acts 2: 
 
The gift of tongues might fall, and men arrive 
From the four quarters of the winds do to 
For France what without help she could not do, 
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A work of honour. (X, ll. 121-124) 
 
Although Wordsworth is disillusioned with the Revolution, he does not abandon 
his hope for the transformation of the world. The question now is, where does 
Wordsworth turn in terms of revolution in the world? 
 
2.2. The growth of the mind: imagination 
2.2.1. Imagination, nature, ‘a new world’ 
    In 1790, the 20-year old Wordsworth and his friend Robert Jones went on a 
walking tour towards the Alps during his summer vacation from Cambridge, but 
the ‘two brother pilgrims’ (VI, ll. 478) famously missed the destination of their 
pilgrimage. When they learned from a local peasant that they had already 
crossed the Alps, their long-hoped for vision, without noticing it, an 
anticlimactic narrative followed their disappointment. But Wordsworth’s sense 
of frustration shifted immediately with the unexpected manifestation of his own 
imagination: ‘Imagination – lifting up itself [. . .] “I recognize thy glory”’ (VI, ll. 
525, 532). The ‘usurpation’ (ll. 533) of Imagination thus enabled the poet to 
envisage the landscape. In a similar vein, through the power of imagination 
Wordsworth offers a vision of a new world over and against the terror and 
despair of the Revolution. Books IX and X of the Prelude show how the poet 
was thoroughly disillusioned with the promise of the Revolution in so far as he 
referred to ‘utter loss of hope itself / And things to hope for!’ (XI, ll. 6-7). But 
he simultaneously attempted to voice a new hope in ‘our song’: ‘Not with these 
began / Our song, and not with these our song must end’ (XI, ll. 7-8). As the 
 282 
exercise of imagination compensated for missing the object of his pilgrimage, 
he endeavours to re-write his song with a new hope through the ‘Restored’ 
power of imagination. In the last three Books of the Prelude, Wordsworth 
touches on various themes, including imagination, nature, the growth of mind, 
hope, inside and outside, spots of time, poet and prophet, everyday experience, 
God and man and the universe, and finally, the vision of Snowdon. 
    There is no doubt that the relationship between imagination and nature is 
one of the key themes which Wordsworth discusses repeatedly in the last three 
Books, but I would suggest there is another dimension to this relationship. We 
must remember that the Prelude is called ‘the Anti-chapel’ as part of his grand 
project, The Recluse, which would deal with ‘Nature, Man, and Society’. In the 
last three Books of the Prelude, Wordsworth tries to make sense of human life 
in terms of the relationship between man, nature, and God in that he is finally 
able to perceive ‘a new world’ (XII, ll. 372), in ‘communion with the invisible 
world’ (XIII, ll. 105). It is through growth of his mind that he could attain this 
vision, and therefore the ‘restored’ power of imagination plays a key role. 
    Although the poetic vision of a new world requires no turbulent 
transformation of the world, as in the apocalyptic vision of the Revolution, it is 
still focused on an apocalyptic way of transforming the world in so far as this 
song expresses a vision of ‘a new world’ (XII, ll. 371). It can thus be argued that 
this song replaces the disillusioned world of the Revolution by envisaging an 
apocalyptic pattern of a new world. His yearning for a new world and his 
apocalyptic pattern of thinking do not disappear even after the disappointment 
of the Revolution, but persist in a different way. Interestingly, Abrams provides 
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a remarkable insight into how ‘the external means was replaced by an internal 
means for transforming the world’. That is, ‘faith in an apocalypse by revolution 
now gave way to faith in an apocalypse by imagination or cognition.’125 If the 
new world of the Revolution meant the transformation of the actual outward 
world, this new song, according to Abrams, is concerned with the internalization 
of the apocalypse. But it should be noted that imagination itself is not a vision, 
but a means through which the poet can write his song for hope. Although 
Wordsworth formulates the song for a new world through such internalized 
means, the power of imagination, his song is profoundly associated with an 
external world. 
    As the title of Book XI, ‘Imagination, how impaired and restored’, implies, 
the last three Books offer an account of how Wordsworth struggled between 
external and internal powers to uncover a primary source for knowledge and 
emotion. External objects had ‘power over my [his] imagination since the dawn 
of childhood’, but now the poet declares that ‘the mind’, ‘a creative soul, is lord 
and master, and that outward sense is but the obedient servant of her will’.126 
This statement seems to justify the idea that nature is a mere projection of the 
mind, but it must be noted that the power of mind does not disown nature in 
terms of its materiality and independent value.127 Rather than deny nature, the 
restored power of imagination enables the poet to re-discover what before he 
could not see in nature. ‘Having tracked the main essential power – Imagination’, 
Wordsworth now ‘returns’: 
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And in the rivers and the groves behold 
Another face, might hear them from all sides 
Calling upon the more instructed mind 
To link their images [. . .] 
With forms and definite appearances 
Of human life.” (XIII, ll. 289, 294-301) 
 
Most significant is the phrase, ‘the more instructed mind’, which brings ‘another 
face’. It seems that the poet can find a deeper knowledge in nature through the 
growth of mind. This sense of growth, in fact, reminds us of Tintern Abbey, in 
which Wordsworth confesses, ‘I have learned / To look on nature, not as in the 
hour / Of thoughtless youth’. The restored power of the imagination re-
establishes a relationship with nature such that Wordsworth still finds beauty 
and consolation in nature, but now he can look on a new aspect of nature in 
relation to ‘a new world’ through his more instructed mind. 
 
2.2.2. ‘A higher power’ in ‘life’s everyday appearances’ 
    Indeed, it was through this restored power of imagination that the poet 
eventually could find ‘a new world’, for which he had been yearning and could 
replace the disappointing new world of the Revolution. At the end of Book XII, 
he mentions that he ‘exercised’: 
 
Upon the vulgar forms of present things 
And actual world of our familiar days, 
A higher power – have caught from them a tone, 
An image, and a character, by books 
Not hitherto reflected. (ll. 360-365) 
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Thus, ‘in life’s everyday appearances’, he was able ‘to have a sight / Of a new 
world’ (XII, ll. 369-371). Jonathan Roberts also argues that Wordsworth’s 
engagement with apocalypse is ‘one in which apocalyptic language is fulfilled in 
the everyday’, rather than ‘a revelation of the transformation of the mind’ or 
‘the anticipation of revolutionary bloodshed’.128 In this new world, there are two 
main elements, ‘a higher power’ and ‘everyday appearances’. His idea of a new 
world refers not to a special world, but to ‘a high power’ in ordinary everyday 
experience. 
    What the poet is able with the growth of his mind to recognise in daily life 
experience is the sense of greatness and wonder, which is enough to bring 
hope for a new world. In the first half of Book XI the power of imagination is 
underlined, and the second half recounts two famous ‘spots of time’ concerning 
memory and mind. For Wordsworth, however, the significance of imagination 
itself, as mentioned above, is not the subject of his song. Book XII begins with 
‘nature’s gift’ and suggests a re-established relationship between nature and 
the mind through returning with a mature mind: ‘Did nature bring again that 
wiser mood, / More deeply re-established in my soul’ (ll. 45-6). Then the poet 
addresses some fundamental questions on ‘rulers of the world’, ‘the dignity of 
individual man’, ‘hope’ and ‘obstacles’. In order to find the answers, he chooses 
to ‘turn / To you, ye pathways and ye lonely roads’, and seeks ‘you, enriched 
with everything I prized’ (ll. 123-5). He describes the bliss of walking or 
wandering daily through fields or groves or forests or naked moors, conversing 
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with men on the way.129 Eventually, in ‘such walks’, he could find: 
 
Hope to my hope, and to my pleasure peace 
And steadiness, and healing and repose 
To every angry passion. There I heard, 
From mouths of lowly men and of obscure, 
A tale of honour – sounds in unison 
With loftiest promises of good and fair. (ll. 178-184) 
 
This passage epitomizes the idea of ‘a new world’ which can be discovered with 
the growth of the mind in ‘life’s everyday appearances’. The rural environment 
provides him with the sense of peace, calm, and restoration. Whereas he sought 
out liberty and dignity in the grand scale of the Revolution, he now recognises 
the ‘loftiest promises of good and fair’ from ‘lowly men’ and ordinary daily life. 
These discoveries enable him to realise his hope for a new world. In fact, what 
has changed is not the world itself, but the way of perceiving it, which is 
dependent upon the growth of mind and the power of imagination. Accordingly, 
a new world is based on the integration of mind and nature as it is the outcome 
of ‘a balance, an ennobling interchange of action from within and from without: 
Both of the object seen, and eye that sees’ (ll. 376-9). 
    Having touched on the issue of the sublime in the common, lowly, trivial and 
mean, we cannot overlook the discussions between Coleridge and Wordsworth 
over Lyrical Ballads, which indicate again a significant relationship between 
common life and the power of imagination in terms of ‘a new world’. In the 
Advertisement of Lyrical Ballads (1798), it is mentioned that the language and 
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style of ‘the middle and lower classes of society is adapted to the purposes of 
poetic pleasure’. 130  In the Preface of 1800, Wordsworth explains more 
specifically how he is interested in ‘the incidents of common life’, ‘low and 
rustic life’, ‘the beautiful and permanent forms of nature’, in order to 
communicate ‘the essential passions of the heart’. 131  Interestingly, in the 
expanded Preface of 1802, he develops his earlier statement, suggesting that 
over ‘the incidents and situations from common life’ he throws ‘a certain 
colouring of imagination, whereby ordinary things should be presented to the 
mind in an unusual way’.132 When Wordsworth refers to common and rural life 
in his poetic project, he does not mean adding some typical images of such life, 
but indicates a new way of perceiving it. Later, in Chapter XIV of Biographia 
Literaria (1817), Coleridge corroborates such an idea by arguing that 
Wordsworth aims: 
 
to give the charm of novelty to things of every day, and to excite a feeling 
analogous to the supernatural, by awakening the mind’s attention from the 
lethargy of custom, and directing it to the loveliness and the wonders of 
the world before us; an inexhaustible treasure, but for which, in 
consequence of the film of familiarity and selfish solicitude we have eyes, 
yet see not, ears that hear not, and hearts that neither feel nor 
understand.133 
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This comment explains how Wordsworth tried to discover a sense of greatness 
in the minutiae of lowly life through ‘the modifying colours of imagination’.134 Of 
particular importance is the biblical phrase, ‘we have eyes, yet see not, ears 
that hear not’. What matters is not the transformation of outward appearances, 
but the growth of an inner mind, through which we can see and hear what we 
could not see and hear before. As Abrams put it, Wordsworth attempts to ‘make 
the old world new not by distorting it, but by defamiliarizing the familiar through 
a refreshed way of looking at it’.135 
 
2.2.3. Apocalypse: a prophetic voice, God, and nature 
    ‘A new world’ does not involve the outwardly turbulent and dramatic 
transformation of a world, but, rather, is found in the appearances of daily life 
through the power of imagination. How does this idea of a new world suggest an 
apocalyptic vision? First of all, this new world is expressed in a prophetic voice 
as a hope for the future and a criticism of the present. Wordsworth seems to be 
aware of his vocation as a poet-prophet both before and after the French 
Revolution. Although, in Home At Grasmere, he narrates that he was ‘no 
prophet, nor had even a hope, / Scarcely a wish’ (ll. 13-4), the poem reveals his 
‘prophetic declarations’, which close with the invocation of the ‘prophetic spirit’, 
‘teaching me to discern’ and ‘expressing the image of a better time’ (ll. 1026, 
1030, 1045).136 If we look at one of the famous ‘spots of time’ episodes in Book 
XI of the Prelude, we find an interesting way of re-interpreting the past in a 
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prophetic sense. On a stormy and wild day, the thirteen-year-old schoolboy on 
a crag was watching intensely and waiting impatiently for two horses, which 
would take him home for the Christmas holidays. But, before staying for ten 
days at home, his father died. He regards it as ‘a chastisement’ (XI, ll. 369). As 
he recalls that day with ‘such anxiety of hope’ on the summit, he ‘bowed low / 
To God who thus corrected my desires’ (XI, ll. 371, 373-4). In other words, an 
event of the past is re-interpreted as a prophetic sign for correcting his desires 
in that the father’s death makes him ‘convert that moment of hope into an 
ominous, even murderous anticipation’.137 In Book XII, the vocation of the poet 
as a prophet is distinctly revealed. Book XI describes the mission of the poet as 
‘speaking of purer creatures!’ (ll. 68-9), and, in Book XII, a poet and a prophet 
are ‘connected’ with each other ‘in a mighty scheme of truth’, who are ‘enabled 
to perceive / Something unseen before’ (ll. 301-5). Accordingly, the song of ‘a 
new world’ bears a prophetic voice which has the ability to see ‘something 
unseen before’. 
    This prophetic tone is also sensed in Wordsworth’s critical attitude towards 
urban life and class-based society over and against his new hope. Although 
some critics regard Wordsworth’s poems as increasingly turning away from 
history and politics, he clearly engages with contemporary social issues even 
after his disillusionment with the French Revolution. Like the Old Testament 
prophets, Wordsworth is seen to raise his voice against contemporary society. 
According to Ian Baucom, Wordsworth’s poems express the moral that 
‘metropolitan culture’ is harmful to ‘Englishness, primarily because the city 
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induces a forgetfulness of precisely the skill the poems teach – the skill of 
reading and valuing England’s memorial places’.138  Wordsworth is explicitly 
aware of the Industrial Revolution and its outcome with the phenomenon of 
urbanization. In Book XII, he contrasts sharply the ‘loftiest promise of good and 
fair’ in rural walks with the sickness of city life by dichotomising them. 
Immediately after his account of the enlightenment, he begins to criticise city 
life: 
 
Oppression worse than death 
Salutes the being at his birth, where grace 
Of culture hath been utterly unknown, 
And labour in excess and poverty 
From day to day pre-occupy the ground 
Of the affections. (ll. 194-199) 
 
This passage implies that the people in cities were oppressed by poverty and 
overwork partly due to urbanization and industrialization. Accordingly, the poet 
denounces ‘cities’ where ‘the human heart is sick’ and ‘love does not easily 
thrive’ (ll. 201-2). 
    His criticism is also aimed at the class-based society emerging from these 
processes.139 In a letter to John Wilson from 1802, Wordsworth criticises the 
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privileged classes for falsely ‘supposing them to be’, rather than a part of 
human nature, ‘fair representatives of the vast mass of human existence’.140 
The Essay of 1815 also states that one of the difficulties in creating such taste 
lies in ‘breaking the bonds of custom’, and we need to ‘divest the reader of the 
pride that induces him to dwell upon those points wherein men differ from each 
other, to the exclusion of those in which all men are alike, or the same’.141 In 
both the letter and the Essay, what Wordsworth tries to point out is that a 
privileged class is not the universality of all human life, but a part of it. Then he 
endeavours to show that ‘we have all of us one human heart’, which is deeper 
than the outward forms of different classes.142 As the Advertisement of Lyrical 
Ballads (1798) reveals, Wordsworth attempts to articulate this ‘one human 
heart’ through his ‘class-conscious experiment with language of conversation in 
the middle and lower classes of society’.143  Eventually, in Book XII of the 
Prelude, he proclaims that he has found in the common and lowly life hope and 
the ‘loftiest promises of good and fair’.144 Accordingly, when the poet sings a 
song of a new world of ‘one brotherhood of all the human race’, it is fully 
supported by his critical view of the rigidity and false superiority of a privileged 
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class.145 But we need to clarify that the outward forms of the lowly do not 
themselves represent ‘the universal heart’, but can be recognised as such 
through the power of imagination, which is attained by the growth of mind.146 
    I take this prophetic voice, which foresees hope in the common and lowly 
life and criticises the present, to be fundamentally religious. First, his song for a 
new world is associated with the eternity of God. Just as the poet can sense 
‘The sky-roof’d temple of the eternal hills’ in ‘communion’ ‘with God’ in 
Descriptive Sketches (ll. 551, 553), so in the Simplon Pass of Book VI, 
‘Characters of the great apocalypse’ are conceived as ‘the types and symbols 
of eternity, / Of first, and last, and midst, and without end’, which is resonant 
with the prayer of Adam and Eve in Paradise Lost, ‘Him first, him last, him 
midst, and without end’.147 This view of eternity also ‘alludes to the words in 
John’s first vision’ of The Book of Revelation: ‘I am Alpha and Omega, says the 
Lord God, who is and who was and who is to come, the Almighty.’148 Likewise, 
the song of a new world ‘seeks in man (and in the frame of life, / Social and 
individual) [. . .] the gifts divine that has been, is, and shall be’ (XII, ll. 39-44). 
‘The objects’ which are spotted on ‘a public road’ are ‘like a guide into eternity, 
/ At least to things unknown and without bound’ (XII, ll. 145-150). The grace of 
God is seen to be present in human life, and the objects on a public road are 
said to indicate a sense of eternity. At this stage the poet does not say that a 
new world will finally lead to eternity beyond our life on earth, but he clearly 
                                            
145
 The Prelude, Book XI, ll. 88. 
146
 The Prelude, Book XII, ll. 219. 
147
 Paradise Lost, Book V, ll. 165. 
148
 See, Paley, Apocalypse and Millennium, p. 172; the Revelation, 1. 8., ‘I am Alpha and Omega, 
the beginning and the ending, saith the Lord, which is, and which was, and which is to come, the 
Almighty’ (from the King James Bible). 
 293 
links it with the idea of eternity which is based on the Christian idea of the 
eternal God, ‘Was, Is and Shall be’. 
    Secondly, in the conclusion to the Prelude (Book XIII), the vision of 
Snowdon shows that the idea of a new world is deeply related to a feeling of 
the presence of God and eventually to the sense of eternity. The ascent of 
Snowdon was already the climax of Descriptive Sketches and was re-used in 
the Five-Book Prelude. There is no need to underline the significance of his 
experience of the ascent, seeing that he retained that privileged position for it 
in the Prelude of 1805; here it is the thematic resolution for, at least, the last 
half of the Prelude, dealing with the disillusionment of the French Revolution, 
the regained power of imagination, and a song for a new world.149 Further, as 
Hartman put it, ‘his special poetic mission is made absolutely clear by the 
power and character of the episode.’150 The Snowdon vision can be analysed by 
dividing it into three parts. In the first part (ll. 1-65), the poet describes his 
mystical experience of ‘the universal spectacle’ within the structure of nature. 
When light fell instantly like a flash upon the turf, he saw a huge sea of mist, 
being looked down upon by the moon in single glory. At the same time, like 
‘Characters of the great apocalypse’ in the Simplon Pass, he heard the roar of 
waters, torrents, streams innumerable, roaring with one voice. Just as he can 
find hope in the common and lowly, he also experiences the universal spectacle 
of the glory in nature. 
    This experience is followed by ‘a meditation’ in the second part (ll. 66-84). 
After the scene disappeared, Wordsworth has ‘the perfect image of a mighty 
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mind’. There is a striking similarity between this meditation and that of the 
Simplon Pass in the sense that both of them ascribe the great spectacle of the 
scenes to the workings of ‘one mind’ or ‘a mighty mind’. But the difference is 
that the meditation of Snowdon, unlike that of the Simplon Pass, explicitly 
identifies this mind with ‘the sense of God’, who ‘feed[s] upon infinity’. In this 
respect, for Wordsworth, the universal spectacle in nature, which can be 
recognised by the power of imagination, is essentially linked with the presence 
of God. After this meditation, Wordsworth re-visits in the third part (ll. 84-122) 
the area of the mind in terms of discerning truth and knowledge. He claims that 
higher minds have the power to acknowledge such thoughts, but nature is part 
of the power in that it ‘thrusts forth upon the senses’. He calls it ‘the spirit’ in 
which higher minds deal with all the objects of the universe. Interestingly, such 
minds are associated with God and eternity as they are ‘truly from the Deity’ 
and ‘fit to hold communion with the invisible world’. After the disillusionment of 
the Revolution, Wordsworth has attempted to create a new song of hope, and he 
is able to write his new song through the power of imagination. He does not 
stop there, but tries to relate higher minds with the presence of God and 
eternity. Why does Wordsworth want to link the mind with God and the invisible 
world? It appears that he is trying to lay a secure foundation for his vision by 
associating it with faith in God. He proposes five phrases beginning with the 
adverb ‘hence’ after referring to the relationship between higher minds and the 
Deity. Owing to that relationship, everything is secured; 1) the identity of such 
minds, 2) religion and faith, 3) sovereignty and peace and emotion, 4) 
cheerfulness in every act of life, 5) truth in moral judgements and delight in the 
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external universe. He describes this state as ‘genuine liberty’, and therefore his 
vision for a new world is based on the presence of God. 
    In the long run, his song for ‘a new world’, formulated by the internalized 
means, is fundamentally religious and involved in the external world through its 
prophetic voice. Further, it should be noted that it does not overlook the 
external reality of nature, but rather offers a deepened insight into it. In other 
words, for Wordsworth, this song unearths the intrinsic value of the natural 
world. First, the possibility of writing the song is dependent upon the growth of 
the mind and the power of imagination, but this internal faculty is affected by 
nature’s material aspects as the rural environment provides the poet with the 
sense of peace, calm, and restoration. Secondly, the song aims to discover the 
‘loftiest promises of good and fair’ from ‘life’s everyday appearances’, and it 
enables the poet to re-discover a deepened knowledge of nature. Accordingly, 
he now can see what he could not see before. Thirdly, nature maintains its own 
intrinsic value over and against the internal power of the imagination because 
the presence of God permeates the natural world. Given that the imagination 
becomes a key element in creating the song, it might be supposed that the 
meaning of nature is now defined by it. Thus nature would be a mere projection 
of the mind. Yet, the song develops a mutual relationship between the poet and 
nature in terms of the calm of the rural environment, his deepened insight, and 
the presence of God. The natural world thus plays a part in this song for ‘a new 
world’. 
 
2.3. The final vision of the universe 
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    Wordsworth suggests a final vision of the universe in which the whole 
universe, including the non-human world, will be integrated into the eternal city 
on the day of the Lord. Wordsworth’s thought about an apocalypse seems linked 
to the sense of eternity, and eventually his vision goes beyond this earthly life. 
On the one hand, in both visions of Snowdon and Book IX of The Excursion, he 
refers to the transformation of the present life in that the power of infinity is 
present in the whole universe, ‘moulding, enduing, abstracting, and combining 
the outward face of things’, and ‘That Paradise, the lost abode of man, / Was 
raised again; and to a happy Few, / In its original beauty, here restored.’151 On 
the other hand, in the conclusion of Ecclesiastical Sonnets, he claims that the 
universe will ‘reach the eternal City’ after being purified from ‘stain’ and 
‘pollution’.152 The Ecclesiastical Sonnets are concerned with the journey of the 
British Church or of an individual, struggling with the uncertainty of faith in a 
fallen world as well as yearning for political stability and a spiritual goal over 
and against mutability, decay, and paradox. And the natural world participates in 
the journey. The predominant image for this journey is ‘a Holy River’ which 
introduces, binds, and concludes the sequence in a circular pattern. 153  If 
Wordsworth sets out on a journey, seeking in the sonnet of Introduction ‘upon 
the heights of Time the source / Of a Holy River’, he completes the orbit and 
reaches ‘the eternal City’ in the sonnet of Conclusion. Although sequence 
characterises history, as being subject to mutability and a fallen state, the world 
is transformed into eternity beyond time and sinfulness. A sense of the eternity 
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of heavenly dwelling was mentioned in the previous chapter, but now we can 
show that the sense of eternity is contained in an apocalyptic vision.154 That is, 
stained human history can be transformed into a Heavenly Jerusalem through an 
apocalyptic power. 
    The last two sonnets of the Ecclesiastical Sonnets assert by the interaction 
between humankind and the natural world Wordsworth’s apocalyptic vision that 
the second coming of Jesus Christ will enable us to return to our lost Paradise. 
The first part of sonnet XLVI (Ejaculation) refers to the glory and light of God 
and the Son in ‘love divine’ 
 
That made His human tabernacle shine 
Like Ocean burning with purpureal flame; 
Or like the Alpine Mount, that takes its name 
From roseate hues, far kenned at morn and even 
 
The metaphors of glory and light applied to God and the Son are reminiscent of 
those of ‘a new heaven and new earth’, the holy city, the new Jerusalem’, in the 
Revelation: ‘the city has no need of sun or moon to shine on it, for the glory of 
God is its light, and its lamp is the Lamb. The nations will walk by its light’ 
(21:23-4). Intriguingly, the second part of the sonnet urgently asks people to 
‘seek the light’ ‘at the approach of all-involving night’. What is significant here 
is the interaction between humankind and the natural world in seeking the light: 
‘Earth prompts – Heaven urges’ [. . .] like the Mountain, may we grow more 
bright / From unimpeded commerce with the Sun.’ This intense atmosphere of 
seeking the light links with the dramatic transformation of the Holy River in the 
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next sonnet. 
    The first part of the last sonnet presents a picture of a closed future, ‘why 
sleeps the future’, with the image of ‘a snake, enrolled, coil within coil’, which 
reminds one of the Fall of Adam and Eve in Genesis. But ‘the Word’ – Jesus 
Christ – yields ‘power at whose touch the sluggard shall unfold / His drowsy 
rings’. Then we hear an urgent call in the imperative phrase, ‘Look forth!’, and 
the Holy River suddenly ‘bursts through the inert present into the apocalyptic 
future’:155 
 
[. . .] Look forth! – that Stream behold, 
THAT STREAM upon whose bosom we have passed 
Floating at ease while nations have effaced 
Nations, and Death has gathered to his fold 
Long lines of mighty Kings – look forth, my Soul! 
(Nor in this vision be thou slow to trust) 
The living Waters, less and less by guilt 
Stained and polluted, brighten as they roll, 
Till they have reached the eternal City – built 
For the perfected Spirits of the just! 
 
This second part has two main features of an apocalyptic vision. Though there 
are no turbulent symptoms like thunder and storms, the sense of suddenness is 
underlined by the contrast between the stillness of sleeping in the first part and 
the dramatic transformation in the second part. In particular, ‘the Word’ who 
begins to exert His ‘Power’ on ‘the sluggard’ refers to the second coming of the 
Lord, which brings about a transcendent transformation of ‘The living Waters’. 
Secondly, the relationship between the stream and human beings is important. 
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Obviously ‘the living Waters’ shape the apocalyptic vision, as human beings 
have passed upon the bosom of the stream, and at the same time they are 
transformed into ‘the perfected Spirits’ through the purifying power of ‘the 
living Waters, less and less by guilt / Stained and polluted’. At the beginning of 
the last chapter of Revelation, ‘the river of the water of life’ in the new 
Jerusalem is described as: 
 
Flowing from the throne of God and of the Lamb through the middle of the 
street of the city. On either side of the river is the tree of life with its 
twelve kinds of fruit, producing its fruit each month; and the leaves of the 
tree are for the healing of the nations. Nothing accursed will be found 
there any more. (22. 1-3) 
 
Whereas Coleridge points explicitly to the imperfection of both humankind and 
the non-human natural world by referring to the ‘future perfection’ of ‘all the 
creation’, Wordsworth appears to have in mind only the sinfulness of humankind 
as he mentions ‘the eternal City – built / For the perfected Spirits of the just!’. 
Nevertheless, the two sonnets show that the non-human natural world plays a 
crucial part in his apocalyptic vision of the day of the Lord. This is how the poet 
formulates his final vision of the universe, into which the non-human world will 
be integrated on the second coming of Jesus. 
    We have seen that Coleridge’s and Wordsworth’s thoughts on eschatology 
divide into three phases: 1) they showed an initial enthusiasm for the French 
Revolution, interpreting it as the Apocalypse and Millennium; 2) even after their 
disillusionment, they continued to seek the transformation of the world, through 
a transformation of the mind for Coleridge, and a growth of the mind and of the 
 300 
imagination for Wordsworth; 3) finally, they envisaged an eschatology with a 
final vision of the universe, including the non-human natural world. And it has 
been shown that each stage has an ecotheological perspective, in that nature 
plays a significant part. For Coleridge, in the first phase, nature participates in 
the apocalyptic and millennial vision of the Revolution through symbols and 
images of, in particular, its potential destructive power, and its power of joy and 
love in the new Heaven and new Earth; secondly, nature itself portrays the 
symbolic drama of the Apocalypse, creation, destruction and reproduction 
through its symbols and elements, and it enables the poet to experience the 
power of transformation and also helps him partly to attain the revolution of the 
mind; lastly, the non-human natural world will go through a transformation on 
the final Day as all creation ‘contain[s] the presentiment of its own perfection’ 
and it will be perfected through ‘the union of life with God’ on the Day. For 
Wordsworth, first of all, the lessons taught by nature enable the poet to 
confront the violence of the Revolution in terms of the dynamic of destruction 
and rebirth, and at the same time the ‘power of strong controul’ in nature is 
invoked for bringing about the apocalyptic transformation of the world; 
secondly, the restored power of imagination does not deny the value of nature, 
but re-establishes a mutual relationship with it to the extent that it enables the 
poet to re-discover a deeper knowledge in nature, which provides him with a 
sense of peace, calm, and restoration; however, the intrinsic value of nature is 
independent of human recognition, because the presence of God permeates the 
natural world; finally, the non-human natural world is integrated into a final 
vision of the eternal city through its interaction with humankind as shown by the 
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metaphors: light, glory, and the Holy River. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
    In this thesis, the central aim has been to investigate the concept of nature 
in the works of Coleridge and Wordsworth from the ecotheological point of view, 
and to suggest how Coleridge’s search for the unity of the universe and 
Wordsworth’s yearning for dwelling relate to recent developments in 
ecotheological theory. Ecotheology can thus help us understand their ideas on 
nature. Chapter 1 defined ecotheology in terms of three issues derived 
primarily from the works of Teilhard and Moltman, which were then used as a 
conceptual framework for examining the works of Coleridge and Wordsworth. 
These three issues were the interrelatedness of the universe, the independent 
sacred value of nature, and a cosmic eschatology. These three aspects of 
ecotheology attempt to locate the significance of nature in its relationship with 
humanity and God. Unlike ecology, ecotheology helps human beings to 
recognise the importance of nature and to develop an appropriate relationship 
with it by uncovering God’s involvement with the universe. Ecotheology thus 
forms a faith-based conceptual framework for communicating the intrinsic value 
of nature. 
    In proposing to use this framework for exploring the works of Coleridge 
and Wordsworth, a number of challenges arise, mentioned in the Introduction. 
Most of all, it is hard to define Coleridge’s and Wordsworth’s concept of nature. 
On the one hand the ecological and ecotheological readings of Romantic poetry 
pose a radical challenge to existing ways of understanding it by developing the 
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idea of nature, not as a mere projection of the mind, but as an independent 
material reality, and the unity of mind and nature. On the other the two authors 
formed their ideas of nature in terms of the creation of the mind as well as an 
independent material reality. For Coleridge, the landscape of nature offers the 
source of consolation and beauty, and later it becomes an object for scientific 
investigation into the idea of evolution. At the same time, he creates the 
meaning of nature through the power of the imagination as he can read the 
language of God in the beauty of nature and the sacramental language in the 
evolutionary process of nature. Wordsworth also develops a similar way of 
comprehending nature. For him, the natural environment plays a crucial role 1) 
in providing the harmony and joy of dwelling over and against city life through 
the soft, gay, and beautiful vale of Grasmere; 2) in creating the community of 
the living and the dead through the sense of beauty, soothing influence, and 
egalitarian aspect; 3) in being incorporated into church architecture in terms of 
beauty and caring. And yet, he expresses the presence of God in nature in the 
sense that sacredness is experienced in nature and the mystical experience is 
described as a ‘visitation from the living God’. 
    The meaning of nature is thus dependent upon both its external reality and 
the power of the mind, but it is hard to say to what extent the meaning of nature 
is subject to the power of the mind. Interestingly, both Coleridge and 
Wordsworth themselves were aware of the difficulties posed by the relationship 
between the mind and nature in terms of creating a meaning for nature. 
Coleridge was struggling with the passivity and activity of the mind or the 
external world and the mind, and in 1825 the poet refers to a battle between 
 304 
two rival artists, the Mind and Nature. Wordsworth underwent a process of 
growth of imagination. In his Preface to the Edition of 1815, Wordsworth 
provides a sense of the interactive relationship between perceiver and object: 
‘These processes of imagination are carried on either by conferring additional 
properties upon an object, or abstracting from it some of those which it actually 
possesses, and thus enabling it to re-act upon the mind which hath performed 
the process, like a new existence.’1 It may be questionable to what extent he 
preserved successfully the integrity of both the mind and the object in his 
poetry. Just as Coleridge acknowledges the tension between two rival artists, 
so, for Wordsworth, the interplay between the mind and an external reality, as 
Keith Thomas has put it, may ‘never reach synthetic closure’ but instead ‘the 
tensions reinstate themselves, prompting Wordsworth to favor by turns one 
tendency over another, or let the tension persist unresolved’.2  The debate 
about the relationship between them will continue within Romantic criticism, but 
it ought to be recognised that, even after the power of imagination became 
dominant in the works of Coleridge and Wordsworth, the idea of nature as an 
external materiality still continued to matter. 
    The possibility of integrating the two different dimensions of the meaning of 
nature can be found in the relational dynamic among humanity, nature, and God. 
Coleridge’s lifelong search for unity, which is based upon a monistic idea of God 
and the power of love in his early years, and an evolutionary idea of 
individuation in his later years, is fundamentally associated with the 
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interrelatedness among them. A monistic idea of God, derived from Spinoza’s 
philosophy and Priestley’s Unitarianism, is immanent as the universal Soul in 
the universe, and therefore it enabled the poet to see the universe as one in the 
sense that each individual, human and nonhuman, shared as a common source, 
the one substance and energy of God. Individuals are interrelated with each 
other through God in whom they move, live, and have their Being. Coleridge 
also imagined a close relationship between them by arguing that all should be 
loved because God loves all. After becoming interested in natural philosophy, 
he applied evolutionary thought to his understanding of the universe as unity in 
that, in the evolutionary process of individuation through polarity and opposition, 
man as the highest of the class has all the previous stages and forms in nature, 
through which man and the natural world achieve a sense of unity. Rather than 
focusing upon whether this scientific knowledge is valid or not, Coleridge uses 
it as a tool for articulating the unity of the universe. 
    Likewise, for Wordsworth, his on-going search for an ideal place for 
dwelling, which goes through three phases, is always based upon the 
interrelatedness between humanity, nature, and God. His idea of dwelling does 
not simply mean a place for living, but, like Heidegger’s idea of dwelling, is 
fundamentally associated with the idea of interrelatedness. It develops at the 
level of emotion and psychology and also as an environmental locality. In the 
first phase of dwelling in a cottage in Grasmere, the poet is struggling with the 
inhuman ways of city-life and the fears and anxieties of human mortality, but he 
experiences ‘one life’ in ‘one Household under God’ in Grasmere. He is able to 
discover an ideal place for dwelling here, in which he develops a mutual and 
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caring relationship between the dwellers and the natural environment within the 
context of God’s presence. Yet, this ideal place is still subject to human 
mortality in that he had to go through the death of his brother and two children. 
The second phase thus tries to embrace the dead in his idea of dwelling. He 
locates the idea of dwelling in the community of the living and the dead whom 
are bonded together by locality, emotion, and mortality, and, at the same time, 
this community represents a sense of interrelatedness on the grounds that it is 
dependent upon the religious notion of immortality in God, and the soothing, 
beautiful, egalitarian and epitaphic aspects of nature. Recognising that even this 
community of the living and the dead is subject to human mortality, Wordsworth 
eventually turns to the heavenly dwelling which is represented by the church 
buildings. The idea of church architecture symbolises an imperishable eternal 
home, and it bears a close relationship to God and nature because it is based 
upon the sense of immortality in God and nature’s various characteristics: 
beauty, purity, sacredness, care, consolation, hope, and metaphor for on-going 
journey. 
    This relational dynamic in Coleridge’s lifelong search for unity and 
Wordsworth’s on-going search for an ideal place for dwelling shows that the 
two poets are able to formulate their relationship with nature and God 
metaphysically as well as physically. They are affected by nature’s material 
reality but at the same time they produce the meaning of nature through their 
power of the mind. They are willing to experience the presence of God in the 
world but at the same time they are looking for God who is beyond the world. 
These physical and metaphysical dimensions of nature bring about the intrinsic 
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value of nature in terms of materiality, sacredness, and mutuality. If nature can 
maintain its own external reality insofar as its materiality has an influence on 
the power of the mind, the sacredness of nature is perceived by the power of 
the mind. For Coleridge, the monistic notion of God and the powers of 
imagination and symbol in the evolutionary process of individuation 
communicate the presence of God in nature. Wordsworth continues to express a 
sense of holiness in nature throughout three phases for the idea of dwelling. 
Both Coleridge and Wordsworth also build a mutual relationship with nature 
over and against a hierarchical relationship. While Coleridge attempts to 
promote the value of nature through the thought of being ‘reordained in more 
abundant honour’ and to categorize ‘both great and small’ into one same level, 
‘love’, Wordsworth indicates nature’s caring and egalitarian aspects. 
    With respect to this intrinsic value of nature, it was mentioned in Chapter 1 
that, in ecotheology, it is of great significance for nature to be included in the 
picture of the final salvation. Otherwise the understanding of nature can be 
susceptible to being anthropocentric. Intriguingly, both Coleridge and 
Wordsworth develop their cosmic eschatological visions, ones in which nature 
constitutes a significant part. When they interpreted the French Revolution as 
the Apocalypse and Millennium, nature is essentially associated with their 
eschatological visions through, for Coleridge, its symbols and images of, 
particularly, a potential destructive power, and its power of joy and love in the 
new Heaven and new Earth, and, for Wordsworth, the lessons taught by nature 
in terms of the dynamic of destruction and rebirth, and the ‘power of strong 
controul’ in nature in relation to the apocalyptic transformation of the world. 
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Even after their disillusionment, they continued to pursue their eschatological 
vision by communicating the transformation of the world through, for Coleridge, 
the transformation of the mind, and, for Wordsworth, the growth of the mind and 
imagination. In this stage, in Coleridge, nature itself discloses the symbolic 
drama of the Apocalypse, creation, destruction and reproduction through its 
symbols and parts, and it enables the poet to experience the power of 
transformation and also helps him partly to conduct the revolution of the mind. 
In Wordsworth, the restored power of imagination does not deny the value of 
nature, but re-establishes a mutual relationship with it to the extent that it 
enables the poet to re-discover a deeper knowledge in nature, which still 
provides him with the sense of peace, calmness, and restoration. Finally, in 
Coleridge, the non-human natural world will go through the transformation on 
the final Day on the grounds that all the creation ‘contain the presentiment of its 
own perfection’ and they will be perfected through ‘the union of life with God’ 
on the Day. Wordsworth integrates the non-human natural world into the final 
vision of the eternal city by involving it with the apocalyptic process of the Last 
Day in terms of its metaphors: light, glory, and the Holy River. 
    For the two authors, this intrinsic value of nature is fundamentally 
associated with their understanding of God, but it was not an easy task to hold 
that the representation of God in their works is religious, partly because their 
views on the idea of God changed and at the same time were neglected or 
misrepresented. First of all, it has been suggested that Wordsworth’s early 
religious aspects should not be regarded as a mere secularization of Christianity 
on the grounds that the definition of religion is not subject only to a set of 
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teachings and a belief system, but is also based upon the dynamic of personal 
experience. There is no doubt that Christianity had been seriously shaken 
during the eighteenth century by the force of reason in the Enlightenment, 
recent scientific discoveries, and the secularization in French Revolution.3 But 
we should not be mistaken about the aftermath of the historical process, which 
could bring about, to some extent, an unavoidable change to Christianity, but at 
the same time could not portray a completely different picture about it 
overnight. Intriguingly, James Deboo holds that the perceived chasm between 
‘orthodox’ and ‘secularising’ accounts of the religious reaction to the 
Enlightenment and the French Revolution is not as wide as is often assumed.4 
One of the most significant changes since the Enlightenment is the awareness 
of the authority of a subjective mind. In his article, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 
Kant described Enlightenment as ‘man’s quitting the nonage occasioned by 
himself’. 5  He argued that the crucial element in realizing Enlightenment is 
freedom, ‘a freedom to make public use of one’s reason’, and he coined the 
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term, ‘Sapere aude!’: have courage to exercise your own understanding.6 Kant’s 
definition of the Enlightenment entitles an individual to use his/her own reason 
in reinterpreting an established doctrine over and against an established 
authority. 
    Clearly, aspects of personal feeling came to have great significance in 
understanding religious experience during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. There had been the affective tradition in religion, particularly 
mysticism, in the past, and Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) may be one 
of the pioneering modern European thinkers who attempted to base religion on 
feeling. 7  He constantly uses the word ‘feeling’ to characterise religious 
experience throughout his major writings.8 In The Christian Faith, he famously 
writes: 
 
The common element in all howsoever diverse expressions of piety, by 
which these are conjointly distinguished from all other feelings, or, in 
other words, the self-identical essence of piety, is this: the consciousness 
of being absolutely dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being in 
relation with God.9 
 
Having discussed the importance of feeling within individual experience, in his 
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famous second speech in On Religion, Schleiermacher argues that ‘one can have 
much religion without coming into contact with any of these concepts’, such as 
‘miracles, inspirations, revelations’.10 Likewise, we have seen that the dynamic 
of feeling plays a key role in Wordsworth’s yearning for dwelling, based on the 
natural environment and the presence of God. In The Pedlar, Wordsworth 
explicitly and implicitly contrasts the traditional doctrine of Christianity with a 
mystical experience in nature by explaining how the pedlar, whose religion 
‘seemed self-taught, as of a dreamer in the woods’ (ll. 357), ‘feels his faith in 
the mountains’ (ll. 216). Above all, he identifies this mystical experience as 
‘visitation from the living God’. In addition, in Descriptive Sketches, the poet 
experiences a sense of sacredness and ‘power of strong controul’ in nature 
which is recognised as ‘great God’ later in the same poem. Even in his later 
poetry, Ecclesiastical Sonnets, soothing nature, not the traditional smoke of 
incense, is involved in the veneration of the cross in the Church. Hans-Georg 
Gadamer made an interesting comment that a ‘conscious break with tradition’ 
led in turn to ‘the creation of a new consciousness of continuity in the reaction 
to this break’.11 In this respect, it can be claimed that this act of feeling within 
an individual experience opens up a new way of understanding religion, which 
equally demonstrates the depth of religion in a different way over and against 
the traditional language of Christianity.12 
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    Secondly, I tried to uncover a sense of continuity in the change of 
Coleridge’s and Wordsworth’s religious views. They did not identify their 
religion with the established Church in their early years in the sense that 
Coleridge was a Unitarian and Wordsworth was looking for a power of 
transcendence in nature, a kind of nature mysticism. Whereas there is a 
discontinuity from the perspective of religion as an institution, a continuity still 
can be detected from the perspective of their personal understanding of God, 
which is basically involved in Coleridge’s lifelong search for unity and 
Wordsworth’s on-going search for an ideal place for dwelling. On the one hand, 
the Unitarian and Spinozistic ideas of God enabled Coleridge to attain a sense of 
unity, and Wordsworth was able to formulate the idea of ‘one Household’ in 
Grasmere through the experience of God in nature. On the other, Coleridge 
became aware of the problem of pantheism, but later perceived the presence of 
God in the universe without pantheistic suspicion through the relational notion 
of the Trinity. Along with the painful experience of human mortality, 
Wordsworth gradually moved to the idea of heavenly dwelling, which referred 
to the transcendence of God. Although their later views on God focused on the 
sense of transcendence, the immanence of God still mattered. In other words, 
they were able to grasp both the immanence and transcendence of God in their 
later years. Accordingly, their early and later years are not disconnected by 
two different Gods, but connected by the same God. In the former the 
immanence was important, but in the latter the transcendence was recognised. 
                                                                                                                                
(though perhaps I do not want one for myself.’ Edith J. Morley, Henry Crabb Robinson on Books 
and their Writers, 3 vols (London: Dent, 1938), vol. 1., p. 87. Quoted by Deboo, ‘Wordsworth and 
the Stripping of the Altars’, p. 331. 
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In spite of the gulf between two periods, a sense of continuity thus needs to be 
acknowledged in terms of their understanding of God with the two different 
dimensions. 
    Ultimately it has been argued that the works of Coleridge and Wordsworth 
relate to three pivotal principles of ecotheology. It is not intended to identify 
these ecotheological aspects in them with ecotheology itself, but to refer to an 
intimate relationship between them, in that their works offer considerable 
resources for further developing the concept of ecotheology. The historical gap 
between Romanticism and ecotheology has already been mentioned, but it has 
been shown that the two poets, in particular, Wordsworth, were already aware 
of ecological issues. Moreover, we have noted the chasm of two different 
disciplines separating literature and theology, but they were seen as being able 
to cooperate with each other and both Coleridge and Wordsworth explicitly and 
implicitly communicate their religious ideas through literary forms. Providing a 
substantial resource for ecotheology, this thesis sheds a new perspective on 
Coleridge and Wordsworth, which enables us to see our place in the universe 
and to recognise our significant relationship with the natural world within the 
context of God’s presence in creation. 
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